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ABSTRACT 
Before the outbreak of the Second World War Britain had suffered the 
consequences of uncontrolled industrial development - too highly 
populated built-up areas and indiscriminate sprawl of houses in the 
suburbs of industrial cities. Those associated with town planning called 
for comprehensive national planning. The state of city centres was the 
microcosm of the lack of such planning - insufficiency caused by traffic 
congestion and chaotic development of buildings of all kinds, and the 
absence of social amenities such as civic centres and public open spaces. 
But the local authorities could do very little, because, for one thing, 
there was no proper legislation dealing with such highly densely 
developed areas. 
The German air raids on several industrial cities in 1940 were 
thought to have provided a golden opportunity for the local authorities 
to set to the task of replanning city centres. The Government promised 
to make up the necessary legislation, and encouraged the blitzed local 
authorities to plan boldly and comprehensively. City centre replanning 
had become a symbol of post-war reconstruction as a whole. However, the 
blitzed authorities soon had to face a wave of pressure to subdue 
boldness in their city centre plans. This thesis, by exploring the three 
case studies of Bristol, Coventry, and Southampton, illustrates the 
development of city centre replanning in the 1940s, and explains why it 
failed to live up to some of the expectations of its supporters. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
The main part of this thesis is devoted to a description of how the 
replanning of the blitzed city centres proceeded in the 1940s. The work 
is arranged around three case studies of Bristol, Coventry and 
Southampton, which were the first provincial cities in Britain to suffer 
the German blitz in 1940. 
As the existing literature shows, British town planning had been 
abundant both in personalities and organisations armed with a variety of 
ideas. Their aim was to overcome the impoverished and insanitary 
conditions in the industrial cities and towns - the outcome of 
uncontrolled development since the Industrial Revolution - and to create 
more humane living standards. On the one hand an ideal society envisaged 
in Utopian terms, especially that of William Morris' News From Nowhere, 
had some spiritual impact on town planning. At the same time the 
prototype, in a more practical sense, was found in Robert Owen's projects 
for model industrial villages in 1816. Later in the nineteenth century 
some philanthropic industrialists made attempts to reproduce the rural 
atmosphere of cottage and village green in housing for their factory 
workers. In 1898 Ebenezer Howard gathered together these and various 
other ideas in his book Tomorrow. His suggestion was the 'Garden City' 
principle -a self-contained town of limited size where people could work 
near their home, live in helpful neighbourliness, and enjoy all the 
advantages of city and country life. This principle was vigorously 
advocated by the Garden Cities Association, which, with its energetic 
secretary, F. J. Osborn, became one of the strongest propaganda 
organisations in town planning circles. ' 
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What turned out to be particularly important to those associated 
with town planning was to call for more positive and comprehensive state 
intervention - national planning. The Government had offered only 
partial and ad hoc solutions to particular problems of the industrialised 
society. In the last century the main task had been to provide 
preventive measures against insanitary conditions in the older central 
areas of industrial cities. In this century it was to facilitate the 
provision of houses for the working classes on new estates, which sprang 
up in the suburbs of large cities. There was, however, a serious lack of 
machinery for comprehensive planning. First there was no central 
planning authority. Secondly, the planning legislation was inadequate 
both for the built-up central areas and for the suburbs where new 
development was taking place. These defects had produced too high a 
central density and traffic congestion in large cities and towns, and an 
indiscriminate sprawl of houses over the countryside. The state of 
London was especially appalling. 
The call for national planning was intensified in the 1930s by those 
groups and individuals associated with so-called 'middle opinion'. It 
was argued that a wide range of economic and social problems the country 
was facing should be tackled through collectivist means. At the same 
time the emphasis was put on the technocratic approach to the problems by 
making the best of the experience, knowledge, and opinion of experts. 2 
Gradually Governments had taken action. Particular attention had been 
paid to what experts thought to be the worst evil of contemporary society 
- the unbalanced distribution of industry and the industrial population. 
The south, especially London, had overgrown while the areas based on the 
old staple industries were in serious decline. In 1937 a Royal 
Commission was set up to investigate the question. Its conclusion, 
published in January 1940 (known as the Barlow Report) declared that the 
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unbalanced distribution of industry and industrial population were 
disadvantageous to national life. In order to check this, the country: 
needed positive Government action with a view to achieving a controlled 
distribution of industry and population based on national planning. 3 
The war prompted the Government to go further, for there would be 
the need for reconstruction after the war. Town planning had been 
expected to play a vital part in the pursuit of national planning. This 
was reflected, for one thing, in the appointment of Lord Reith as a new 
Minister in October 1940 to study the appropriate methods and machinery 
for dealing with the post-war reconstruction of town and country. His 
first decisions included the setting up of an experts' committee and of a 
panel of experts to examine various difficult subjects involved in town 
planning. The question that attracted particular attention was the 
redevelopment of built-up areas, especially of city centres. The German 
blitz on London and the congested central areas of several provincial 
cities in late 1940 had created an opportunity for comprehensive 
replanning by the local authorities. Bristol, Coventry, and Southampton 
were chosen by the Government as 'test case' survey cities in an attempt 
to identify what kind of legislation was needed for the planning of 
built-up areas. Moreover, Reith encouraged the blitzed local authorities 
to plan boldly. The replanning of city centres had become symbolic of 
post-war reconstruction as a whole. As Esher and Ravetz observe, the 
mood of the time was that experts, with confidence and enthusiasm, would 
create a totally new and better Britain. 4 Cullingworth's extensive 
research in the public records also demonstrates that the Government made 
considerable efforts, which led to the setting up of the Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning in 1943, and two Town and Country Planning Acts of 
1944 and 1947. Presumably by the nature of his work (an official history 
of the Ministry) he emphasises the importance of the part played by civil 
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servants in establishing the legislative framework of post-war town 
planning. 5 
However, in the studies dealing with the task of reconstruction 
under the war-time Coalition Government and Labour between 1945-51, city 
centre replanning has not been given the attention which might have be-n 
expected of such an important subject6 Among the general studies of town 
planning and the works of local history, fairly frequent reference has 
been made to the case of Coventry, because, as they often emphasise, the 
city's uniquely imaginative plan not only received a great deal of 
contemporary publicity, but has been regarded from technical viewpoints 
as a model of the post-war replanning of city centres.? What seems to be 
lacking here (not to mention the cases of other cities) is a detailed 
analysis of the essence of city centre replanning - the process by which 
consensus was sought in support of the local authorities' plans. 8 A 
close examination of this process shows, first of all, how diversified 
were the opinions as to the future city centre. This was true of all 
three plans. It also shows how the plans were affected by a variety of 
different opinions. The local interests and the Government departments 
concerned put various pressures on the local authorities so that their 
views were well represented in the final outcome. The three local 
authorities, however, responded to such pressure in quite distinctive 
ways. What made the difference in the authorities' responses were often 
such factors as the perception of the industrial future, the Council's 
financial situation, political conflicts among Councillors or Corporation 
officials about the city centre plans, and the attitude of the local 
public. 
By examining the replanning process in these three case studies, and 
placing it in a wider perspective, the thesis brings into relief the fate 
of that optimistic, early period when the idea of reconstruction stood 
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for a peaceful and fairer post-war world. This study also tries to 
contribute to an explanation of the change of direction which post-war 
reconstruction took after the Town and Country Planning Act of 1944 was 
passed. For ease of exposition, what follows is divided into three parts. 
The first part serves as an introduction to the main theme. Chapter II 
presents a brief account of the history of British town planning up to 
World War II. Chapter III analyses a variety of views about post-war 
reconstruction, laying emphasis on the Government's attitudes towards the 
opinions of the experts. Chapter IV describes the pre-war character of 
the three cities - Bristol, Coventry, and Southampton - from an economic, 
political, and social point of view. This chapter also comments on the 
destruction caused by the bombing of 1940-41. The second part examines 
the replanning process during the war with regard to Coventry (Chapter 
V), Southampton (Chapter VI), and Bristol (Chapter VII) respectively. In 
the final part the main point of discussion is how far these plins had 
obtained the recognition - especially the responsible Ministry's approval 
- by the time the construction of permanent buildings commenced at 
the 
end of the 1940s (Chapters VIII and IX). Chapter X makes a concise 
comparison of the three case studies, and presents some 
brief 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
British Town Planning up to World War II 
Town planning in Britain up to World War II was the history of a 
partial reaction to the problems of a rapidly urbanising society. The 
Industrial Revolution brought nineteenth century Britain a problem of 
overcrowded, insanitary, urban growth. This new urban growth prompted 
the state, which was increasingly intervening in other spheres, to 
introduce a series of public health measures in the latter half of the 
last century: towns and cities were watered, drained and sewered, lit and 
paved; building by-laws endowed local authorities with the power for 
controlling street widths, and the height, structure and layout of 
buildings. But this by-law control of British towns soon met another 
criticism, that is, the dreariness, ugliness and formlessness of the 
development it encouraged. Moreover, there emerged a new problem of 
suburban sprawl, with jerry-built houses spreading over the countryside. 
In Britain the town planning movement grew mainly out of the 
activities of practical housing reformers and social philanthropists. 
The social analyses of Charles Booth, General William Booth of the 
Salvation Army, and Seebohm Rowntree reinforced the case for housing 
reform. Model settlements set up by industrial philanthropists to 
improve the living standards of the working classes (and, of course, to 
attract labour) were influential, notably Cadbury's Bournville near 
Birmingham (1879), and Lever's Port Sunlight on Merseyside (188$). 
Around the turn of the century the National Housing Reform Council was 
founded which, embracing such prominent figures as H. R. Aldridge 
(active 
in the Land Nationalisation movement) and T. C. Horsfall (advocate of 
German advances in public works and municipal control over 
town 
expansion) campaigned for the introduction of town planning and 
for new 
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legislation relating to it and housing. Similar demands came from local 
government and professional associations such as the Association of 
Municipal Corporations, the Royal Institute of British Architects, the 
Surveyors' Institute, and the Association of Municipal and County 
Engineers. 
Yet the most influential propagandist body was the Garden City 
Association founded in 1899 as the immediate outcome of Ebenezer Howard's 
book, Tomorrow: a Peaceful Path to Real Reform (1898). As Ravetz 
summarises it, his idea was 
the deceptively simple one that all the 
advantages of town life could be maximised 
and all the disadvantages minimised if 
development were limited to towns of small 
and strictly limited size (32,000 maximum 
population). 
Encircled by the green belt, these towns would be self-contained for 
their food, natural resources and all the necessary services and 
industries. Any further expansion should be through the foundation of 
new satellite towns at a distance, rather than peripheral growth around 
the existing centres. 1 
Spreading rapidly in its influence and ideas, and gathering up more 
or less everyone who was concerned with housing and town planning, the 
Garden City Movement was also the strongest lobbyist in town planning. 
The pressure from them and various other bodies for new town planning 
legislation eventually resulted in the Housing and Town Planning Act 
1909. This provided local authorities with the new powers to prepare 
schemes for controlling the development of new housing areas. It was, as 
McAllister puts it, 'a great advance': 
henceforward no-one could regard housing as 
an isolated problem. The business of 
rehousing was seen at last - even if not very 
clearly - to be part of the general scheme to 
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provide a proper environment at work, at 
play, and in the home, for men, women and 
children. 2 
What the Act could deal with was, however, only land which was being 
developed or appeared likely to be developed. It made no provisions for 
the re-planning of the existing towns or badly planned areas. In any 
case because of the cumbersome administrative procedure few schemes were 
actually completed under the 1909 Act. 
**** 
While population growth slowed down after the First World War, urban 
concentration and suburban sprawl became more and more characteristic of 
Britain's physical fabric. People who were concerned with town planning 
were trying hard to react to these problems during the inter-war period. 
One new element to be reckoned with was the Modern Movement in 
architecture, especially the influence of a Swiss architect, Le 
Corbusier, on British architects. Like the Garden City Movement it 
decried the vast agglomeration of the existing towns and their 
formlessness. When it came to a means of solution, however, the parties 
differed in their approach, with the Garden City Movement favouring low- 
density 'cottages' and the Modern Movement advocating high-density flats. 
In Britain the main current in town planning remained the Garden 
City Movement, both in ideas and in practice. Howard's principles were, 
however, as Ravetz puts it, 'flouted, for the Garden City was immediately 
translated into "garden suburbs": low-density, well-planned and 
predominantly middle-class areas at the edge of existing towns', a 
pattern already well established in Victorian times. Only two Garden 
Cities, 'in the proper sense of the term', were founded, at Letchworth 
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(1904) and Welwyn (1920) but neither one came near to 'realising the 
radical social aims of Howard's theory'. 3 
Interwar legislation made hardly any impression on the crucial 
problems in town planning - suburban sprawl and central congestion. The 
Housing and Town Planning Act, of 1919, accepted the principle of state 
subsidies for housing, thus marking the start of the nationwide growth of 
council house estates. It also introduced an entirely new standard of 
Report's 
working-class housing, by accepting the Tudor Walter's stipulation that 
they should be built at the density of not more than twelve houses to the 
acre. Certain early council estates attracted favourable comments. But 
the cutting of subsidies in the early 1920s had an adverse effect, and as 
the inter-war housing boom went on, as Ravetz puts it, 'the graceful 
style of the earliest council houses, which clearly showed their Garden 
City origins, gave way to crudely utilitarian styles'. 4 
The housing boom during the inter-war period also gave rise to 
'ribbon development', i. e. a single line of houses on either side of a 
traffic road on the outskirts of a town. This occurred largely due to 
the private developer's desire to avoid road-making charges and the 
provision of services for which they would become responsible if the 
houses were built on new streets. The Restriction of Ribbon Development 
Act, in 1935, was supposed to check this phenomena by prohibiting, with- 
out the consent of the highway authority, the erection of any building 
within 250 feet from the middle of the road. But because of the 
liability of the responsible authority to pay compensation to any person 
whose property was injuriously affected by these restrictions, the Act 
failed to restrict ribbon development-5 
The last general pre-World War II Town Planning Act, in 1932, did 
for the first time extend planning powers to almost any type of land, 
whether built up or not. It also provided that the percentage of 
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'betterment' (the increased value of land consequent upon neighbouring 
development) which might be claimed by a planning authority as charges 
should rise from 50% to 70%. Yet the Act did little to remedy the 
situation largely due to three main defects of it, or of previous town 
planning legislation. 
First, pre-war planning was essentially on a local basis and it did 
not have regard to neighbouring areas, so that it did not influence the 
desirable geographical distribution of the population as between one 
locality and another. Although a number of joint planning committees 
constituted of several local planning authorities were set up, and many 
joint planning schemes were drawn up, these were essentially voluntary 
bodies with advisory but not executive powers. 
Secondly, the procedure to carry through a planning scheme to its 
final stage was protracted and complicated. It might well take three or 
four years to obtain final approval from Parliament, and if any amendment 
were sought, a repetition of the whole procedure would be necessary. 
The third and most serious defect was the fact that planning 
authorities had in most cases to pay compensation to owners affected by 
town planning schemes. In the case of undeveloped land, the local 
planning authority had to pay compensation to the landowner when a piece 
of his land was compulsorily acquired, or development upon it was 
prohibited. The landowner would receive compensation for the loss of 
potential development value in relation to the most profitable, rather 
than actual, use of land, even if it was unlikely that the land would 
be 
so developed. Moreover, the prohibition of development on one site 
usually resulted in the development value being merely shifted 
to other 
land. Thus, in general, the fear of indefinite liabilities 
for 
compensation for forbidding development made it 
impossible for planning 
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authorities to reserve adequate land for parks and playgrounds, for 
highway development, and for agricultural purposes. 
In highly developed urban areas, the kernel of the problem was the 
already high cost of land and consequent expense of such works as 
widening roads, providing open spaces, slum clearance, the provision of 
amenities and cultural facilities and of industrial necessities. In 
addition, acquisition in such areas involved payment for the value of 
existing buildings to be demolished, and compensation to a trader for his 
removal expenses and for disturbance to his business. Naturally the 
progress of slum clearance and redevelopment, if any, had been retarded 
and forced into piecemeal patterns, again to avoid the necessity of 
paying compensation. While planning authorities were almost always 
liable for compensation, they rarely benefited from the collection of 
betterment, for the procedure involved was again very complicated and 
difficult to apply. For one thing, the provisions for deferment of 
paying betterment until the increased value had been realised by a sale 
or new sale had rendered it almost ineffective. As Lewis Silkin put it 
in 1943, it was thus not surprising that at the outbreak of war only 
three per cent of the area of Great Britain was covered by operative 
schemes which had completed their last stage and received the 
final 
approval of the Ministry of Health, which was then responsible for town 
planning. 6 
**** 
The fact that there existed virtually no effective town planning 
in 
the country was accentuated by a serious economic and social problem 
of 
the inter-war period - the problem of industrial concentration. 
The 
inter-war period saw the continued drift of the population to 
London, the 
Home Counties and the Midlands where thriving new industries created 
12 
comparatively favourable opportunities for employment. At the same time 
such areas dependent on the declining old staple industries as the North- 
East and Wales were suffering from an actual decrease in the working 
population. 
This uncontrolled shift of industrial population caused a heavy 
burden on local authorities. In the newly developed areas, the 
authorities had to bear heavy expenditure for the provision of various 
necessary facilities. Moreover it was often impossible for them to keep 
pace with the enormous demand created by the rapid influx of workers. 
Among other things many working-class houses were put up by speculative 
builders which might be dearer to buy or to rent than the workers could 
well afford, or otherwise well below the desirable standard from the 
planning viewpoint.? 
In the depressed areas the authorities had to maintain such 
necessary facilities while they became less able to support the services 
for their communities because of the loss of working population. As 
there was no system of control over industrial population, planning 
schemes had to be decided by past experience in population movement, 
rather than their being related to an ideal pattern of population 
distribution derived from an idea of the national interest. 
The problems of the central parts of cities and towns became 
particularly acute in those areas where the influx of population was 
prominent. They were, as Abercrombie perhaps the most eminent town 
planner of the day put it in his plan for the County of London in 1943, 
overcrowded and out-of-date housing; inadequacy and maldistribution of 
open space; the jumble of houses, shops and industry compressed between 
narrow roads; and traffic congestion which caused both danger to life and 
limb and a waste of travellers' time. 8 As will be illustrated in Chapter 
III it was well realised that city centres were no longer capable of 
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properly achieving their economic and social functions as business, 
commercial, civic and cultural foci. 
The problem of uncontrolled industrial location naturally caused 
grave concern in the 1930s. This, and the vivid experience of the Great 
Depression of the early 1930s, led to a rapidly growing realisation of 
the need for national planning. Politicians, businessmen and academics, 
from left and right, emphasised the importance of national economic 
planning through such organisations as the New Fabian Research Bureau, 
the Next Five Years Group and Political and Economic Planning. 
The Government also started some action. Various advisory 
committees9 were set up and reports were issued dealing with the problems 
in London caused by an ever-increasing influx of population. In November 
1934 the Depressed Areas Bill was introduced to pass the Special Areas 
Act, with the view to attracting new industries to such areas as defined 
in the Act, namely, the north-east coast, West Cumberland, industrial 
South Wales and the industrial area around Glasgow. The lessons learnt 
over the following few years were that there was little prospect of the 
spontaneous action of industrialists bringing work to such areas, and 
that there was, therefore, a need for control of further industrial 
development "10 
At last in July 1937 the Government appointed a Royal Commission on 
the Distribution of the Industrial Population with Sir Montague Barlow as 
chairman. The Commission was asked to explore three questions: the 
causes of the present geographical distribution of the industrial 
population; the extent and nature of the social, economic, or 
strategical disadvantage of the concentration of industries and 
population in certain areas; and possible remedial measures 
in the 
national interest. In January 1940 the Report of the Commission was 
eventually published (Cmd. 6153). It explained that the concentration of 
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population in large cities was due to the growth of industry in those 
places. As for the disadvantages of such concentration, the Commission 
thought, that, 
It is not possible from the evidence 
submitted to us to avoid the conclusion that 
disadvantage in many, if not in most, of the 
great industrial concentrations, alike on the 
strategical, the social, and on the economic 
side, do constitute serious handicaps and 
even in some respects dangers to the national life and development, and we are of the 
opinion that definite action should be taken 
by the Government towards remodelling them. " 
The main objects of such national action should be, as the Report put 
it: 
a) Continued and further redevelopment of 
congested urban areas, where necessary. 
b) Decentralisation or dispersal, both of 
industries and industrial population, 
from such areas. 
c) Encouragement of a reasonable balance 
of industrial development, coupled with 
appropriate diversification of industry 
throughout the country. 
For this purpose the setting up of a new Central Planning Authority was 
essential. This Authority should collect and co-ordinate information 
relating to location of industry through research, inspect all existing 
and future planning schemes, and consider, where necessary, the 
modification or correlation of them in the national interest. It also 
should examine and formulate the policy to be adopted in relation to 
decentralisation or dispersal. Such decentralisation or dispersal might 
be achieved by means of garden cities or garden suburbs, satellite 
towns, trading estates, further development of existing small towns or 
regional centres, and other appropriate methods. 12 
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Thus it was now keenly realised that town planning should be part 
and parcel of national planning and not a matter of local affairs as it 
had been. Demand for a new Central Authority of one form or other was 
already rife in town planning circles, 13 while some new ideas and 
techniques also came out. ' It was felt to be high time that town 
planning ceased to be a partial and ad hoc solution to specific problems, 
and the first essential seemed to be determined Government action. 
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CHAPTER III 
Development of Reconstruction Policy during the War 
The case for national planning put forward by the Barlow Report was 
rather suddenly in the limelight as a result of the air raid on London in 
September 1940, followed by a series of heavy blitzes throughout the 
country. As Ian McCallum, author of the Architect Journal's weekly 
feature 'Note and Topics' in 1945 retrospected 
From the moment of this first big attack on 
London the interest of the British people in 
planning was awakened; it began in fervent 
hope and determination to use the damage done 
by bombs to good purpose. ' 
The interest was so keen that 
the mere contemplation of plans for the 
future was a stimulus to the almost back- 
breaking efforts of the present. Hopes 
loomed vaguely but largely behind the dust 
and smoke of war damage and the uncertainty 
of the struggle itself. 2 
In early 1941 the Minister responsible called for expert assistance in 
planning the future Britain, and also told the blitzed local authorities 
to plan boldly and comprehensively. But hopes were gradually 
disappointed as the Government adopted ad hoc solutions to the immediate 
problems. In particular, the faith in experts in making plans for the 
future Britain, which was characteristic of the time, did not achieve 
very much at the national level because of the Government's fear of 
drastic change and its preference for the conventional approach. As 
McCallum observed in 1945 
Four years have passed since this bold 
planning began; and now the scene has 
changed in a most significant way. The bold 
conceptions are being analyzed down into 
detail, and every detail is a cause of 
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controversy. The well-known slogan First 
Things First, that gained such currency in 
the planning period of the mid-war years, has 
quietly changed its meaning. It no longer 
suggests that the most important post-war 
aims should be firmly placed in the 
forefront, but that the most immediate ones 
are all we have time to consider. 3 
**** 
The realisation, of the 1930s, about the need for national planning 
gained even further currency as the war went on. Because of the 
devastation caused by enemy action, town planning provided a focal point 
for discussion about Britain's post-war future. In particular, public 
interest centred around the replanning of the heavily damaged city 
centres. During the winter of 1941-42 the BBC broadcast a series of 
weekly talks, entitled 'Making Plans'. In the first programme of the 
series, 'Bombed Out', a London manufacturer said 
The bombs are levelling our old cities. In 
my view there's got to be a lot more 
levelling, not only of old slums and 
buildings, but of outworn institutions too; 
and a better opportunity and more security 
for the majority than there has ever been 
before. That can only be achieved if private 
and sectional plans are fitted into national 
schemes, and judged in the light of the 
national balance sheet. ... 
The key to it all lies in a true democracy 
where all of us can play our part, both in 
making plans, and in carrying them out. 
That's what most of us are fighting for. 4 
Despite the talk of 'democracy', however, the most remarkable feature of 
those days was 'an almost boundless professional self-confidence among 
architects and others involved with town planning' 
-5 The Town and 
Country Planning Association (thus renamed in 1941, incorporating 
the 
Garden City Association and the Town Planning Association) remained 
the 
most active propaganda body. Its annual conferences 
became the hub of 
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discussion about contemporary thinking. 6 No less important were its 
publications such as The Rebuilding Britain Series' (started in 1941) and 
The Planning and Reconstruction Year Book° started in 1942, both 
including comprehensive material on a wide range of issues related to 
town planning. Another important body was The Royal Institute of British 
Architects [RIBA], the views of which were most comprehensively advanced 
in Rebuilding Britain, published for their Exhibition held in February 
1943.9 Although there were some contrary views of what was needed 
(notably in regard to the question of density) among various bodies and 
individuals, there was an agreed conclusion that drastic change would be 
inevitable in replanning the country, especially the areas which had been 
badly damaged by the air raids. 
The initial response of the Government to the blitz was swift and 
promising. In October 1940, Lord Reith was appointed as Minister of 
Works and Buildings, and was personally charged with responsibility for 
reporting to the Cabinet on methods and machinery for reconstruction of 
town and country after the war. In January 1941, Reith announced that 
the Government accepted a recommendation of the Barlow Commission to set 
up an Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, and Mr. Justice 
Uthwatt's Committee was accordingly appointed. On 26 February, Reith 
told the House of Lords that the Government accepted the principles of 
national planning and of a Central Planning Authority. He also announced 
the establishment of a Consultative Panel on Physical Reconstruction, to 
which he said he attached great importance, and the beginning of an 
examination of planning problems through consultation with experts 
outside the Government. Meanwhile Reith encouraged the 
London County 
Council to make a plan with the help of Professor Abercrombie, a 
leading 
figure in the town planning of the time. He also chose Coventry, 
Birmingham, Bristol and Southampton as test cases for the survey of 
the 
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existing planning system and of its future requirements. Most 
importantly he told them and many other severely damaged local 
authorities to plan boldly and comprehensively. 
The Uthwatt Committee published its Interim Report in June 1941 
(Cmd. 6291), just six months after its appointment. Its recommendations 
were: the adoption of the value of land at 31 March 1939, as the 
'ceiling' price for public acquisition; the setting up of a Central 
Planning Authority as soon as possible; and the definition of 
'reconstruction areas' (i. e. areas of substantial devastation caused by 
enemy action and such areas as were likely to be involved in consequent 
schemes of redevelopment) within which no building should be permitted, 
except under central licence, until reconstruction schemes had been 
prepared. On 17 July, Lord Reith announced that the Government accepted 
the Committee's recommendations in principle. It was also suggested 
that, pending the creation of the central planning authority in its final 
form, a Council of Ministers - consisting of Reith as chairman, the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, and the Minister of Health - would work 
together. In October Lord Justice Scott's Committee on Land Utilisation 
in Rural Areas was appointed to consider the rural repercussions of the 
Barlow Report policy of decongestion and dispersal. 10 
Behind the scenes intensive consideration was also being given among 
the civil servants to the question of replanning the devastated areas 
caused by enemy action. By the end of February 1941, the results of test 
surveys of four blitzed cities were brought to the Interdepartmental 
Committee of officials on Reconstruction. The chief inspector of the 
surveys pointed out that the most urgent requirements were: firm and 
more positive interim control to be conferred upon the planning 
authority; the preparation of outline plans by the local planning 
authority as soon as possible for the guidance of such control; and more 
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simplified and expedited powers of purchase which should apply not only 
to the sites of destroyed buildings but to areas of convenient shape and 
size capable of being redeveloped as units. " Consequently strenuous 
efforts were made to draft a Bill which would provide machinery for the 
reconstruction of devastated areas, and strengthen the planning system so 
as to prevent prejudice to reconstruction during the war and immediate 
post-war period. Of particular importance was the contribution of this 
Interdepartmental Committee's Sub-Committee (under the chair of T. D. 
Harrison, Ministry of Health) whose various reports 'formed the basis of 
much of the legislation which was eventually enacted in the early post- 
war years. ''2 By November 1941 the Harrison Committee had completed two 
important reports; the first one recommended the amending legislation 
extending interim development control over the country; the second one 
dealt with the provisions related to 'Reconstruction Areas'. 13 
Thus, by November, Reith was in a position to submit a draft Town 
and Country (Reconstruction) Bill to the Cabinet Committee on 
Reconstruction Problems. At the meeting of the Committee, however, the 
main discussion centred around the nature of the proposed central 
planning authority, which was a first indication of a lack of coherence 
in the Government's decision making. On 11 February 1942, Reith 
announced the Government's decision to establish a Central Planning 
Authority by transferring the planning functions of the Ministry of 
Health to a renamed Ministry of Works and Planning. A fortnight 
later, 
however, Reith, 'distrusted by Churchill', was suddenly replaced by Lord 
Portal, and 'had to content himself with token honours 
for the rest of 
his life'. 14 From then on the Government became more and more indecisive 
about important matters, and frustration soon mounted among experts 
at 
large. 
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Gone with Lord Reith was his Consultative Panel on Physical Recon- 
struction. Members had been recruited in early 1941 from various fields 
concerned with planning, and divided into groups to consider and advise 
the Minister16 on such questions as the recruitment and training of 
planners; the strengthening of planning control over the design and 
external appearance of buildings, with a view to providing a system of 
guidance on the technique of development; 17 the preparation of a series 
of maps, to similar scale and size, with a view to reserving land for 
agriculture and for recreational purposes or as national parks; and the 
study of industries suitable for location in country areas. 18 Meanwhile, 
the publication of the Uthwatt Interim Report and the preparation of a 
Town Planning (Reconstruction) Bill necessitated the setting up of a sub- 
group to consider special problems arising on the redevelopment of Recon- 
struction areas - the exercise of compulsory purchase power by local 
authorities and the method of redevelopment, redevelopment finance, and 
procedure and priority of work in such areas. 19 
Interestingly at its second meeting of 10 October 1941, the 
unofficial members in the group expressed views as to the undesirability 
of local authorities' large scale purchase, and redevelopment and estate 
management. They argued that the ultimate use of the purchase power 
would be unduly restrictive of private enterprise; 20 the probable cost 
of purchasing central areas would be so great as to be quite beyond 
the 
local authority's resources; 21 and if the local authority were allowed 
to 
acquire and develop considerable areas of land a local 
land monopoly 
might be created and the local authority would have a powerful vested 
interest in the use of the land. 22 Ministry officials were not 
impressed 
with such views. One thought that 'we are fighting 
for democracy and I 
see no reason why we should not give local authorities 
the chance to rise 
to their responsibilities'. 23 In the end it was agreed to 
have a further 
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meeting to consider this subject along with others. No further meetings, 
however, seemed to have been held. The curtailment of the reconstruction 
Bill obviously poured cold water on the initiative. As a Ministry 
official pointed out to one outside member, it would not include any 
provisions for Reconstruction areas; and, he continued, 'On this footing 
the fundamental questions which the Group discussed will not arise on 
this Bill'. 24 
The Panel itself soon ceased to function. Once Lord Reith was 
dismissed the officials of the Ministry became more and more cautious 
about any consultative machinery on such a large scale. Moreover, while 
the setting up of the new Ministry of Works and Planning would require 
the re-organisation of the structure and work of the existing staff, the 
officials also felt that it would take rather a long time to create a 
proper Central Planning Authority. As one official put it, they should 
'not get the complete picture' until they had created the new planning 
system. 25 When the Ministry of Town and Country Planning was eventually 
set up in 1943, one of the original members of the Panel sent a letter to 
the new Minister, which illustrates the frustration of the members. As 
he put it: 
A number of us were appointed as members of a 
Panel by Lord Reith. Has this Panel lapsed 
on the creation of the new Ministry? And if 
so will a new one be appointed? I was asked 
to serve on a committee to deal with the 
practical problem of redevelopment of city 
centres, and this made a start and promised 
to be useful. Is there any intention to call 
it, or a similar committee, together again? 26 
**** 
The publication of the Scott Committee's Report (Cmd. 6378) 
in 
August and of the Uthwatt Committee's Final Report (Cmd. 
6386) in 
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September 1942 intensified the voices urging the need for immediate 
positive action by the Government. Within the Ministry of Works and 
Planning anxiety about the effect on public opinion of any Government 
prevarication regarding the two Reports caused concern even before their 
publication. Arguing for the appointment of a 'top-notch' public 
relations officer, one official deplored the lack of positive publicity: 
The prime justification for the existence of 
a Ministry of Planning during the war is one 
of morale. Its success or failure must be 
largely measured by whether it is making 
people more hopeful of the future and thereby 
more willing to endure the present. The best 
way of achieving this is by producing visible 
results i. e., legislation. When this is 
impossible, the next best way is to explain 
why the results are not immediately 
forthcoming and to give assurance that 
everything possible is being done to produce 
them and that they will, in fact, be produced 
by the time they are really needed. 27 
Thus, for the moment, it was imperative for such a public relations 
officer to `attempt to persuade the public that only a short Bill on 
immediate emergency measures is possible this year [1942] and that 
implementation of Scott and Uthwatt [Reports] must wait over until 
later. '28 
The 
The publication of Uthwatt's Final Report was believed to remove, as 
Times put it, 'the last excuse for further postponement of official 
action in the field of national planning', 29 and its contents were 
discussed in the most heated way. Its main recommendations were: 
1. The State acquisition of development 
rights of all land outside built-up 
areas, with fair compensation on a 
"global" basis in ratio to market 
values at 31st March, 1939, such land 
to be compulsorily acquired at the 
residual agricultural value if and when 
needed for development, and to be 
granted to the developer on leasehold 
only. 
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2. Powers to be given to planning 
authorities to purchase war-damaged and 
obsolete or unsatisfactory built-up 
areas needing redevelopment as a whole. 
All land so acquired to be leased, not 
sold outright. 
3. A periodic levy of 75 per cent of the 
increase of annual site values of all 
developed land, whatever the reason for 
such increase of values, the values to 
be assessed quinquennially for rating 
purposes. 
4. An expedited procedure for compulsory 
acquisition of land. 
Not surprisingly there were strong objections to the Uthwatt proposals 
from the landowners' organisations. The National Federation of Property 
Owners, for instance, regarded the Uthwatt proposals as 'a fatal 
deterrent to individual initiative, thrift, and enterprise'. Claiming 
that the increase in the value of land was created more often by the 
enterprise of individual owners than by the State or local authorities, 
they argued: 
The majority of the proposals are aimed at 
avoiding the rights and freedoms of 
individuals, and would mean the creation of 
officials at whose mercy the property owner 
would be. Some of the methods suggested 
would cause a grave injustice to owners of 
property - dictatorship methods, in fact. 30 
At the other extreme the Labour Party argued that 'The Uthwatt Report 
does not appear to indicate a clear comprehension of the difficulties 
confronting Planning or Housing Authorities in urban areas'. The 
high 
cost of urban land, especially in the central areas of larger towns, 
had 
so far prevented local authorities from providing open spaces or working- 
class houses in such areas because of the fear of heavy rate 
burdens on 
their ratepayers. The only satisfactory solution was, 
they argued, 
'nationalization of urban land': 
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Once the land was nationalized, the State 
would either lease or sell to the Planning 
Authorities the land comprised in their area. These authorities would then be in a position to plan their areas as a whole, and develop 
them to the best advantage regardless of what 
any particular price of land had originally 
cost. ... In this way open spaces, housing, 
public buildings, commercial buildings, and industry could each be sited in the most 
suitable and convenient position. 3' 
Nevertheless, the Labour Party eventually conceded: 
if fairly and carefully administered, ... the periodic levy of 75 per cent of the increases 
in annual site values, with all its defects, 
might be accepted as a step in the right 
direction. It is a valuable though partial 
recognition of the principle that increases 
in site values, in a special sense, are 
created by efforts and activities of the 
community, and properly belong to the 
community. Whatever are the defects of the 
proposed levy, it cannot be impugned on the 
ground that it is injustice to owners of 
land. 32 
In 1943 criticism was focused on the Government's inability to 
announce its findings. In February 1943 the Town and Country Planning 
Act was passed, establishing a new Ministry to take over the planning 
functions of the Ministry of Works and to concentrate solely on planning. 
Then in July the Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act was 
passed to bring under planning control from an ' operative date' (22 
October 1943) land which was not yet subject to a scheme or resolution 
under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932. These measures, however, 
could not really tranquillise the widespread impatience. 
leader stated in October 1943 it had been suggested that: 
the difficulties [for the government] are 
centred upon the Uthwatt proposals for a 
national requisitioning of the development 
rights in land lying outside built-up areas 
and for an expedited and enlarged power of 
As a Times 
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purchase by local authorities of land within 
those areas. If so it will be wiser policy to 
publish the nature of these difficulties than 
to maintain an evasive official silence. By 
such a course opinion would at least be 
instructed, and the chances of a practicable 
solution advanced. Without some such 
disclosure the suspicion will grow that the 
reports have been successfully resisted by 
interests affected by them, and their 
effective consideration indefinitely 
postponed. Yet if the Uthwatt 
recommendations or some other proposals of 
equivalent effect were not essential as a 
preliminary to a reconstruction programme, 
the Government would have had no occasion to 
appoint the Committee at all. 33 
Just two days after this article, W. S. Morrison, the Minister of Town and 
Country Planning announced that the Government's findings on the Uthwatt 
Report were almost 'ready for presentation'. They were, however, the 
mere acceptance of the two pledges already given, i. e. the principle of 
the public acquisition of all land in reconstruction areas, and the 
principle of the compensation for the public acquisition or control of 
land not exceeding the standard of value at 31 March 1939. At the same 
time he underlined the fact that the Government had been determined not 
to be hustled into premature conclusions: 
There are some who speak as though the 
Uthwatt report was a panacea of all planning 
difficulties, as though all that the 
Government had to do was to say "Aye" and all 
the problems of the planning would then 
automatically sort themselves out like a 
complete jigsaw puzzle ... The Report 
does 
not pretend ... to provide a 
blueprint of all 
the administrative machinery which their 
solution would demand. 
The Government pledges on the Uthwatt report 
mean that the local authorities can go ahead 
with the making of plans, secure in the 
knowledge that they will have possession of 
the land in those areas. The planning 
authority of every district should now review 
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its resources and its needs into the stark light of 1943 and make a plan to balance 
them. 34 
**** 
Meanwhile the Uthwatt proposals had been considered by a sub-committee of 
officials of various Departments, again under the chair of T. D. 
Harrison. " At the end of 1942 an official of the Ministry of Works and 
Planning on the committee, reporting to L. Neal (Deputy Secretary of the 
Ministry) on the progress of its work, said: 
In this connection, I should like to raise 
once again the urgency of the contemplated 
investigation into Coventry and other 
"blitzed" areas. At their meeting yesterday, 
... the committee were informed, forcefully, 
by the representative of the Valuation 
Department that the cost of land acquisition 
in reconstruction areas will reach 
astronomical figures. If this is so it is of 
the highest importance that before we 
introduce the Reconstruction Areas Bill in 
May we should have the broad measure of the 
problem and know the lines on which it is 
proposed to deal with the matter. 36 
Within the Ministry of Works and Planning, the setting up of a Blitzed 
Cities Committee had been contemplated and, by September 1942, the scope 
and nature of its task was already drafted by Neal, but had been post- 
poned pending the establishment of the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning (hereafter MOTCP). Now in February 1943, Neal urged Whiskard, 
Secretary of the Ministry, to take up the matter immediately. Problems 
which the local authorities had to face in the reconstruction of the 
central areas of the blitzed cities would 'transcend local interest, and 
constitute one of the earliest - and most formidable - task of national 
planning': 
This is a matter in which not only the 
population of the cities concerned, but the 
public generally, may be expected to take a 
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keen interest. They would probably not be 
content to leave to a Government Department 
the task of formulating the principles to be 
followed. It is therefore suggested that a 
small committee, so constituted as to command 
public confidence, should be appointed, and 
should be asked to advise, within a short 
period, on the problems and the programme of 
the reconstruction of central urban areas. 37 
Whiskard was somewhat concerned about the publicity which would be 
inevitable given a formal committee. Accordingly the Minister held a 
meeting with the Parliamentary Secretary, Whiskard, Neal and Pepler, and 
it was agreed that the Minister would invite a small team of unofficial 
advisers to assist his officers in making a study of the matter. 38 
The Advisory Panel on Redevelopment of City Centres was appointed in 
May 1943.39 Its terms of reference were: 
To examine the main planning issues involved 
in the redevelopment of city centres which 
have been devastated by bombing, to redefine 
and measure the problems of finance and 
organisation connected therewith and to set 
out the relevant considerations on which 
central and local Government policy in regard 
to such redevelopment should be based. 40 
It was pointed out that the Panel's problem could be solved 'only by 
visits to some of the cities concerned and by discussions with the 
responsible people on the spot'. " Accordingly seven cities were chosen 
(Southampton, Portsmouth, Coventry, Swansea, Bristol, Hull and Plymouth) 
and visited by the Panel by the end of 1943. In selecting cities, 
they 
excluded ' on the one hand, the "conurbations" such as 
London and 
Liverpool', for they had their own quite special problems. On the other 
hand, 'the medium sized or small towns such as Exeter and 
were also excluded on the understanding that 
Canterbury' 
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the general run of our findings can be 
applied broadly to other cities and towns 
whose centres have been heavily damaged. it 
should be remarked, however, that the cities 
chosen by us illustrate devastation in its 
severest form. 42 
Just before the Panel submitted their report to the Minister of Town and 
Country Planning in August 1944, the Government's answer to the Uthwatt 
proposals finally appeared in June as the White Paper on Land Use (Cmd. 
6537) and the Town and Country Planning Bill. The former, mainly 
concerned with Uthwatt's Development Rights Scheme, did not contain the 
settled policy of the Government, but presented some modified thoughts on 
their own suggestions for public discussion to discover what measure of 
support they might command. It was the latter, which provided the 
measures for the acquisition of land for the purpose of redeveloping the 
air raided and obsolete central parts of towns, that could and had to be 
settled urgently. There were difficulties in reaching agreement with all 
concerned. After lengthy debates at all levels and consequent amendments 
the Bill eventually received the Royal Assent in November 1944.43 
Dissatisfaction was, however, rife, especially among the local 
authorities concerned. A 1939 'standard' instead of 'ceiling' basis of 
compensation, for instance, would prevent local authorities from buying 
much land at less than 1939 prices. On the other hand, the pressure from 
many Conservative politicians who did not like the idea that landowners 
could get no more than 1939 prices for compensation had led to a supple- 
mentary payment to all owner-occupiers up to 30 per cent of the 1939 
value of the payments. Government assistance under the Act was a grant 
equal to the loan charges for two years on the cost of purchase and 
leaving of land in war-damaged areas, such grants possibly being extended 
to ten years, after which time it was assumed that the Reconstruction 
Scheme would be self-supporting (i. e. the local authority's receipts 
from 
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the scheme would be sufficient to meet the outgoings). Many local 
authorities regarded this as a too optimistic view since their schemes 
would usually provide ample open spaces and other amenities which would 
not produce rate revenue. 
The Minister of Town and Country Planning claimed that the new Act 
showed 'the welcome green light to those who wanted to get on with the 
rebuilding of our bombed towns and cities'. 44 But, as The Times pointed 
out, the general feeling was that the only legitimate excuse for the 
enactment of such imperfect measures was that 'to delay further the 
legislative remedy for the war-damaged areas is a choice which cannot 
seriously be made'. 45 The criticism from socialists was much more acute. 
As G. D. H. Cole and R. Postgate put it, for instance, the Uthwatt 
proposals had been 
hotly opposed by landowners and anti- 
socialists, and after long delays were 
finally rejected by the Government without 
any alternative plans covering most of the 
ground being put forward in their place. As 
the war advanced it became increasingly plain 
that any measures of post-war reconstruction 
which in any way limited private property 
rights or proposed an extension of public 
ownership would be strenuously resisted by 
vested interests both in and outside 
Parliament and by the main body of 
Conservative and capitalist opinion. 46 
The provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1944 were 
in fact 
no less disappointing to members of the Ministry's Advisory 
Panel on 
Redevelopment of City Centres. Originally it was hoped that the 
Panel 
would help the officials of the various Government Departments 
in drawing 
up the Town and Country Planning Bill. The Panel emphasised, 
from their 
observations on the heavily damaged towns, that any 
financial arrangement 
between the Government and local authority should make 
it possible for 
local authorities to choose such plans and programmes as would 
secure the 
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long-term interests of the community at large, rather than those that 
might, at the expense of proper planning, most quickly restore local 
rateable values. 47 Consequently their recommendations in regard to 
Government financial assistance for the redevelopment of city centres was 
fairly generous. Under their scheme Central Government would make good 
the local authority's net deficit on its Reconstruction revenue for 
twelve years. If a local authority's reconstruction accounts for any 
year should show a net deficit, Central Government would provide an 
advance of that amount. At the end of twelve years, should there be 
advances still outstanding, Central Government would, as a justifiable 
national charge, cancel them. 48 Moreover, while it was practically 
certain that there would be a short-term net deficit during the first 
twelve years, it was also possible that there might in certain instances 
be a longer-term net deficit too, because the Reconstruction plan would 
often justifiably necessitate a destruction or shift of old site values; 
the time taken over rebuilding together with high buildings costs would 
make it difficult to re-establish new values; and there might be other 
unfavourable factors outside the control of local authorities (e. g. the 
reconstruction scheme of itself might not prove fully successful in 
attracting new development, or the town itself might at some future time 
decline in prosperity). 49 For this reason it would be necessary to 
consider methods of continued Government financial assistance 
in the 
long-term period, 50 and of establishing organisations to secure maximum 
speed of reconstruction, both of which were virtually ignored 
by the 1944 
Act. 51 
The Panel's elaborate consideration, however, did not really exert 
any particular influence on the provisions of 
the Town and Country 
Planning Bill. In early 1945 an 'abridged' version of the Panel's 
Report 
was sent to about 60 local authorities, including 
the seven cities which 
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it visited, as a private circulation. There was no mention of the 
unofficial members, the seven cities chosen preserved anonymity, and any 
part related to their own recommendation about the twelve-year financial 
assistance had to be omitted as superseded by the 1944 Act. In reply to 
the Chairman of the Panel, who proudly claimed that the report had been 
well received, 52 one outside expert member said: 
I am so glad that the Report has been 
considered useful but it makes me regret that 
it could not have been sent out in its 
original form with the backing of legislation 
- it would then, I think, have been of real 
service. 53 
Thus towards the end of the war it was quite clearly felt that bold and 
comprehensive planning with the aid of experts, promised by the Govern- 
ment in the early days of the war, was now withering away. One obvious 
reason for this was the Government's retreat from a bold and more inter- 
ventionist stance to a concern with economising and protecting private 
interests. On the other hand, the Government did not really lay any 
particular importance on experts, as the cases of Lord Reith's 
Consultative Panel and the Advisory Panel of the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning clearly indicate. At the same time these experts were, 
apart from their hostility to the present state of affairs, radically 
divided about what was needed, and could not offer the public consensus 
about the ideal society of the future. There was certainly conflict 
between modernism and traditionalism among the architects and planners 
which may have inhibited their capacity to mobilise public opinion 
on 
these issues. Some experts on the Consultant Panel, who were themselves 
the officers of the local authorities, expressed 
their doubt of the 
competence of local authorities to undertake the redevelopment 
(see pp. 
6-7). Although these experts became fairly confident 
in the ability of 
local authorities by the time they sat on 
the Advisory Panel on 
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Redevelopment of City Centres, the essence of their proposals did not see 
the light of day due to the Government's, if not the Ministry's, neglect 
of them. Because of the highly technical nature of town planning, the 
failure of experts to consolidate their divergent views more often 
resulted in the fading-out of interest on the part of the public, rather 
than their positive participation in the decision-making process. Not 
surprisingly experts were now afraid that the enthusiasm among the 
public, once looming so large, was almost disappearing. As one authority 
put it, town planning was 'for the mass of the people ... still something 
shapeless and remote from their daily lives ... There is no reason why 
discussion of planning issues should not become at least as widespread 
and as intelligent as the recent discussions on Beveridge. '54 
The local authorities had to replan their blitzed city centres under 
such difficult and indeed rather unpromising circumstances. There were 
also other sets of factors to be reckoned with at the same time, such as 
the quick restoration of the loss of the rateable value destroyed by 
enemy action; the towns' industrial and demographic future; the local 
authority's ownership of land as against the concerns of certain private 
interests. As these factors had close relevance to the town's economic, 
social and political characteristics and the effect of 
devastation caused 
by air raids, it is now necessary to make a close examination of 
these 
points with regard to the three case studies 
in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Pre-war Character of Bristol, Coventry, and Southampton, 
and the extent of destruction caused by enemy action 
This chapter depicts the character of the three cities - Bristol, 
Coventry and Southampton - from the economic, social, political and town 
planning points of view. Then it shows the extent of destruction caused 
by the German blitz, such as damage to property and loss of rateable 
value. 
Special mention is made of the pre-war re-planning of the central 
area of Coventry, where the question had been exceptionally hotly 
discussed. This will show why comprehensive re-planning of the city 
centre was not possible at this time. At the same time it will suggest 
why Coventry could later adopt with such determination and speed the City 
Architect's bold plan for a new city centre after the blitz of November 
1940. 
**** 
Bristol' 
Situated on the River Avon about five miles from the Severn estuary, 
Bristol had grown to be a world port, the main city of the west of 
England, and the centre of commercial activity and of University 
life. 
At the beginning of this century its population was already well over 
300,000. By 1939 it had grown to beyond the 400,000 mark. 
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Table IV. 1 Growth of Population 
Year Bristol %** Southampton %** Coventry 
1901 328,945 83 104,824 60 69,978 42 
1911 357,048 90 119,012 68 106,349 64 
1921 376,975 95 160,994 91 128,157 77 
1931 396,918 100 176,025 100 167,046 100 
1938 * 415,500 105 *180,100 102 +229,900 138 
1939 * 419,200 106 *181,400 103 +224,267 134 
(Sources: Census and * Treasurers' Report s, 
+ Annua l Reports of the Medical Officer of Health. 
** 1931 = 100 
The port was one of the chief centres of maritime trade in the 
country, and served a very large area, including the western and south- 
western counties, Birmingham and the Midlands. The population which it 
served amounted to twelve and a half million within a 100 mile radius. 
The trade of the port was mainly one of imports of all kinds, such as 
grain, bananas, tobacco, oil and metals, dairy products and seasonings. 
Yet Bristol was not dependent exclusively on its port. The 
industries of Bristol were remarkable for their variety, there being 
about 300 different types in all. The industries which employed a large 
number of workers included building and contracting, general engineering, 
vehicle and aircraft building, transport and communication, paper and 
printing, distributive trades, and food, drink and tobacco. Government 
service (national and local) and professions and entertainments were 
other important sources of employment. Bristol was therefore to some 
extent immune from those consequences of depression experienced in other 
centres where there was a dependency on one or two staple industries 
only. 
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Politically the local Labour Party obtained for the first time a 
majority on the City Council in 1937. In the following year, however, 
the Citizen Party (a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals) wiped it 
out. 2 Consequently the two parties, with 56 representatives each, were 
to share power between them for the duration of the war. 
As the city grew bigger, there was considerable building activity, 
especially in the interwar period. A total of 36,000 houses was built 
during these years, 14,000 of them by the Corporation. The City Council 
was also well advanced in planning outer areas - whether inside or beyond 
its formal boundaries. 
In March 1923 the City Council set up a Town Planning Committee and 
appointed B. F. Brueton as executive Planning Officer to act under the 
supervision of the City Engineer. The new Committee soon invited the 
neighbouring local authorities to form the Bristol and Bath and District 
Joint Regional Planning Committee. The Joint Regional Planning 
Committee, although disbanded by the time the war broke out, had 
published in 1930 a Regional Survey and Plan prepared by Professor 
Abercrombie and B. F. Brueton. When the war broke out the Corporation had 
five statutory schemes comprising 95,765 acres, of which more than 78,862 
acres were outside the city. 3 
The planning machinery of the Council had also been strengthened 
during the 1930s. In June 1932 Marston Webb was appointed as the new 
City Engineer and was responsible for the preparation and supervision of 
town planning schemes. In May 1938 J. Nelson Meredith was appointed as 
the City Architect, to carry out the whole of the architectural require- 
ments of the Corporation. He was also asked to collaborate with 
the 
Engineer in the preparation and administration of town planning schemes 
where it was necessary to take into account the 
design of buildings. 4 
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When it came to the replanning of the central area, however, there 
was no comprehensive planning scheme. The city centre served as a 
regional centre of commercial and cultural activities with long 
traditions. Its hilly topography had created, however, a difficult 
situation. As factories and commercial premises concentrated in the 
limited flat spaces, the central area became very congested, and there 
were no extensive open spaces, only small patches scattered all over it. 
The main shopping area was along a west-east route following Wine 
Street and Castle Street. This area was closely confined by the two 
rivers, the Avon to the south and the Frome to the north, which were only 
150 yards apart. Consequently, development there had been extremely 
dense along very narrow and tortuous streets. 
Traffic congestion was also acute in the central area. Bristol was 
the principal focus of all traffic within its region, and was the meeting 
place of ten first-class radial roads. These roads amalgamated within 
the city and concentrated most of their traffic on Bristol Bridge and The 
Centre (the space provided by the covering up of the river Frome). There 
had been various attempts to relieve the problem. Among the schemes 
tried was the construction of the southern part of an inner ring road 
known as Redcliffe Way and Temple Way. 
In 1935 a scheme to create an 11-acre civic centre in the College 
Green area was ratified. 5 When war broke out the construction of a 
dignified neo-Georgian Council House (one of the last products of the 
great town hall and civic building boom of the interwar period) had 
been 
well advanced. Generally speaking, however, there was not much 
enthusiasm for the comprehensive replanning of the central part of 
Bristol, as existed in Coventry and, to some extent, 
in Southampton. As 
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we shall see later, it was the experience and the opportunity provided by 
the German blitz that inspired the serious consideration of the matter. 
**** 
Southampton6 
Southampton in 1939 was a town of 180,000 inhabitants. It ranked 
first amongst British ports for passenger traffic and fourth for freight 
trade, and was often called the 'Gateway to England', being located 
within easy and convenient reach of London, the Midlands and the West. 
Not surprisingly its main industries were shipping, shipbuilding and 
repairing, and other ancillary industries included the manufacture of 
cables, growing and supplying farm and garden seeds, tobacco, margarine, 
and flour mills. 
Politically the Ratepayers' party (a coalition of Conservatives and 
Liberals) had been the majority party on the Borough Council. As a 
result of the 1938 local elections, their representatives were 12 Alder- 
men and 28 Councillors, while the Labour Party had 25 representatives - 
two Aldermen and 23 Councillors, although Labour polled 296 votes more 
than the Ratepayers' party in that election. (19,857 to 19,561)' 
Southampton's rapid growth took place with the development of the 
docks. The Old Docks were begun in 1838, the railway from London arrived 
in 1844, and so prompted a rapid increase in the transatlantic shipping 
trade. In 1934 the New Docks were opened, forming part of the Extension 
Scheme of the reclamation of 407 acres of tidal mudland 
in the bay of the 
River Test, where many firms became established. Between 
1918 and 1938 
more than 18,700 houses were built, of which 
the Council were responsible 
for 4,450. 
Yet towards the end of the 1930s there was a growing concern 
about 
the industrial future of Southampton. Councillor 
Matthews, deputy Labour 
44 
leader and acknowledged expert on town planning, argued in 1938, for 
example, that the fact that over one third of Southampton's workers were 
directly engaged in shipping and allied services made it too dependent on 
shipping which was in its turn too vulnerable to domestic and world 
trade. He also pointed out that the number of shipping workers had 
fallen from 17,000 in 1930 to 11,000 in 1938, not only because of the 
world-wide depression but also because of rationalisation in the 
industry, which was expected to continue for years to come. In con- 
clusion he urged that it was 'in every way desirable that a variety of 
industrial development should be encouraged in Southampton. '8 
Southampton's importance as a port had made its central area a 
commercial magnet of some consequence. The principal shopping street ran 
from the Civic Centre down to the Town Quay, and consisted of two 
sections, separated by the Bargate, known as Above Bar and High Street. 
The central area had developed with this street as its main north-south 
axis, in a form of 'internal ribbon development', measuring a mile long 
and a quarter mile wide. 9 
Within the central area the outstanding features were the new Civic 
Centre, the open spaces, and the remaining parts of the ancient walled 
town. The town was exceptionally blessed with extensive town parks 
stretching for half a mile through the heart of the central area, while 
within walking distance of it lay the Commons of 375 acres, still thickly 
wooded. 
The new Civic Centre was another great asset to the town. Its 
origin dated back to proposals in the late nineteenth century 
for a Town 
Hall to replace the old Guildhall over the Bargate and the old municipal 
offices. After years of prevarication the Council eventually approved 
in 
1928 a design by the London architect, Berry Webber and 
between 1932 and 
1939 a complex of four blocks of buildings were erected: 
municipal 
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offices and Council Chambers; Law Courts and Police Offices; the 
Guildhall; and a General Public Library, Art Gallery and the School of 
Arts and Crafts. It was regarded as 'one of the best examples of inter- 
communicating civic buildings' in the country. '° 
Southampton's lengthy history had left its mark on the town in a 
varied collection of antiquities and historical remains. One fine 
example was the Bargate, which had formed the principal entrance on the 
north and was now preserved as an interesting feature in the middle of 
the main street. Its presence worsened, however, one of the serious 
problems in the central area - the traffic congestion in Above Bar - High 
Street. The Bargate interfered with the flow of traffic as it had only 
one arch for vehicles, and this was so narrow that only one line of 
traffic could pass through at a time. 
Although this specific problem was partially relieved in 1938 by the 
City Council's scheme for the construction of two roadways around the 
outside of the Bargate, the traffic congestion in Above Bar - High Street 
continued to deteriorate. The crux of the matter was that this was the 
most direct route to and from the Docks, and at the same time the primary 
business and shopping street. Dock workers and passengers or visitors to 
and from the liners passed through it, while numbers of shoppers and 
businessmen tended to park alongside the kerbline leaving only the 
central portion of the roadway available for through traffic. 
This problem was especially serious at the north end of Above Bar, 
i. e. at the junctions with Commercial Road and Civic Centre - 
New Road, 
where the congestion was worsened by the stream of cross traffic 
between 
the east and the west, and through traffic from the north. 
As the volume 
of traffic increased due to the opening of New 
Docks and the reclaimed 
land, the congestion became more and more serious-" 
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The question of traffic congestion was much considered in the 1930s 
in connection with the replanning of the lower part (i. e. below the 
Bargate of the town). As the retail zone had extended northwards since 
the late nineteenth century, so that Above Bar had become outstandingly 
successful, High Street had declined in importance, and warehouses were 
interspersed with retail shops. 12 In 1934 the local Civic Society and the 
Chamber of Commerce presented reports on the question to the City 
Council. With the rejuvenation of business life in the area below 
Bargate as the primary object, they argued for not only the completion of 
the Bargate Scheme, but also the provisions of markets and car parking, 
the building of flats for the Dock workers, and a new north-south road 
from the Old Docks parallel to Above Bar - High Street. 13 
Planning problems in the central area had been brought to light in 
this way, and they had been to some extent considered by the City Council 
before the war broke out. For instance a preliminary plan for an 
alternative north-south road to Above Bar had been under consideration in 
the late 1930s. 14 There were, however, serious defects in the planning 
machinery of the local authority. At the municipal level there was not 
even a full Town Planning Committee on the Borough Council, nor was there 
an independent Town Planning Department. And the town planner 
to the 
Corporation, who was anyway only an assistant to the Borough Engineer, 
had not been given full authority or responsibility 
in the matter. As we 
shall see later, it was not until the German 
blitz destroyed the town's 
central area that the redressing of these administrative 
defects was 
seriously considered by the Borough Council. 
**** 
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Coventry13 
Coventry in the late 1930s was both a mediaeval town, with many 
historic buildings and streets, and a rapidly expanding modern industrial 
city, producing a wide variety of goods - from motor vehicles and aero 
engines to artificial silk. It had a long and varied history of crafts- 
manship and industry. From the 14th to the 16th century it was the chief 
centre for woollen manufacture in the Midlands. Then it turned to silk 
ribbon weaving until the 1860s, and watch making until the 1880s, both of 
which fell into decay because of foreign competition. Its very rapid 
industrial expansion, however, started around the turn of the century 
with the coming of motor vehicle production, following the rise of the 
cycle industry in the 1890s, which soon became the principal trade of the 
city. There were added to this the aircraft industry, machine tools, 
rayon, radio and telephone equipment. The population grew at a very fast 
rate as its thriving industry and relatively high wages attracted 
immigrants from various parts of the country. 
Within a decade up to 1938 nearly 26,000 houses were built, of which 
about 22,500 were erected by private enterprise. 16 There was a 
remarkably high rate of house ownership, which was reflected in the rapid 
growth of building societies. For instance the Coventry Permanent 
Economic Building Society had increased their assets from a little more 
than £1,750,000 in 1932 to around £4,000,000 in 1937.17 The City Council 
was responsible for the planning of 25,914 acres in 1939, of which 8,598 
acres were outside the city boundaries. One scheme had already become 
operative in 1938, while four other schemes were in course of 
preparation. 
The city's central area, however, had never been covered 
by a 
planning resolution. It remained substantially mediaeval 
in character 
and became extremely inadequate for the ever-increasing 
tasks of a modern 
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city. Narrow and winding streets in the city centre became increasingly 
congested by traffic, 18 but early attempts to construct new streets to 
remedy the situation were shelved because of opposition from citizens 
concerned to protect old streets or properties. Over a period of thirty 
years after 1910, in fact, only two new conduits were completed - 
Corporation and Trinity Streets19 - and these were described quite 
rightly by a local newspaper as 'patchwork expedients, two isolated, 
incomplete and separate links. '20 The City Engineer and the Chief 
Constable expressed alarm in 1938. Streets in the central area were: 
no longer wide enough to permit an 
uninterrupted flow of the present volume of 
traffic in both directions and at the same 
time to have uncontrolled waiting for such 
purposes as loading and unloading of goods 
vehicles, making business calls, picking up 
and setting down people using large passenger 
carrying vehicles, collection of refuse, etc. 
All these matters create serious congestion 
and traffic delays. 2' 
Another pressing problem was the inadequacy of municipal buildings such 
as the Council House'22 Central Police Station, and Courts of Justice, 23 
and the lack of such cultural amenities as an Art Gallery and a Museum. 24 
Because of this, some began to urge the development of a civic centre, 
and E. Ford, newly appointed City Engineer, set to this task on his 
arrival in 1924. In the mid-1930s the matter proceeded rapidly. In 1934 
the City Council set up a Civic Centre Sub-Committee, and within a year's 
time it was decided to promote a Parliamentary Bill on schemes for 
various public buildings based on the City Engineer's plan. 2 The 
Corporation's scheme put the question of the replanning of the central 
area in the limelight. Some local architects, 26 the Coventry City 
Guilds' and a local Councillor20 produced their own ideas for a civic 
centre, and the question was much discussed in the local press. 
As these 
suggestions often saw a new civic centre as part of the replanning of 
a 
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much wider area, the discussion soon focused on a new city centre as a 
whale. 29 
The Corporation itself, however, confined their scheme to a small 
area in Earl Street and Little Park Street where the possibility for 
further extension was limited, while they could not settle the question 
of sites for an Art Gallery and a Museum. The opening-up of Broadgate to 
the Cathedral to gain the vista contemplated in the City Engineer's plan 
was totally dropped. What made it impossible for the Council to consider 
any comprehensive replanning was the fact that the Town and Country 
Planning Act, 1932, which supposedly allowed the town planning of built- 
up areas for the first time, in fact provided little opportunity. As the 
Town Clerk of Coventry put it: 
... 
it will be out of the question to attempt 
the town-planning of the built-up areas of 
Coventry as a whole. The best policy seems 
to be to prepare, as occasion arises, town- 
planning schemes for selected built-up areas, 
... where experience 
has shown the need to be 
greatest. 30 
The crux of the matter was the liability for compensation, which 
prevented, among other things, the City Engineer's proposal 
for the 
opening up of Broadgate, where the cost of acquiring the shop properties 
was thought to be prohibitive. Gradual acquisition of 
land thus became 
the best possible way, for by that process the Council would 
'save money 
by avoiding a certain amount of trade claim'31 - claims 
for compensation 
for loss of trade. 
The problem of compensation was directly related 
to the problem of 
increasing rates. In 1937 the Labour Party took over 
the control of the 
City Council from the Coalition Party of the 
Conservatists and the 
Liberals, whose major concern was to keep 
the rates as low as possible. 
The Labour Party thought that there was much need 
for municipal 
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intervention. They set up a Policy Advisory Committee to supervise the 
work of other Committees and Departments, so that the work of the 
Corporation should be centralised. Its first Five Year Programme of 
Capital Expenditure, covering £1,570,000 for various projects, promised 
among other things new streets and more open spaces. In order to carry 
out these developments in a proper and coherent manner, it was also 
decided to set up a City Architect's Department so that in future all 
architectural work of the Corporation would be handled by a single 
department. 
No mention was made, however, in this five-year capital programme 
about a civic centre. It was estimated that a 6d increase in the rate 
from 13s. to 13s. 6d. in the pound was necessary to carry through the 
projects proposed in the programme. As G. Hodgkinson, one of the Labour 
leaders, said, 'If the five-year programme was enlarged to cover more 
ambitious projects obviously a 13d 6s rate would not be sufficient'. 32 
Around this time the need for the replanning of the central area was most 
intensively urged in the local press. But Hodgkinson had to say: 
The view of the Labour Party is that we feel 
that the more pressing problems at the moment 
are those provided by the new areas on the 
outskirts of the city, and these have to take 
first place as against any claims for the 
development of a civic centre. ... 
We know that the ratepayers are not too happy 
about the recent rate imposition, and if they 
say that they are not prepared to pay any 
more they cannot have improved schemes in the 
centre of the city. 33 
The problems of expansion were aggravated when Coventry was chosen as a 
centre for the Government's armament programmes. It was estimated 
that 
there was an influx of at least 30,000 munition workers and 
their 
families, which brought the city's population over the quarter million 
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mark in 1939.34 All told eight shadow factories were operating in the 
Coventry area during the war. 35 Naturally, any possibility of city 
centre replanning seemed to disappear. Some even argued, as the Mayor 
for 1936-37 said rather jokingly, that it would be better to wait for 
bombing, because 'then the land would be cleared free of all charges. '36 
Elsewhere, somewhat different reasoning led to the same conclusion. 
Alderman Halliwell, another leader of the Labour Party, for instance 
argued that any city centre scheme under the present form of the 
government would mean very little for ordinary citizens, because 'an 
improved centre would simply create additional vested interests in 
property', unless there was 'conscription of wealth'. 37 
Thus it seemed as if these efforts to think about future city centre 
development were totally futile. Yet there were some ideas which proved 
to be important for the future. Donald Gibson, a Liverpool University 
graduate in his early thirties, was appointed in 1938 as first City 
Architect. He could easily recruit enthusiastic young architects for his 
staff, for they felt that the creation of a City Architect's Department 
was 'a noteworthy step ... [towards showing] that a Municipal Authority 
could do work comparable to the best in private practice'. 38 Although 
town planning was not at first considered part of their tasks, they set 
about the job by planning a new city centre, for: 
We believed that a beautiful city could 
result only when each building in the 
programme was designed to respect its 
neighbouring buildings, in height, shape and 
colour and, too, in the arrangements of the 
roads and gardens around them. 
Here was the genesis of precinctual treatment 
of buildings and their surroundings. The 
desired result could, we felt, be obtained 
only when an overall picture could be 
produced before building began; and in our 
view the architect-planner, ..., was the 
person best fitted for this task. 39 
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Gibson assigned four members of his staff the work of designing a 
correlated scheme for all the civic buildings considered necessary, and 
of preparing a large model for display purposes, 'hoping that by this 
means we should be given the chance to prove our case. '40 The team was 
headed by the first Principal Planning Officer of the Department, Percy 
Johnson-Marshall, another young Liverpool graduate. 
In fact, as Gibson recalled, the preparation work was 'a voluntary 
task - undertaken at home in the evenings - shared by wives and sweet- 
hearts of members of the Department and some enthusiasts who were not in 
local government service'. 41 Within a matter of months they produced a 
model of the scheme for grouped public buildings, taking an area of forty 
acres and forming a precinct round the Cathedral with a new central park. 
As Percy Johnson-Marshall admits, while the main theoretical source and 
inspiration came from Le Corbusier's The City of Tomorrow, all the 
buildings in their plan 'were kept comparably low in order to emphasise 
the verticality of the Cathedral and St. Michael's Church, and were to be 
faced with brick and stone to harmonise with the local red sandstone of 
the latter buildings. '42 
The next step was to make the public 'planning and design 
conscious'. 43 So the Coventry branch of the Association of Architects, 
Surveyors and Technical Assistants, which was almost entirely composed of 
members of the City Architect's Department, decided to hold a planning 
exhibition in the summer of 1940. The 'Coventry of Tomorrow' Exhibition, 
attended by several thousands of people, featured not only the above- 
mentioned model, but also evening lectures on town planning delivered by 
famous town planners and architects, and presided over by a number of 
City Councillors. 'So, ' as Gibson recalls, 'the seeds of a later harvest 
were being sown'. " When the German blitz wiped out the central area of 
the town about six months later, those Councillors 
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remembered the model which we had produced at 
the St. Mary's Hall exhibition, and invited 
me to join forces with the City Engineer and 
to prepare a new plan for the city centre. 
... At last we as architects had been given 
the opportunity to present to the City 
Council our views on town planning and civic 
design. Because of our pre-war studies the 
new plan did not take long to prepare. 45 
**** 
Destruction46 
The pattern and effects of the major air raids on the three cities 
were quite similar in many ways. 
Table IV. 2 
Coventry 
Southampton 
Bristol 
(and 
Avonmouth) 
Major Blitz Attacks on the Three Cities 
Date 
14 November 1940 
8 April 1941 
Tonnage of HE 
818 
17,23, & 30 Nov. -1 Dec. 1940 
19 January 1941 
647 
24 Nov., 2,6 Dec. 1940 919 
3-4 Jan., 16-17 Mar., 11-12 April 1941 
(Sources: T. Harrisson, Living Through the Blitz, p. 356 and R. 
Winstone, Bristol in the 1940s, pp. 23-25. 
The bombing was concentrated in the winter and early spring of 1940- 
41 as Table IV. 2 shows. And yet the damage caused was, as Table IV. 3 
shows, still serious at the end of the war. 
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Table IV. 3 War Damage by May 1945 
Commercial 
Shops Buildings 
Coventry (a) 826 149 
(b) 290,000 351,000 
Southampton (a) 730 311 
(b) 1,124,000 1,642,000 
Bristol (a) 996 190 
(b) 3,388,000 901,000 
Factories & 
Warehouses 
108 
3,394,000 
141 
1,415,000 
403 
4,778,000 
(a) = number of properties destroyed, damaged and not yet repaired 
(b) = floor space in sq. ft. of (a) above 
(Source: HLG 71/195 'Ministry of Town and Country Planning: An Estimate 
of War Damage to Shops, Commercial Buildings, Factories and Warehouses in 
a Few Selected "Blitzed" Towns', 19 March 1945). 
When it came to the destruction of houses, however, Coventry and 
Southampton sustained much more severe damage than Bristol did, as shown 
in Table IV. 4. 
Table IV. 4 Houses destroyed and seriously damaged through enemy 
action 
Number Percentage of total houses 
Coventry 23,577 30.3 
Southampton 13,610 29.9 
Bristol 5,197 4.9 
(Source: HLG 71/593 'Revised Appreciation of War Damage Based on Injury 
to Houses', Ministry of Town and Country Planning, April 1944. ) 
But the extensive destruction, as shown in Table IV. 5, tended to be 
localised in the central areas which led the Government to make special 
surveys in early 1941. 
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Table IV. 5 Approximate extent of major devastated area (in acres) 
Coventry Southampton Bristol 
53 60 40 
(Source: HLG88/9, Report of Advisory Panel on Redevelopment of City 
Centres, Ministry of Town and Country Planning, 1944. ) 
These 'test case' surveys revealed that the three cities were 
concerned most about the damage to the main business and commercial 
areas, especially to the principal shopping streets, which were almost 
wiped out. In Coventry Smithford Street was 'practically burnt out'; 47 
in Southampton the proportion of properties having frontage on Above Bar 
and High Street which were destroyed was about three quarters of the 
total; in the Castle Street area of Bristol, out of a total of 185 
shops, 139 were completely destroyed and 36 damaged, leaving only ten 
shops undamaged. 
The severe damage to these main shopping areas caused a serious loss 
to the local authority's finance, for shop property was the most 
profitable to the Corporation as regards rate revenue. The test case 
survey report revealed that the rate income of Coventry was reduced 
by 
about 17 per cent, while Southampton had lost one third of 
its rate 
revenue by early 1941. Table IV. 6 shows that in Coventry there was still 
considerable loss of rateable value with regard to business and 
commercial properties, such as shops, offices, and warehouses. 
In 
Bristol retail shops with rateable value exceeding £80 were particularly 
hard hit as shown in Table IV. 7. The restoration of the rateable value 
was thus a very important question for the local authorities concerned. 
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Table IV. 6 Analysis of Rateable Property in Coventry 
Class of Property Rateable Value at 
31.3.1940 (£) 
Houses 1,011,906 
Shops with dwelling 
accommodation 83,933 
Lock-up Shops 112,137 
National Service Hostels (not specified) 
Hotels 39,487 
Offices 23,451 
Industrial (de-rated) 72,647 
Warehouses 26,075 
Theatres, Cinemas 18,927 
Sports Grounds 2,843 
Clubs 8,789 
Hospitals and Nursing Homes 3,040 
Garages 16,787 
Advertising Stations 962 
Crown Properties 29,138 
Church Halls 79 
Banks 4,873 
Schools 17,510 
Other Corporation Properties 157,497 
Freight Transport 1,123 
Miscellaneous 3,679 
Rateable Value at 
31.3.1946 (f) 
(Sources: Abstracts of Account for years 1939-40 and 1945-46) 
Table IV. 7 Analysis of Rateable Property in Bristol 
Class of Property Rateable Value at 
1.4.1939 (£) 
Houses 1,766,549 
Retail Shops with Houses 225,309 
Retail Shops with Rateable 
Value not exceeding £80 50,048 
Retail Shops with Rateable 
Value exceeding £80 239,607 
Crown Property 33,635 
Offices 91,526 
Warehouses, Storage Yards etc 112,650 
Bank premises 28,126 
Garages and Stables 52,608 
Hoardings 1,568 
Theatres and Cinemas 23,312 
Hotels & Licensed Premises 73,598 
Rateable Value at 
1.4.1945 (£) 
1,756,828 
192,992 
983,114 
61,492 
70,952 
15,805 
63,027 
14,262 
74,969 
19,793 
15,112 
4,605 
5,979 
4,583 
9,425 
854 
42,235 
224 
5,511 
22,904 
21,484 
1,239 
8,399 
45,628 
124,107 
125,593 
106,792 
156,132 
27,357 
52,618 
3,215 
27,186 
76,804 
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Corporation Property 
Houses 199,517 195,752 
Offices, Yards, etc 11,099 17,867 
Schools, Baths, 
Hospitals etc 61,924 66,942 
Land - Non Agricultural (Sports 
etc) 7,528 11,316 
Hospitals & Nursing Homes 15,900 7,984 
Schools (other than Council) 13,480 19,045 
Parish and Mission Halls 2,178 2,857 
Clubs, Institutes, Hostels etc 16,313 18,590 
Ferries, Bridges etc 962 1,323 
Public Utility Undertakings 203,991 200,885 
Industrial Hereditaments 99,363 94,934 
Freight Transport 35,750 21,493 
Miscellaneous 31,285 8,897 
(Sources: Abstracts of Accounts for years 1939-40 and 1945-46) 
Table IV. 8 
Year 
1939-1940 
1945-1946 
Rateable Value of the three cities 
Coventry Southampton Bristol 
£1,634,883 
£1,577,987 
£1,632,255 
£1,428,679 
(Sources: Abstracts of Accounts of the three cities) 
£3,433,087 
£3,326,926 
As Table IV. 8 shows, however, Coventry and Bristol recovered their 
financial situations better than Southampton did. As the Ministry 
pointed out in 1943 Coventry, although badly damaged in terms of business 
premises, had in fact gained industries rather than lost them, for a 
number of shadow factories had been built in the vicinity. Consequently 
its economic activity recovered considerably, while the need for 
accommodation for munition workers seemed to contribute a lot to the 
enhancement of rateable value. 48 As for Bristol, although the damage on 
the Castle Street area was quite considerable, the city had a number of 
subsidiary shopping areas still available, 49 while the war brought about 
a spectacular rise in the scale of, among other things, Government 
services. In Southampton, however, the damage to the shopping centre, 
particularly to Above Bar, and its effect on the local authority's 
finance seemed very formidable. 
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Table IV. 9 
Street 
London Road 
Above Bar 
East Bargate 
West Bargate 
High Street 
Hanover Bldgs 
East Street 
Rateable Value of Shopping Centre in Southampton 
1 October 1939 1 April 1946 
No. of Properties R. V. (£) No. of Properties R. V. (¬) 
109 10,701 51 4,223 
256 78,703 90 23,802 
25 3,418 23 4,698 
3 197 3 224 
222 37,022 84 16,942 
46 3,559 24 1,694 
104 25,067 54 8,045 
765 158,667 329 59,628 
(Sources: SRO SC/T9/100, 'Rateable Value of Shopping Centre', Borough 
Treasurer, 17 April 1946. 
As Tables IV. 8 and IV. 9 show, loss of rateable value in Above Bar 
alone accounted for more than a quarter of the total loss. Moreover 
Southampton was unfortunate that its industry was dependent on shipping 
and allied activities. Unlike Bristol which enjoyed a fairly diversified 
structure, Southampton suffered severely once its port activities came to 
a standstill. 
At the same time it was realised by all sides that the bombing, by 
clearing the previously congested central areas, gave a great opportunity 
to replan such areas in a comprehensive way. The local authorities were 
very keen to grasp their chance - especially in Coventry, where two 
schemes for the central area of the City Engineer and of the City 
Architect already existed. The author of the test case survey also 
admitted that the carrying out of either scheme had been 'greatly 
facilitated by the bombardment. '50 
In fact Coventry received by far the greatest publicity and 
attention, with interest focusing on both the 
destruction which it had 
suffered and on the redevelopment plan which was now proposed. 
The city 
was often cited as the first victim to suffer the 
German blitz, with the 
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spire of the ruined Cathedral standing defiantly in a vacuum. Then the 
bold plan for a new city centre, so quickly adopted and so confidently 
supported by the City Council, became the symbol for post-war 
reconstruction. It is now appropriate, therefore, to turn to a more 
lengthy discussion of the Coventry case. 
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CHAPTER V 
Replanning the City Centre: the case of Coventry 
1940-1945 
Being one of the first provincial towns to suffer from the German 
blitz, Coventry attracted nationwide attention because of the destruction 
of its central core and the redevelopment plan for that area that was 
subsequently prepared. At the very beginning of re-planning the future 
city centre the Minister concerned, Lord Reith, encouraged the City 
Council to plan boldly. Two plans were prepared. The City Engineer's 
plan, in the Ministry's words, 'suffered from some lack of imagination', 
while the City Architect's plan 'suffered from rather too much 
imagination'. ' Although the Government Inspector appointed to assess 
these documents reported rather optimistically that 'a compromise plan 
based on the good features in both schemes would be acceptable', 2 it soon 
proved to be very difficult to arrive at any compromise. 
The City Council adopted the City Architect's plan and waited for 
the Ministry's reaction to it, while refusing any consultations with the 
local interests affected by it. The Ministry, and particularly its 
Regional Planning Officer (hereafter RPO) were very concerned at this 
lack of consultation at the local level. Some features of the Coventry 
plan, notably the arcaded shopping precinct and civic centre, also caused 
the Ministry's anxiety because of their boldness. 
Following the visit to Coventry of the Advisory Panel in the summer 
of 1943, the Ministry worked very hard to persuade the City Council to 
meet local interests and to consider a possible new plan on a more modest 
scale. The task was not an easy one. The Council stood firm in sticking 
to its plan. The provisions of the Town and Country Planning Bill, 1944, 
obviously disappointing to the local authorities concerned, added to the 
Ministry's anxiety. As one official put it, there was 'a very serious 
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risk of Coventry becoming the centre of the hostile elements opposed to 
the Government proposals', especially in view of 'the strong sentiment 
which surrounded Coventry in the public eye as the first small city to 
endure the weight of the German air assault'. 3 Also worrying was 'the 
grandiose nature' of the plan, which 'would lend itself particularly well 
to an outcry that the Government for reasons of financial stringency, as 
opposed to planning, were attempting to force the blitzed cities to cut 
their proposals to the bone. '4 
Although the Ministry could avoid the worst potential scenario 
taking place, they thought that there was still much left to be done. 
All they could claim in late 1945 was, as the able RPO put it: 
For the past three years we have been 
gradually working the City Council off the 
idea that a long term plan can be prepared in 
less than three months at the height of a 
blitz without consulting any outside 
interest. That is very broadly what happened 
at Coventry. 5 
**** 
Within a month of the November blitz the City Council set up the 
City Reconstruction Committee (hereafter the CRC) to consider the 
redevelopment of the city, especially that of the heavily damaged central 
area. The City Engineer and the City Architect were asked to collaborate 
in preparing a plan for that area. 6 In early January, 1941, the Council 
sent a deputation on the initiative of Alderman Hodgkinson to Lord Reith, 
Minister of Works and Buildings. While the bombing gave Coventry an 
excellent opportunity to re-plan its central part, the Council were 
rather apprehensive about making the most of it 
in view of lengthy 
procedures and an enormous amount of money involved under the existing 
legislation. As Hodgkinson told the Minister: 
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It may be that none of us around this table 
today will see in our lifetime the city that 
ought to emerge from the ruins of Coventry, 
but what we are concerned with is taking the 
right steps and building in such a way that 
future generations will not curse someone or 
other for making false steps now, and we 
believe that your Department may be able to 
help us very considerably in reaching the 
ideal we wish to achieve.? 
The Minister, suggesting that Coventry would be made a test case (for 
future legislation), told the deputation: 
The City of course cannot do more than it can 
do, and possibly you are entitled from that 
to form an optimistic conclusion about future 
help. 
I would hope that you would be able to 
proceed with your wider plan, and not just 
the conservative one. I would hope you would 
find encouragement later on to proceed on a 
pretty broad basis. 8 
The conference with the Minister undoubtedly gave tremendous heart to the 
City Council. As The Standard reported Hodgkinson telling the Council 
[he] had not the least doubt, having regard to 
the smooth way in which they were received 
in London, that they would get a great deal of 
help, and probably much more help than they 
thought before they went into that 
conference. "That delegation was the most 
fruitful I have been to of any Government 
department", he commented. "In so far as 
this job can be speeded up, we shall get 
every assistance from London. "9 
By early February two plans for the city centre were submitted to the CRC 
by Ford and Gibson respectively. Although they were asked to 
collaborate, they could not see eye to eye. 10 Ford put a primary 
emphasis on the need for quick restoration of business premises and of 
rateable value, by disturbing as little as possible the traditional 
pattern. Consequently his plan consisted in the main of street improve- 
ments on existing lines, which would in most cases avoid trouble over 
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ownership. " Gibson emphasised, however, the far-reaching potential of 
the Council's position. As he put it in his report to the CRC: 
The city is being made a test case, and its 
solutions will form a guide to the other 
cities which have been similarly devastated. 
The decisions of the Council will therefore, 
have a national and not merely a local effect 
We have an opportunity in front of us that 
has never occurred before, born it is true, 
out of a catastrophe of colossal magnitude, 
but an opportunity to be grasped with both 
hands. Let it not be said by future 
generations that the people of Coventry 
failed them, when the ideal was within their 
reach. 12 
on 25 February the City Council adopted Gibson's plan by an overwhelming 
majority, 43 votes to 6. They were struck by the new Coventry, bordered 
by an inner ring road and divided into a number of zones based on 
function. Among the spectacular features included were a civic centre 
consisting of a library, police offices and law courts, civic hall, 
museum, municipal offices, adult educational institution, school of art 
and art gallery, with generous provision of open spaces; and a traffic- 
free shopping precinct, possibly arcaded, of six or seven storey 
buildings connected to a new retail market, replacing the old shopping 
streets of Smithford Street and Hertford Street. 13 
Outside the Council the boldness of Gibson's plan attracted 
favourable comments, including those from various national papers. 14 Of 
particular importance was the King's visit to Coventry in early 1942, 
since the monarch pronounced himself "particularly satisfied" with an 
idea for arranging a shopping precinct under the arcading principle. He 
expressed the opinion that in all replanning schemes of blitzed towns, 
the future amenities for citizens were 'of supreme importance', and hoped 
that 'his visit ... would help to make such plans materialise. 
'15 But 
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how would the Government react to such a plan? There was some concern 
about the financial implications of this bold plan, the cost of which had 
not yet been estimated. While the majority of the Council were confident 
of the Government's generosity, there was strong doubt, as the Standard 
expressed, about 'the gift of the realisation of an otherwise impossible 
dream' .1 16 
Within the Labour Party Alderman Halliwell thought it was absolutely 
necessary to call on the Government to introduce conscription of wealth 
(or socialisation of land), without which any rebuilding scheme would be 
impossible to operate. While his fellow Labour members agreed that 
socialisation of land would be the best measure, they did not think it 
could be realised very quickly. '' They thought therefore that it would 
be enough in the first instance to secure access to the land required for 
redevelopment by 'steriisation' (so that no buildings other than those 
of a temporary nature should be permitted on the cleared site, pending a 
proper redevelopment plan)18 -a method that could be pursued under 
existing legislation. Subsequently it was hoped the Government might 
move well beyond this position. At the same February Council meeting 
Halliwell could not receive a seconder to his amendment, and the 
Council's adoption of Gibson's plan led to his resignation from the CRC 
and from the Coventry Labour Party. 19 
The Labour Party stood very firm indeed on the question of temporary 
buildings. As early as December 1940 the CRC had recommended that any 
building be subject to the submission of a proper plan for the approval 
of the Town Planning and Buildings Committee and the duration of the 
approval be for only one year. 20 It faced an amendment (from the 
Progressive Party members) at the Council meeting that the duration be 
three years or until six months after the termination of the war. It was 
pointed out that property owners could not afford to build temporary 
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premises to let on such a short-term basis, nor could shop owners hope to 
establish themselves and recoup the capital costs within that time. 
Labour contended that, in order to safeguard future redevelopment from 
prejudicial building, it was absolutely necessary to have as firm control 
over land as possible, and defeated the amendment by 20 votes to 15.21 
The local Chamber of Commerce were not at all contented with the 
Council's decision. They maintained that the duration should be much 
longer than twelve months so that goodwill could be re-established. They 
also criticised Gibson's approach to the redevelopment of Coventry, and 
asked the CRC (who were so confident in Gibson's plan) to receive a 
deputation to discuss whether the latter should contain co-opted members 
from outside the Council. 22 The CRC simply said that they did 'not think 
a deputation would serve any useful purpose', 23 and proceeded to give 
Gibson the primary responsibility for the re-planning. 24 To anticipate, 
it was not until late 1943 that the CRC invited the Chamber to discuss 
Gibson's plan. If anything, the City Council were intently awaiting the 
Government reaction during the first half of the war, while the boldness 
of Gibson's plan and Lord Reith's encouragement were beginning to loom 
large in the minds of the Government officials. 
*** 
The reaction from the Ministry of Works and Buildings to Gibson's 
plan was not as promising as the Council expected. In February 1942, the 
Ministry wrote to Coventry, asking about the progress of work in 
connection with it. In reply the CRC expressed 'surprise', for the plan 
had been investigated in detail by the Ministry's Inspector a year 
previously, and, 'to make the position quite explicit', they resolved to 
make an application for the Minister's formal approval of the plan. 25 
This fitted in with the Committee's wider decision that it would not make 
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any further move unless and until the Ministry demonstrated its own 
position. 26 Thus, in late 1942, E. H. Doubleday, newly appointed Regional 
Planning Officer (hereafter RPO) of the Birmingham Region of the 
Ministry, found that little progress had been made regarding Coventry's 
re-planning scheme. He asked Headquarters to send a letter to Coventry 
regarding new development. Accordingly the letter was sent in December 
1942, stating that no formal approval could be given, since no planning 
resolution was operative over the central area of Coventry. Instead, the 
letter suggested reviewing the plan in relation to a wider area of the 
city, to make a detailed survey of changes in the conditions of the area 
caused by war damage, and to discuss the matter with the RPO. 27 The CRC 
had a conference with Doubleday and decided to carry out the suggested 
detailed survey of a wider area. 29 
Nevertheless Doubleday had to write again to Headquarters in April 
1943. As he put it: 
The crux of the whole matter is finance. An 
air of uncertainty exists locally as to the 
intentions of the Government regarding 
assistance to "blitzed areas", and this has 
created, in this region at any rate, a 
position of stalemate. 29 
Doubleday had been trying to discuss amending the 1941 Plan with the 
Corporation officers through informal monthly meetings, and, at the same 
time to promote discussions about Coventry's 1941 plan between the 
Council and business and industrial interests of the city by speaking to 
different Council members on various occasions. His efforts, however, 
especially that to promote discussions with the local interests had been 
unsuccessful as the Council were most reluctant to make any further move 
under the existing legislation. Concluding the letter, 
he urged the 
Headquarters that: 
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evidence on all sides points to the fact that 
the next phase in redevelopment lies with the 
Government. In this respect there is also 
much evidence that they (Coventry and 
Birmingham) are expecting a great deal from 
our new Ministry [of Town and Country 
Planning] now that we are solely responsible, 
and the opportunity is ripe for 
development. 30 
As already seen in Chapter II, however, the Government were suffering 
from great difficulties in decision-making, especially in regard to the 
Uthwatt proposals. 
The Advisory Panel of the Ministry provided important opportunities 
to discuss the matter with several of the most heavily blitzed cities. 
Before its visit to Coventry on 13 July, 1943, it was already concerned 
about the concentration of all the civic buildings together, and the 
replacement of an ordinary shopping street by arcaded shops of uniform 
design, which had not yet been discussed with the commercial interest. 3' 
At the meeting between the Panel and the Corporation, the Coventry 
side was anxious to know the possibility of formal approval of its 1941 
plan and the scope of Government's financial assistance. In reply the 
Panel pointed out that 'the Government could not be expected to sign a 
blank cheque', and urged the need for some financial estimates regarding 
the scheme. 32 During discussion of the Council's proposal to replace 
Smithford Street by an arcaded shopping precinct, the Panel found: 
The Council are unaware of any objection, on 
the part of traders, to go into a "precinct" 
instead of an ordinary shopping street. ... 
Although the Council have had no official 
consultation with the traders and have not 
worked out the cost of the expected revenue 
from the shops they are apparently confident 
that the arcade scheme will be a success. 33 
Immediately after this visit, the Panel decided that Doubleday should 
'insinuate into the minds of the Council' the need for consultation with 
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business and industrial interests. 34 
and reported to Headquarters: 
Accordingly he met the Town Clerk 
The visit of the Panel to Coventry has had a 
most salutary effect, and I am glad to say 
that the Town Clerk now appreciates the need 
to consult business and industrial interests 
in the Town. This is a big step forward, and 
on my next visit to Coventry I will discuss 
with him ways and means of making a start on 
this long overdue matter. 35 
The local atmosphere was, however, getting worse. In October Alderman 
Moseley, chairman of the CRC since its inauguration, commented on the 
recent announcement of the Minister of Town and Country Planning stating 
that the Government's findings on the Uthwatt Report were ready for 
presentation: 
I am surprised at the wide attention that has 
been directed to the statement made this week 
by the Minister. ... In fact, if there 
is 
anything new in the Minister's statement it 
seems to suggest that little in the way of 
financial assistance will be forthcoming from 
the Government, and, if I am interpreting the 
statement correctly, this is serious. 36 
Around this time Hodgkinson also said: 
It was feared that the bombed towns were 
going to be treated like old soldiers in days 
gone by - forgotten and left to their own 
resources when the war was ended. Bombed 
towns would be like wounded, limbless 
soldiers unless the Government did its duty 
by them. So far there had been little 
evidence of Government enthusiasm in this 
connection. 37 
Meanwhile the survey of a wider area suggested by the Ministry was well 
advanced. The CRC made a recommendation in October formally to accept a 
Reconstruction Area of 383 acres. The Committee stressed the importance 
of this decision, as. it would 'form a basis for discussion with 
the 
Government as to the extent and character of State assistance'. 38 By 
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this time the Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act was 
passed which gave power to local authorities to grant an interim develop- 
ment permission for a limited period only. The CRC recommended in 
September that the initial period of permission should be one year. 39 
The last possible challenge from the Chamber of Commerce through 
Councillor Corbett (President of the Chamber) at the October Council 
meeting was defeated by 32 votes to 24.40 
Under such circumstances, the CRC decided for the first time to 
invite the Chamber of Commerce to discuss the new shopping provisions of 
the 1941 plan. 41 Things thus eventually started to move. The Ministry 
came to realise the gravity of Coventry's case more acutely, especially 
through the efforts of the RPO and through the visit of the Advisory 
Panel. The Corporation became highly frustrated at the indecisiveness of 
the Ministry and, in particular, at the uncertainty of financial 
assistance. At the same time they decided for the first time to face the 
local traders' criticisms of an arcaded shopping precinct. 
In the following year of 1944 some features of the Corporation's 
plan, notably an arcaded shopping precinct of high-storey buildings, came 
under vigorous attack from the Chamber and the Ministry. At the same 
time the Ministry had to go through difficult phases in their approaches 
to Coventry in part due to the lack of unity in opinion among officials, 
but most importantly because of their failure in bringing the long- 
awaited general legislation into being. 
*** 
The meeting between the CRC and the Chamber of Commerce was held in 
February 1944. The Chamber conveyed their objections to the shopping 
provisions in the Corporation's scheme, particularly to the idea of an 
arcaded traffic-free shopping precinct. They argued that the precinct 
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principle 'would, due to its restriction in size, tend to create 
monopolies, and would prevent any further addition or expansion'; arcade 
shopping was not favoured either, because it would be 'unpopular with the 
general public'; they further maintained that the existing main shopping 
streets should not be eliminated altogether, because the inclusion of 
vehicle traffic was essential to the success of the shopping area. In 
this connection it was stated that, under their auspices, an alternative 
layout for a shopping area was being prepared. 42 In reply the CRC stated 
that they were willing to consider the points made by the Chamber, and 
also to examine the suggested alternative layout on its merits. 43 The 
president of the Chamber thought highly of this meeting as 'a good- 
natured, long, and friendly talk', and went on to say, as reported in the 
local press: 
The real objection was the layout of the City 
Architect, and it was strongly felt that the 
old idea of street shopping was much better 
than what was called "cloistered 
precincts". 44 
The proposed alternative plan prepared by Messrs. Woolworth's architect45 
was considered by the CRC on 19th June 1944. The plan envisaged a self- 
contained shopping area in a semi-circle shape, surrounded by a 60 ft 
wide road, with a kind of "underground city" beneath, in that goods and 
service access roads would be provided by excavation below the present 
ground level. The CRC observed, however, that the sandstone of the area 
was so charged with water that the maintenance of the suggested under- 
ground roads would be impracticable. 46 They therefore concluded that 
they were not in favour of the alternative scheme, adding though 
they 
would 'be pleased to consider any further observations which 
the Chamber 
[might] wish to make'. 47 
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While there was an obvious sign of some mutual understanding between 
the Corporation and the Chamber of Commerce, the much tougher battle was 
going on behind the scenes between Coventry and the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning. At the Headquarters of the Ministry, L. Neal, Deputy 
Secretary of the Ministry, became rather impatient of the slow progress 
in Coventry's re-planning. Admitting the importance of informal monthly 
meetings organised by the RPO, Neal repeatedly requested more direct 
action by the Ministry in the form of an official letter of criticisms of 
the 1941 Plan. At first Doubleday resisted such an idea, for, in 
Coventry he felt, 'one has to steer a steady if not a fast course'. 
he went on: 
Coventry can, and probably will say that the 
Government's difficulty in coming to a 
decision on reconstruction legislation has 
severely embarrassed them in the preparation 
of their scheme with public support. In this 
they will be strongly backed by other 
"blitzed" cities. ... [And] the feeling "agin" the Government appears to be getting 
deep-rooted and somewhat bitter. 48 
As 
Doubleday made the most of monthly meetings with the help of other 
Ministry officials and of F. Smith, Town Clerk of Coventry, who was 
strongly opposed to Gibson's proposals, especially that to eliminate 
Smithford Street. They exposed Gibson to considerable criticism. At the 
monthly meeting of February 1944, for instance, the precinct principle of 
high buildings of six or seven storeys was severely attacked by the Town 
Clerk and the City Treasurer. Gibson replied that at any rate the City 
Council was fully prepared to back his plan. Smith argued, however, as 
recorded in the Ministry's file: 
Confidentially, he interpreted the Council's 
attitude in this way. Excessive publicity 
had been given to the damage sustained by 
Coventry and, in consequence, the Council had 
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developed an idea that they had suffered more 
than any other town and, therefore, had a 
greater claim than any other town to have all 
their reconstruction done for them at the 
expense of the nation. On the wave of this 
attitude, they had adopted without a period 
of inquiry and with undue haste the plan 
proposed to them as a final plan and were, in 
consequence, committed of a great deal, 
[which], in his view, would certainly have to 
be revised. 49 
The pressure on Gibson was so strong that, towards the end of the 
meeting, he himself agreed that if a plan of a different character was 
asked for he would prepare one. 5° At the meeting in May Gibson was again 
under fierce attack. He tried to defend the precinct concept, citing 
Plymouth which had also envisaged a precinct shopping centre. The 
Ministry side pointed out that while Plymouth was a pre-eminent shopping 
centre within its region without any rivals of importance, Coventry was 
never an established shopping centre and it was too near Birmingham. 
Gibson held on, maintaining that if the Council acted as a developer, his 
shopping centre would be a great success. At this point the Town Clerk 
hurriedly interrupted to say that Gibson's view was not backed at all by 
the local business and commercial interests. Hearing this the Ministry 
side stated categorically that 'it was improbable that the local 
authority would be able to obtain the capital from the Government for a 
scheme which was objected to by the commercial interests on the grounds 
that it was a risky business'. 51 Reporting it to the Headquarters, one 
Ministry official observed: 
None of the officials of the Corporation with 
whom we have been having conversations, 
except Gibson (and his views have been 
slightly modified) believe in the Plan as it 
now stands. 52 
At the same time the Ministry officials (especially Doubleday) started 
feeling that a new stimulus other than monthly meetings was rather 
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inevitable because of 'the stubbornness on the part of the Council to 
agree to amend their present proposals' and of his informal knowledge as 
to 'associations between certain members of the Council and political 
factions which do not approve of the present attitude of the Government 
in regard to planning and reconstruction'. 53 By this time at the 
Headquarters Neal got so impatient that he directed Doubleday to make 
proposals for representing to Coventry that they should make a fresh plan 
within three months. 54 
The forthcoming Reconstruction Bill made such a direct and official 
approach all the more imperative. As one official put it, the financial 
proposals of the Bill 
have been whittled down in such a way as to 
leave the question of redevelopment for 
blighted areas in abeyance for the moment and 
generally to give the whole proposal a 
somewhat smaller scale, which to Coventry, 
always insistent on Lord Reith's "Plan 
boldly", is likely to appear thoroughly mean. 
The question is not whether Coventry are 
right in this view of theirs. The difficulty 
is that the present bill offers them a fresh 
opportunity to make political capital out of 
the Government's attitude to their plan. Now 
that this has been pointed out I must admit 
that any controversy which may arise from 
direct criticism of the Coventry plan before 
the bill is published is likely to be less 
than the difficulties caused by making the 
same criticism after the bill has been 
published, when Coventry are likely to say 
that we have made up our criticisms in order 
to cut down their plan and make it fit into 
what they will call the Government's 
inadequate financial proposals. 55 
The Ministry side agreed to put forward a letter of criticism as soon as 
practicable, and Doubleday sounded the Town Clerk out as to the possible 
reception of such a letter. The main ground of criticism was that 
the 
78 
plan lacked the public support of local traders. On this point the Town 
Clerk expressed his concern: 
that if this lack of public support were used 
as the main ground of criticism, he rather 
thought that the Council might then embark on 
a campaign to win public support to the plan, 
and he would not be surprised if the Council 
obtained a majority of public support in 
numbers as opposed to values in the City, 
mentioning, as a guess, a two-thirds majority 
in favour. 56 
Smith repeatedly made the point that any criticism which gave rise to 
political arguments had to be avoided, for he rather thought that 'some 
of the Labour members of the Council would not be averse to such 
publicity "agin" the Government'. 57 
Accordingly Doubleday produced a note of detailed criticisms of the 
Coventry plan based on purely technical points. The most striking 
question was the extraordinarily large amount of land devoted to civic 
use, which would not be able to produce any ground rents for a 
considerable time to come. In criticising this, however, as he put it: 
one should not minimise the strong socialist 
tendencies of the Council, who may reply that 
they intend to see that these civic buildings 
are provided, a point which may have a strong 
local appeal. Care should be taken, I 
suggest, to keep one's criticism to the 
doubtful merits of such a large concentration 
with its effects on the shopping centre, a 
line which seems to me to be non-political. 58 
At Headquarters, however, Neal wanted a much shorter letter, a much more 
plausible move rather than the detailed criticisms which might upset 
Coventry because of its rather unexpected character. Accordingly the 
letter dated 19 May 1944 was sent to Coventry, asking for a general 
statement as to the recent work done on the redevelopment scheme, and for 
the proposals regarding zoning, re-establishment of displaced 
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undertakings, and the programming of the reconstruction works. 39 The 
letter was considered by the CRC on 19 June, just one day before the 
introduction of the Bill. Around this time discussions between Coventry 
and the Ministry of War Transport were under way as to the route of the 
inner ring road. A plan showing the route had been submitted by the 
Planning Officers to the CRC for approval. As the Committee maintained 
that the demarcation of the areas of use would depend to a far greater 
extent upon the alignment of the inner ring road than the other way 
around, the Ministry's letter of 19 May made them hurry over the question 
of alignment. Thus they resolved to approve the proposed route in 
principle and to submit the plan to the Ministries concerned, so that 
they could consider the questions in the Ministry's letter in the near 
future. 60 
As for the Bill now in Parliament, Alderman Moseley, chairman of the 
CRC, told the local press: 
On the whole my own feeling is one of 
disappointment. At the same time, it has to 
be realised that the bombed towns are fairly 
numerous, so, in total, making the problem a 
big one from the national point of view, and 
if the Bill is the Government's last word, we 
shall have to make the best of it and cut our 
coat according to our cloth. 6' 
Thus Headquarters observed: 
that it looks as though our letter of the 
19th May may have succeeded in its attempt to 
prevent the Coventry Plan from becoming a 
battle cry of the opposition to the Bill. 
The discussion is now on technical grounds, 
while at the same time we have given the 
necessary stimulus from the Ministry. 62 
The question was, therefore, whether the Ministry should bring forward 
immediately the detailed criticisms of the Coventry plan to the Council. 
Doubleday did not think the time was yet ripe. First of all he agreed 
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with the Council that in the meantime they should concentrate on the 
question of the inner ring road. 63 Moreover there were some positive 
signs favouring the Ministry. For instance the Planning Officers had 
prepared certain modifications of the 1940 plan, allowing for the line of 
Smithford Street to be retained as a service-way. Alderman Moseley, who 
had been rather difficult to the Ministry as chairman of the CRC, was to 
retire. His successor, Councillor Grindley, had mentioned to Doubleday 
on several occasions his impression that the 1940 plan was 'based on 
aspirations without foundation work'. 
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By October, however, Headquarters were determined to make a further 
move. As one official put it: 
My impression on reading the earlier minutes 
and correspondence is that it was a pity that 
the possibility of political repercussions 
was considered serious enough to make us take 
a much weaker line with Coventry than was at 
first intended. This fear seems to have 
influenced our action throughout. There is 
no doubt that Mr. Doubleday has done good 
work in very difficult circumstances, but I 
still feel that an earlier tactful but firm 
prod from Headquarters would have produced 
better results and more rapid progress. " 
The Ministry side was now in favour of putting forward the detailed 
criticisms of the Coventry plan in the form of a further official letter. 
With the passing of the Bill into law the City Council were also 
expected to get on with the ground work in connection with the city's 
plan. The first move was supposed to follow the report of the Town 
Clerk 
on the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944,66 which was to 
be submitted 
to the meeting of the CRC on 29th November. As Doubleday observed: 
This is the kick-off for which we have all 
been waiting, and I think the game will be 
fast and furious thereafter. 67 
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At the meeting of 29th November the CRC resolved to initiate a 
series of conferences with the trading and other interests affected by 
the redevelopment scheme, and to invite, in the first instance, the 
Chamber of Commerce on 14th December. 68 At this first conference the 
Chamber's concern was focused on the desirability or otherwise of the 
precinct idea. To their surprise, they were told by the Corporation that 
the precinct proposals had been limited to approximately one fifth of the 
total shopping frontage because it was not practicable to extend the idea 
further in the present scheme. What was more Gibson promised, in reply 
to the request from the representative of multiple shops, that provision 
would be made so that it would be possible to convert the shopping 
precinct into a normal street if experience showed that it was 
unsuccessful from the commercial point of view. 69 
The Chamber's attention was now narrowed down to the question of the 
Smithford Street precinct. As maintained in a Memorandum on Coventry 
Redevelopment Shopping Facilities forwarded to the Corporation, they 
still preferred a through road to the shopping precinct there . 70 The CRC 
left consideration of the matter to further discussions between the 
Planning Officers and the Chamber, which implied the Committee's 
inclination towards an amended design. 71 As the president of the 
Chamber told the local press in May 1945, there had been 'a great change 
in the atmosphere, and he did not think anyone could grumble now at the 
consideration given to the Chamber by the Corporation'. 72 In the same 
month Professor Holford (Technical Adviser to the Ministry) suggested to 
the Corporation officers that they should make some kind of compromise 
with the trading interests, although it did not have to be the 
abandonment of the precinct principle. 73 
In the end the final answer of the Planning Officers was made. While 
the revised plan retained the principle of a shopping precinct in the 
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Smithford Street area, some concessions were made to the views of the 
Chamber. Among other things was a new north to south road intersecting 
the precinct area, 74 with a fly-over bridge to carry road traffic over 
the precinct. The freedom from traffic of the actual shopping area was 
thus preserved while at the same time highway access to it would be 
provided. 75 
The Chamber was not in favour of a traffic bridge, partly because 
they considered it would be a block to a possible future road through the 
precinct, and instead suggested two footways. They also still maintained 
that a shopping precinct was not so desirable as a through road in the 
area. But the Planning Officers pointed out that the suggested through 
road would very likely be used as a through way and thus nullify the 
effect of the ring road. 76 The CRC made the final decision. They 
decided not to proceed with the idea of a traffic bridge and approved in 
principle the proposed subways. At the same time they held the view that 
the shopping precinct was preferable to the suggested through road, and 
accordingly decided to adhere to the precinct. 77 
Thus at the local level a compromise was made between the 
Corporation and the local traders as to the shopping provisions of the 
city centre plan as a result of a number of consultations between both 
sides. At first the start of the consultations pleased the _ 
Ministry. They soon were irritated, however, by the lack of progress, 
due mainly to the over-cautious attitudes adopted by the Town Clerk. No 
further conferences with local interests were yet arranged to follow 
those with the Chamber of Commerce. As Doubleday thought 'the pressure 
to which he is subjected by the political elements in the Council 
is 
proving to be an overburdening factor of his approach to the 
Reconstruction Scheme' . 78 
83 
:¢ý , apt "=fit 
`: ' t, ` 
N ßf1 
1L 4-4 
04 
44 
04 
v 
4-4 
44 
4 -ý ý. I v 
But the Ministry's concern at a civic centre in the Coventry plan 
was looming larger, and consequently, they kept putting pressure on the 
Council to think it over again. Several conferences were held but all 
the Ministry could find was the local authority who was 'much up against 
the Ministry, on the ground that they had been told to plan boldly and 
were now finding themselves hedged about by departmental restrictions'. 79 
Eventually the Ministry sent an official letter to the City Council in 
June 1945, throwing strong doubt about allocating a large area to include 
all the public buildings with ample open spaces surrounding them. B° In 
response the CRC recorded in a strong manner that the points raised in 
the letter were 
essentially matters to be decided by the 
judgment of the local authority; and that, 
the Committee see no reason to make any 
material change in the land-allocations in 
the "civic" area, or in the proposals for the 
inclusion in that area of specific 
buildings. 81 
They also decided to prepare a balance sheet as to the redevelopment 
scheme as a whole, including the net site costs likely to result after 
the Government grants ceased, and the cost of the buildings involved. 82 
The Ministry side thought, somewhat optimistically, that this letter 
'stimulated the Council to test the finances of the proposals from the 
long-period aspect'. 83 At the same time, whereas the Ministry wanted 
Coventry to make rapid progress, by submitting a formal application for 
compulsory acquisitions under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, 
the Council could rightly refuse to submit an application until the 
proposed financial tests had been finished. And this 
financial 
examination in turn was supposed to take quite some time. Moreover 
the 
local elections were coming soon and it was recognised 
that any 
particular change would not happen until they were over. 
After that, 
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however, the fierce battle was expected to resume. As one Ministry 
official put it, it must be admitted that if they [the Council] submit 
the scheme as it stands at present we may have to insist on its being 
considerably modified'. 84 
Just before the local elections took place, the Ministry's 
insistence on modification was expressed in public by Lewis Silkin, new 
Minister of Town and Country Planning. In October, 1945, commemorating 
the city's 600th anniversary of the granting of its Charter of 
Incorporation, the 'Coventry of the Future' exhibition was held, 
featuring a model for a new city centre as its main attraction. It 
received 57,500 visitors during two weeks, equivalent to one in four of 
the city's entire population. As the MDT reported, the exhibition 
has proved in unmistakable manner that, 
contrary to what has been said so often, the 
ordinary ratepayer is intensely interested in 
the affairs of his city, and that he is quite 
prepared to receive the enlightenment which 
is so necessary in municipal administration 
and has been so lacking in the past. 
No more effective method could have been 
devised for creating the determination that 
will be necessary to convert the "dream city" 
into reality. 85 
On the opening day, however, Hodgkinson, as the Mayor, and Silkin 
expressed the conflicting views respectively. At the civic luncheon 
Hodgkinson spoke quite strongly of the 'tremendous delay' by the Ministry 
in giving formal approval to Coventry's plan. As he put it: 
There has been all sorts of manoeuvring in 
order to edge Coventry away from the splendid 
designs it had. 
I hope we have now come to a stage where we 
can halt, where no more modifications will 
be 
required, and no more vetting of our plan. I 
hope the Minister will give approval to what 
we want to do without further modification. 
86 
85 
Declaring the exhibition open, Silkin responded: 
In every reconstruction scheme the local 
planning authority has to reconcile the call 
for boldness and imaginative conception with 
the need for ensuring that reconstruction 
should so proceed as not to outstrip at any 
stage the resources of men, materials, and 
finance available to it, and particularly 
with the need for ensuring that the community 
shall be able to proceed actively with its 
business while step by step the process of 
reconstruction advances. ... All my indications are that Coventry is well on the 
way to securing that reconciliation. 87 
From Coventry's viewpoint the reconciliation had already been secured by 
making concessions to the Chamber of Commerce as to the shopping 
provisions in the plan. In this sense Coventry was the victim of the 
Government's retreat from bold planning to economy and conventionalism. 
The long delayed Town and Country Planning Act of 1944 was quite 
restricted in its provisions, especially those of financial assistance. 
As the central commercial area, which suffered most heavily from the 
blitz, was the area that contributed considerably to the city's 
finances, the Council had to ensure that the plan was acceptable to local 
traders. And in this respect the pressure from the Ministry on Coventry 
played an important role. 
Nevertheless the Council did adhere to the principle of a shopping 
precinct despite the strong opposition to it from the Chamber of 
Commerce, and, when it came to the Ministry's further objection related 
to a civic centre, they would not show any sign of compromise. Labour, 
as the majority on the Council, thought that the new city centre formed 
as important a part of the future Coventry as the improved housing, 
education, and public health did. 88 The municipal elections in October 
1945 brought three gains to labour89 and with this strengthened majority, 
86 
they were reasonably confident to 'go forward with all schemes for the 
city's development'. 90 
Therefore, what sustained the Council's belief in Gibson's plan was 
twofold. First, there was immense interest in the plan, mostly in 
support of it, such as extensive nationwide publicity and the King's 
comment, from which an idea was firmly established that Coventry's bold 
plan was a symbol of the rebuilding of future Britain. Secondly, the 
local Labour Party was confident that the majority of Coventry people 
were with them in pursuit of the dream plan. This confidence squashed 
completely the Ministry's argument that Coventry's plan lacked public 
support, because what the Ministry meant was the objection of traders, 
the limited, sectional and outmoded interests. Consequently the 
Ministry, who did not like the imaginative nature of some proposals, 
notably that of a civic centre, had to be extremely cautious in making 
criticisms for fear of political repercussions. The position of the 
Ministry was further marred by delays in producing the promised 
legislation, and the inadequate provisions of the 1944 Planning Bill 
almost panicked the Ministry officials. When the Ministry at last 
ventured to forward their strong doubt (and yet articulate criticism) of 
the civic centre proposal to the Council, the latter easily bluffed it 
o u, saying that it was a matter to be judged by themselves. Coventry's 
case thus demonstrates that the belief of the Council and the enlightened 
public that bold replanning of the blitzed city centre would be of 
ultimate benefit and credit to the local community and to the country 
after the war, surpassed the attempts during the war of the vested 
interests and of the Ministry to overturn it. 
turned to the second case, that of Southampton. 
Attention will now be 
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CHAPTER VI 
Replanning the City Centre: The case of Southampton 
1940-1945 
Southampton made an early start in replanning the blitzed central 
area, favourably comparable even to Coventry. In the first place the 
planning machinery of the Borough Council was strengthened through the 
efforts of Councillor Matthews, deputy leader of Labour and an 
acknowledged expert in planning. He was appointed as the southern 
regional researcher of the Nuffield College Social Reconstruction Survey 
in the early war years, which gave him ideas about the city's industrial 
future. It was by no means easy for him to make the conservative 
majority on the Council realise the need for the drastic changes which 
town planning required, but his influence had certainly been permeating 
with the help of encouraging words from Lord Reith. Among other things 
the Council appointed as a planning consultant, Professor S. Adshead, one 
of the most experienced planners in the country. 
The report and plan were prepared by Adshead and H. T. Cook, Town 
Planning and Development Officer of the Council, by early 1942. As 
regards the central area their plan envisaged a fairly bold road system 
and a new shopping centre in the form of a promenade, called the 
'Circus'. After discussions with traders and the Ministries concerned, 
the idea of a shopping promenade was totally abandoned, and the emphasis 
was now exclusively to enhance the values of the main pre-war shopping 
street of Above Bar and High Street. 
The Ministry of Town and Country Planning was quite satisfied with 
the progress in Southampton during the war period. The Borough Council 
were, unlike the case of Coventry, very receptive to suggestions 
from the 
interests concerned, and amended their plan to be acceptable to them. 
Not surprisingly the Ministry was rather taken aback as 
they came to 
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realise that the replanning of Southampton's central area had become the 
major political issue of the municipal elections in November 1945, and 
that, as a result of this contest, the existing plan was to be replaced 
by a brand new scheme. 
**** 
In Southampton the Borough Council had their first discussion on the 
replanning of the blitzed town in January 1941, just a month after the 
major blitz. The Council were considering a motion moved by Alderman 
Woolley (leader of the Ratepayers' Party) asking the Town Planning Sub- 
Committee to consider the procedure necessary for the reconstruction of 
the central portion of the town, and to consult the Ministry of Works and 
Buildings with a view to the presentation of a preliminary report. 
Woolley argued that while any long-term reconstruction was out of 
the question at the present time, there was a great deal that could be 
done towards restoring the normal life of the town. Of particular 
importance was to give the traders the opportunity of doing what they 
were anxious to do - getting back to their businesses as soon as possible 
on the original sites. Alderman Moutland, Ratepayers' member and chairman 
of the Works Committee and its Town Planning Sub-Committee since the 
latter's inauguration in 1928, said the preparation of a scheme for the 
central area was now actually underway to meet the point put forward by 
Woolley. 
Matthews was rather alarmed at this approach to the replanning of 
the town developed by the Ratepayers' leaders - rush action for the sake 
of quick restoration of business. Planning required the consideration of 
much wider issues such as the population and industry of the town as a 
whole, which would be influenced considerably by Government policy. 
It 
had to be considered as a long-term policy in an appropriate manner. 
As 
he maintained in a private memorandum, before starting 
the replanning of 
94 
the town, there were several essential steps to be taken. They were th- 
appointment of a town planning expert outside the Council as consultant 
to prepare an advisory report on the replanning of the town; measures to 
safeguard the proposals for the future from prejudicial actions; 
Government intervention at an early stage to secure the replanning on the 
right lines from its beginning; and the strengthening of the town 
planning machinery of the Council. 
He deplored the fact that in the Town Planning Sub-Committee 'no 
more than two members have any deep interest in and knowledge of 
planning. '2 As regards officials they had H. T. Cook, Town Planning 
Assistant, attached to the Borough Engineer. Although Matthews regarded 
Cook as 'a first class man', he was 
handicapped by his subordination to the 
Borough Engineer and by the prevailing 
attitude of Council members to any drastic 
planning proposals. That is why the 
appointment of an eminent Town Planning 
consultant is essential. But in addition to 
this the Town Planning work of the Council 
should be constituted either as a separate 
Department, or Mr. Cook, as Town Planning 
Officer, be given special status. 3 
At the January Council meeting, Matthews, while seconding Woolley's 
motion, also stated: 
We are asking for bold, big and [effective] 
planning, but we do not want consideration of 
the miscellaneous problems presented to this 
Council in a month's time and be asked to 
call that planning. That is nothing of the 
kind. I want to plan reasonably and well, 
and to have first-class brains and first- 
class thought on the job. 
The Council meeting ended with Alderman Woolley's withdrawal of 
his 
motion on an assurance that the Town Planning Sub-Committee would 
be 
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called together as soon as possible to consider the whole matter in the 
light of the discussion which had taken place at the Council meeting. 4 
A week after the January Council meeting the Planning Sub-Committee 
was called together and it made three unanimous recommendations: the 
adoption of building lines for London Road, Above Bar and High Street so 
as to provide for the widening of the road to 80 feet after the war; an 
immediate conference with the Ministries concerned; and the building of 
temporary shops to let to traders until they could re-establish them- 
selves on the original sites. 5 While, as Alderman Mouland told the 
Council, the recommendations had the twofold aims of helping traders 
resume their business, and at the same time safeguarding the proposals 
for the future, his main concern was obviously the quick restoration of 
the business community. As he went on, because it was impracticable at 
present to attempt to set back buildings to a new line, it was therefore 
proposed that traders who wished to resume business should be permitted 
to erect temporary buildings on the existing frontage line for the 
duration of the war, after which the buildings were to be removed and any 
existing permanent buildings set back to the new lines. 
In seconding the recommendations, the point Matthews stressed was 
rather different. In his opinion drastic changes in regard to Government 
policy and legislation in the matter of town planning were inevitable, 
and, therefore there was the need for preventive measures against 
prejudicial development, with the implication that such changes would 
result in drastic replanning of the town rather than mere restoration of 
trade. At the same time the Council should be fully informed as to 
Government policy in order to decide on the broad principle of 
their 
plan, and that was why he wanted the conference-6 
It seemed that Matthews' emphasis on preventive measures won 
the day 
against Monland's desire for quick restoration of business. 
Applications 
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for temporary premises made by Above Bar traders to the Council were all 
turned down, for the Council suspected that the proposed 'temporary' 
buildings were not to be constructed of short-lived materials, and thus 
there was no guarantee of their removal on the Council's request.? 
It should not be overlooked, however, that Matthews' most important 
proposals for the preparation of a long-term plan, such as a consultant, 
a Borough Architect, new Planning Department and Committee, were not 
discussed at all by the Planning Sub-Committee for some time. This 
seemed to indicate the prevailing negative attitude of other Sub- 
Committee members to any drastic change in the matter of planning. 
Keeping himself in silence, Matthews was looking for an opportuning to 
press his case. Such opportunity was soon to be created by the visit of 
Lord Reich, Minister of Works and Buildings. 
**** 
In March Lord Reith came to Southampton with G. L. Pepler and met the 
Sub-Committee. They asked the Minister whetLer they were to plan boldly 
and comprehensively. 
Lord Reith said, most emphatically, "Yes. " 
That advice was definitely valuable to the 
committee, because it will dissipate any 
doubt about the official attitude to long- 
term redevelopment policy. It connoted, 
moreover, that ... the local authorities, who 
must be responsible for the plans but can 
hardly be expected to bear the expense, will 
have the support of the Government. 8 
Soon after the Minister's visit the Planning Sub-Committee started to 
consider the setting up of a Planning Department, with only Monland, the 
chairman, opposing it. But even then the proposal to appoint a planning 
consultant, now seconded by Councillor Lane (Ratepayers' Party) was 
defeated, 9 and the Sub-Committee eventually decided to defer the 
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consideration of the appointment for six months. The SDE predictýi that 
the matter would certainly be raised in the Council before long. '0 The 
point was whether such an appointment might be premature in view of the 
necessary preliminary research work now under way. " Matthews thought 
that the importance of such research work all the more reinforced the 
case for immediate appointment. For, by this course, 
he will be able to be in at the birth of the 
scheme and give his advice in the preparation 
of the data upon which he will build his 
proposals. His experience and knowledge 
would probably save unnecessary labour. 
Further, he himself would benefit materially 
by being able to study the scheme from the 
outset. 12 
At last Alderman Woolley proposed at the Council meeting in June to ask 
the advice of the Minister of Works and Buildings13 -a request which 
resulted in Reith recommending an immediate appointment. 14 In August the 
Planning Sub-Committee resolved unanimously to recommend the appointment 
of Professor S. D. Adshead as Town Planning Consultant. The scope of his 
work was to prepare an outline redevelopment plan and report for 
Southampton, with particular reference to the blitzed central part of the 
town. The work was to be done within a period of six months from the 
date of appointment-15 
Stanley Adshead was one of the most eminent figures in town planning 
with forty years in the field. When the country's first Department of 
Civic Design was created at Liverpool University in 1909, he was invited 
to be its first Professor. Five years later he was offered the Chair of 
Town Planning at London University, which he retained for 21 years until 
his retirement. He had also been involved in the preparation of planning 
schemes for many towns including Norwich, Carlisle, Brighton, Plymouth, 
and Lusaka, new capital city of Northern Rhodesia. 16 Being regarded as 
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one of the best architectural draughtsmen of the day, he was also very 
aware of the importance of social and administrative conditions to town 
planning, which made him write in 1923 a comprehensive study of town 
planning, Town Planning and Town Development. In this book attention was 
already paid to a promenade, which was a feature often seen on the 
continent, but not yet seen in this country. 17 The appointment was quite 
a timely one, for, on top of his profound knowledge and wide experience 
in town planning, he was determined to create a better England after the 
war, which was shown in his book, A New England, just published in 
1941.1 11 
Adshead's partner in the preparation of a redevelopment plan was 
H. T. Cook, who had just recently been promoted to be head of a newly 
created Town Planning and Development Department in July 1941. H. T. Cook 
began his career as an articled pupil to a surveyor and town planning 
consultant in Essex. When Southampton set up a town planning section in 
the Borough Engineer's Department in 1928, he was appointed as town 
planning assistant and had since then been chiefly responsible for the 
Borough's town planning schemes. In addition he had been the Town 
Planning Officer to the Southern Hampshire Joint Town Planning Committee 
since its creation in 1929, thus having an intimate knowledge about the 
region as well. 19 
The setting up of this new Department created conflict between 
Stanton, Borough Engineer, and Cook, Town Planning and Development 
Officer. It was quite understandable that the Borough Engineer had been 
rather disgusted by this event. First of all town planning had 
long 
been, as a general practice, within the jurisdiction of a 
local 
authority's Engineer. Moreover, in the case of Southampton, the new 
Planning Officer, Cook, had been one of the Borough Engineer's assistants 
for more than ten years. Stanton was particularly opposed 
to Cook's 
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intention to be primarily responsible for the design of the road system 
and for acting as liaison between the Ministry of Transport and the 
Corporation. Stanton insisted that anything related to roads, which was 
a matter for the Ministry of Transport and had been the responsibility of 
the Engineer, should remain so. Cook argued that, because the position 
of roads and the use of land were not considered individually during the 
preparation of any town planning scheme, he should be in the first place 
responsible for anything related to road planning. 20 Negotiations 
between Cook and Stanton did not go smoothly, but eventually the Planning 
Sub-Committee decided to formulate the duties of the officers in favour 
of Cook's argument. 21 
Meanwhile the preparation of a plan for the new Southampton had been 
well under way, and in February 1942 the Joint Report of Adshead and Cook 
was submitted to the City Council. 22 The Adshead/Cook Report was quite a 
comprehensive one in that it dealt with various subjects, such as post- 
war housing requirements, future population, and proposals for industrial 
zoning with the object of encouraging new industries. For the central 
area, several interesting proposals were made. Blocks of new and larger 
tenement buildings of four or six storeys were proposed to the south of 
Houndwell for those working at the Old Docks. 23 In order to improve the 
lower part of the town, new meat and fruit markets were to be built in 
High Street; on recently reclaimed land a youth centre, a swimming pool 
and a new park were envisaged. The two most attractive features in the 
Report were, however, the new road system and a town centre. 
The new road system was designed to relieve the traffic congestion 
in the town's main shopping street of Above Bar and High Street. The 
Inner Ring would circumscribe the central area and serve to provide 
connections between important points on existing radial roads. 
Much of 
it would be composed of dignified new roads. With regard 
to the east to 
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west route through the centre the Report proposed a new road leading 
vertically to the front of the Guildhall. The width of it would be 100 
ft, and for the section between the new north to south road and Above 
Bar, a width of 150 ft was proposed. As for the north to south route a 
new road of 120 ft with dual carriageways (the New Dock Road) was 
proposed. It would run parallel on the east of the main shopping street, 
and cater principally for through traffic. Relieved of through traffic 
the main shopping street needed only be widened to 80ft. 24 
As the Report pointed out Southampton had no central square or place 
comparable to those of many other mediaeval towns. In replanning the 
central area the section upon which all main roads would converge was 
designed to form such a centre. The Guildhall entrance to the Civic 
Centre would be the dominant feature of the western end. It would be an 
open space approximately 400 ft wide, while the buildings on the east 
side of Above Bar were to be set back to complete the effect of a large 
open forecourt in front of the Guildhall. The eastern end was composed 
of a large circular Place (the 'Circus'), 500 ft in diameter, at the 
intersection of the new main roads north to south and from the east. In 
view of the great volume of traffic converging upon the Circus, the 
Report proposed to construct bridges for pedestrians at first-floor level 
over the main roads. Around the Circus and along both sides of the Town 
Centre between Above Bar and the new north to south road the Report 
suggested erecting shops of a uniform elevation. 25 
The design of the Circus would provide an opportunity for 
constructing a promenade or a shopping way of 12 ft 6 ins wide around the 
blocks of shops at the first floor level behind a row of columns. This 
promenade would be reached by steps and, possibly, lifts. As the Report 
claimed 
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It would be a unique arrangement in this 
country, where never before has there been a 
good opportunity for putting it into 
practice. If the bridges were constructed as 
already suggested, shoppers could walk all 
round the circus at first floor level under 
cover; the nearest design of a comparative 
nature in this country being "The Rows" at 
Chester, though there are many examples of 
such arcade walks in foreign countries. 26 
The Adshead/Cook Report was referred to the new Town Planning and 
Development Committee, finally created over Alderman Monland's 
resistance. Although he was one of the Committee' s members, he soon 
resigned from it. 27 The new Committee's first chairman during the war 
period was Councillor Lane, and vice-chairman was Matthews. While Lane 
was a Ratepayers' Councillor and also a Director of the Chamber of 
Commerce (by profession he was a surveyor) he stayed in agreement with 
Matthews for most of this period. 
The Plan for the central area in the Adshead/Cook Report was, as 
Cook wrote to an official of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, 
generally favoured by the Planning Committee. He expected that it would 
get the approval of the Council a few months' time after the Committee's 
consideration just commenced in May. 28 However, the Plan, especially the 
idea of a shopping promenade, met strong opposition from the local 
traders and from the Ministries concerned, the MOWT in particular. 
Traders stated that they had little confidence in the success of 
such a proposal, since the shops would not form a natural extension of 
the existing main shopping street and consequently shoppers would be 
faced with the choice of two alternatives - either going to Above Bar or 
to a promenade. At a meeting of the Chamber of Commerce for instance, W. 
Dixon (former president of the Chamber and president of the High Street 
Association) said that he could see 'no real grounds for planning such an 
extension of shopping facilities', and wondered 'if in the planning of 
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the town the planners had not been mesmerised by this new shopping 
centre, which would impinge a new centre on one which already existed. '29 
The Ministry of War Transport was strongly opposed to the proposal on the 
grounds that it would create conditions dangerous to pedestrians. 30 
Revision of the plan seemed imperative, but the task was assigned to 
Cook only. The Planning Committee turned down an offer from Professor 
Adshead to continue his service as Consultant in January 1943 (without 
mentioning any particular reason). 31 In March 1943 the revised plan was 
submitted to the City Council. The most significant change from the 
original 1942 plan was the omission of shops around the Circus. This was 
a keen disappointment to Adshead who had been so proud of the idea of a 
shopping promenade. As he wrote to Cook: 
I don't understand the Ministry of 
Transport's point of view. ([Is] it safety, 
then they can have a railing, as shown on my 
drawing. I thought it was bridges they 
wanted, and we gave them bridges. ) I [don't] 
know that a circus is the last word, but it 
fits the site and is a [splendid] feature if 
everyone can be persuaded to adopt it ... 
It is only natural that owners and the 
majority of [shop) keepers should hesitate at 
such innovations, but there will be a lot of 
innovations to be got used to, after the war, 
if this is to be a go ahead country. 32 
In the revised plan it was also suggested that every endeavour should be 
made to attract retail trade into Above Bar and High Street, particularly 
the latter, which had been for some years in decline from the shopping 
viewpoint. For this purpose several proposals were made. Existing 
buildings adjoining the Town Quay, except those of historical or archaeo- 
logical interest, should be removed. The interesting historical remains 
should be left out in open spaces suitably laid out. The Bargate Circus 
(bottle-neck between Above Bar and High Street) should be entirely 
reconstructed on new lines to give greater continuity between the two 
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streets. The wholesale distribution of fruit and vegetables, which 
previously occupied a considerable part of High Street, should be re- 
established on a site other than that originally suggested of the lower 
part of High Street. 33 
The focus of discussion at the March Council meeting however shifted 
from these new proposals to the rights of property owners. The Planning 
Committee asked the Council to approve the revised plan in principle, 
pending clarification of Government policy, especially the level of 
financial assistance likely to be available. If generous financial 
assistance from the Government eventually came, the rebuilding should 
start as soon as possible. The intention of the resolution was, as 
Councillor Lane told the Council, the sterilisation of properties within 
the area under the plan, which would mean that no buildings other than 
buildings of short-lived materials should be permitted on the cleared 
site pending a final redevelopment plan. It was a clear warning to 
individual property owners that the future of the area was within the 
Council's discretion and they were no longer allowed to rebuild 
themselves as they liked. Alderman Woolley proposed that the adoption of 
the plan in principle only should be a mere expression of the Council's 
intention to replan on the suggested lines, but should not be a ban on 
the right of property owners to stay or rebuild on their original sites. 
In reply Councillor Lane expressed the opinion that it would be better to 
have a Council debate on the question of sterilisation and arrive at a 
settled policy. The Committee were at a stage, as he went on, when they 
had to have some backing from the Council. As he observed: 
We have got to face the fact that at some 
period, if we hope to re-plan and re-build 
Southampton on better lines, we must be 
prepared to accept the sterilisation of 
certain sections. I think it would be 
more convenient to sterilise now, when 
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other factors are already sterilising, 
than it would be to do so at some date 
after the cessation of hostilities when 
everybody will want to get on with plans for 
re-building. 
There is bound to be some sterilisation, and 
the committee are very mindful of the 
necessity to minimise it to the greatest 
possible degree, but that doesn't mean that 
we can completely eliminate it. 
Nevertheless, he could not defy any further the opinion of the leader of 
his party. Rather mysteriously the Labour Party, especially Matthews, 
did not seem to make any particular challenge, and it was eventually 
agreed to embody Woolley's suggestion in the resolution. 34 
Knowing the Council's decision, Adshead lamented in a letter to 
Cook: 
It is what must be expected, "small profits 
and quick returns". We were told to plan 
boldly, and we took a long distance view. It 
would have taken nearly two generations to 
complete our scheme, and Southampton would 
have been the finest town in England. 
The line that seems to be taken is to rebuild 
as quickly and as like the past as possible. 
Everyone will be rejoicing and in ten years 
lamenting. " 
He was now preparing a plan for York, which "in a town of Museums and 
archaelogical and ecclesiastical remains, and there is little more wanted 
than restoration, very different from Southampton. "36 Cook, in reply, 
emphasised that the Council's approval was only tentative. Thus, 
referring to the shops around the Circus, he observed: "Since this [the 
Circus] remains as open space, it does not preclude the erection of shops 
in this position later if the necessity for them arises. "37 Certainly 
encouraged by this letter, Adshead wrote to the SDE and to Councillor 
Lane. As he admitted on reflection, "my views were not presented to the 
Committee and to [the] Council as they would have been, had I been 
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there. " There was, nevertheless, still time "to prevent Southampton from 
being allowed to drift on easy but commonplace lines, instead of making 
it a great city. "38 Although his letter, pressing the case of the 
shopping promenade, appeared in the SDE in June, 39 it did not seem to 
change the Councillors' mind. As Cook told Adshead in July, 
With regard to the shopping circus, while no 
finality has yet been reached as to the 
precise treatment of this junction, the 
Council are naturally influenced by the 
aversions of the traders to the scheme and 
the strong opposition which the proposal has 
aroused with the Ministry of Transport. 4° 
**** 
Meanwhile the MOTCP had formed a favourable opinion about 
Southampton's city centre plan. The Ministry side appreciated the fact 
that fairly close contact had been kept between Cook and certain Ministry 
officials, 41 and that the original plan of 1942 had gone through several 
revisions as a result of the local authority's consultation with 
traders, 42 and with the Ministries concerned. 43 
As shown in Chapter II the Ministry of Town and Country Planning set 
up the Advisory Panel on Redevelopment of City Centres in May 1943, and 
chose seven blitzed towns for detailed study. Southampton was the first 
town to be visited by the Panel in June 1943. At the meeting between the 
Panel and Southampton, the latter emphasised that the Council should be 
enabled to restore their shopping district within a couple of years after 
the war, so as to revive their rateable values lost heavily as a result 
of air raids. 44 (After some conversation with traders, they were 
confident that their plan was likely to be acceptable to them. ) After 
the visit, one member of the Panel expressed his opinion that there was 
too much emphasis on restoration of rateable values and too little on 
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finding the ideal plan, and that the plan hardly seemed to be bold 
enough. 45 It was pointed out, however, that their primary concern should 
be with the successful recreation of the main shopping area, which 
happened to suffer the most extensive devastation. Both because it was 
the social magnet of a large and widespread community, and because it was 
so large a contributor to the city's revenue, its speedy rehabilitation 
was thought to be essential to the city's future. 46 
At the same time in view of its proximity to Portsmouth and Bourne- 
mouth, any strong conflict of interest had to be avoided. Accordingly it 
would be necessary to guard against too ambitious redevelopment. 47 The 
Panel thought however that the point should be borne in mind by the 
Council, for they had Councillor Matthews, who did the Nuffield Social 
Reconstruction Survey which covered Southampton, Portsmouth, Bournemouth, 
and Poole, and the Planning Officer, H. T. Cook, who was also Planning 
Officer to the local Joint Planning Committee and a member of a regional 
advisory planning body for the county. 48 The plan for the Borough itself 
was comprehensive unlike Coventry, which limited its plan strictly to the 
city centre. 49 After the visit to Coventry the Panel formed the opinion 
that Southampton's plan was sufficiently advanced to form a basis for 
their findings, but Coventry's was far behind. They even thought, 
rightly, that Southampton was unique in this respect and that none of the 
other remaining cities would be very far on with their plans. 50 As 
for 
the general layout of Southampton's redevelopment plan for the city 
centre the Panel arrived at the provisional conclusion that 
it 'appears 
to us to be sound. '51 
Whether Southampton knew of the Panel's provisional conclusion or 
not, it did not seem to help the local authority very much. 
What 
Southampton needed among other things, were, as they told the Panel, 
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i) early legislation on the lines of the Uthwatt proposals granting 
them powers to purchase the whole of the areas covered by the plan with a 
view to the principle of public retention of freeholds, and 
ii) financial assistance from the Government in the form of a loan, 
which should be free from interest and redemption payments during the 
early post-war years. 52 As mentioned in Chapter II, however, the Govern- 
ment was facing great difficulty in reaching a final answer to the 
Uthwatt proposals. Thus in early 1944 H. T. Cook reported that 
little progress has so far been possible with 
preparations for active rebuilding of the 
central shopping and business area. This is 
due to uncertainty as to the future disposal 
of land and the financial terms upon which 
such decision will be made. Both of these 
are dependent upon Government policy. 53 
As Government policy was about to be made public as the Town and Country 
Planning Bill, 1944, the consideration of final details of the planning 
scheme for the central area was carried a stage further. A Planning 
Scheme Sub-Committee consisting of Councillors Burrow, Lane and Matthews 
was set up in May 1944.54 Five months after the further revised plan was 
submitted to the Council. 55 Matthews told the Council that they made an 
effort to provide a magnificent square in front of the Guildhall. A 
space approximately 235 ft wide would be left open in front of the 
Guildhall, and shops on the east side of Above Bar would also be recessed 
for a similar width. The width of the main shopping street would be 100 
ft. Then at the bottom of it a fine park would be created by extending 
public open space at Queen's Park to the Royal Pier and by closing the 
bottom end of High Street. Nevertheless, as Matthews himself admitted, 
the revised plan was rather 
an orthodox plan, much more limited than 
those of many other blitzed towns. If we 
take away the two main features - the 
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Guildhall Square and a large open space at 
the bottom of the town facing docks - we 
shall destroy the plan altogether. 56 
Alderman Woolley still had something to say. He made an amendment to 
reduce the width of the main shopping street to 80 ft., and to reconsider 
the layout of Guildhall Square and the site between the Town Quay and the 
proposed southern end of High Street. He was particular about the width 
of 100 ft for the shopping thoroughfare. As ample provision for heavy 
through traffic was made, there was no need to provide for road 
accommodation able to take the heavy traffic in the main shopping 
thoroughfare. 
It is doing the job twice over. It is 
incurring needless expense. It is docking 
off considerable depth of building line 
unnecessarily. It is, in my opinion, 
absolutely spoiling the thoroughfare for the 
purpose for which it is intended, namely, 
shopping. 57 
Matthews argued that the amendment was against the weight of technical 
opinion. Traders wanted pedestrians as well as cars to stop outside 
their premises. If vehicles were allowed to be there, then the road had 
to be sufficiently wide. At the same time the Council would have no 
power to exclude heavy traffic from this road, although they might do 
their best to persuade that traffic not to use it. In the end the 
amendment was carried by 23 votes to 18, although the mover agreed to 
leave the consideration of the layout of Guildhall Square and of the end 
of High Street to the Planning Committee-58 
The Committee soon asked Cook and H. Bennett, first Borough 
Architect appointed in October 1943, to submit a revised layout of the 
areas in question-59 Bennett expressed his particular concern about 
the financial consequences of the layout of the Guildhall Square: the 
deep setback on the east side of Above Bar was likely to diminish the 
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value of the property fronting the east side of the Square; the 
isolation of the small buildings on the north side of the Square, caused 
by the island at the junction of Commercial Road and Above Bar, made it 
impossible to use them for retail distribution purposes. 6° His solutions 
were first that the size of the Square should be reduced in order to 
maintain continuity of shopping along the east side of Above Bar; and 
secondly that the approach to the Square from the New Dock Road should be 
one on the axis of the Square, rather than two hourroads, thus 
eliminating the traffic island in question. " 
By early 1945 Cook submitted the further revised layout to the 
Committee. The set back of the building block on the east side of Above 
Bar was greatly reduced. Approach to the Square was also altered, by 
which, as Cook put it, 'the opportunity of erecting a building block, 
sufficiently large toretain its value as a retail trading site, can be 
secured. '62 
Meanwhile, the passing of the Town and Country Planning Bill into 
law in 1944 made the question of the acquisition of land a very urgent 
matter. The Planning Committee asked Cook to show the maximum portion of 
the central area over which powers of compulsory purchase might be 
exercised. Although Cook managed to tell the Committee that the maximum 
area would be 463 acres, 63 he had been rather concerned that the 1944 
Act was by no means clear on many points. 64 Accordingly a deputation to 
W. S. Morrison, Minister of Town and Country Planning, was proposed , 61 and 
the meeting took place in February 1945. 
Just before this meeting Matthews hinted in public his disappoint- 
ment at the Government's attitude towards planning. Although Southampton 
were told to plan boldly by Lord Reith, a great gap between what they 
wanted and their capacity to carry it through had prevented 
them from 
replanning boldly. Among other things, as he went on to say, 
the 
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Government had dithered completely on the question of land utilisation. 66 
The Chamber of Commerce also expressed their concern about the 
reconstruction of the city centre after the war and maintained that a 
definite declaration by the local authority as to their policy for 
acquisition of land was essential. 67 The Ministry side were in fact of 
the opinion that Southampton should go ahead. As L. Neal, Deputy 
Secretary of the Ministry, recorded in early 1945, Southampton 
is probably further advanced than any other 
blitzed city with its reconstruction 
proposals. These have been adopted by the 
Local Authority and a considerable measure of 
agreement has been reached with the 
Government Departments concerned. Moreover, 
preliminary negotiations with many individual 
traders have gone some way. 68 
The meeting with the Minister gave considerable encouragement to the 
deputation, or at least to Matthews. The Minister told the deputation to 
make a speedy decision in their acquisition proposals through an 
application for the designation of an area under the 1944 Act. That 
designation should be as extensive as possible and any specific exclusion 
should be minimised. He also told them that the local authority should 
not be too worried about grant, and encouraged them to remain ground 
landlords of the land acquired under the Act to have effective control of 
property through the leasehold system. 69 
**** 
By this time it was thought, rightly, that the preparation of a 
replanning scheme for the central area had reached its final stage. A 
Reconstruction Committee was set up which would in future deal with all 
negotiations and transactions for the acquisition and disposal of land, 
re-allocate sites available for development, and deal with all questions 
of priority in the carrying out of reconstruction including the work of 
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other Committees of the Council. 7° The next essential step was, there- 
fore, how much area they should include for compulsory acquisition under 
the 1944 Act. Progress thereafter was, however, very slow. One reason 
was, as Councillor Lane, chairman of the TPDC, pointed out: 'We have one 
member who is very persistent, over-persistent, in exercising his right 
to object. ' This was Alderman Sir Sidney Kimber, former leader of the 
Ratepayers' Party but by this time a maverick, or a black sheep in the 
Council as an 'Independent'. He had a strong view against any infringe- 
ment of the rights of property owners. Consequently he continued to 
object on that ground to almost any proposals related to the replanning 
of the central area, often being the only dissident in the Council. The 
work of the Council had inevitably been held up by these 'frivolous 
objections' which were attacked by both sides of the Council. 71 What was 
more, there emerged the possibility of drafting an entirely new plan for 
the central part of the town. Bennett, the Borough Architect, soon found 
that he could not see eye to eye with Cook in many respects in the 
replanning of the central area. In this he was joined by F. L. Wooldridge, 
the new Borough Engineer appointed in December 1944. In June 1945 both 
submitted jointly a new plan for the central area of the town to the 
Planning Committee. 
As early as March 1944 Cook, in his letter to Bennett, expressed his 
strong suspicion that it seemed that 'you prefer to work out your own 
scheme independently. '72 Although both tried to collaborate with each 
other, the divergence in opinion became wider as Wooldridge supported 
Bennett rather than Cook. In May 1945 the Planning Committee asked 
the 
three officers to report to the June meeting, in order 
that the Committee 
might 'make a decision on the points outstanding 
in respect of the layout 
of the Central area. 173 Bennett and Wooldridge submitted a 
joint report 
and plan at the June meeting. Councillor Lane, chairman of 
the 
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Committee, claiming that the new plan had been put forward to them 'with- 
out any prior notice or knowledge, '74 argued that 'the Council would make 
more progress by going ahead with the original scheme, which appeared to 
be good and acceptable, and to obtain Ministerial approval of the 
plan. '7 
The man who was mainly responsible for the new central area plan was 
F. L. Wooldridge, Borough Engineer. 76 He argued that: 
the basic matters which will influence 
design are economics, and not engineering or 
planning principles. Unless the plan is 
sound economically it is useless no matter 
how fine it may be. To be sound economically 
it must be capable of execution in several 
stages and there must be no insuperable diff- 
iculties in these stages. There is no need 
to emphasise the present state of the Country 
and the present lack of men, materials and 
money. Of course all these will become 
available in the near future but when they 
do, not for profligate use. 77 
One difficulty in the replanning of the central area was that it 
'must be based on plain and simple common sense and yet sufficiently bold 
to our ever increasing traffic problems. ' Bearing this in mind he could 
see that 'sufficient of the old plan of the town can still be utilised to 
build up the lines of the new. ' For instance it was intended to inter- 
fere as little as possible with parks or historic buildings, which 'still 
show us the dignity, tradition and characteristics which make Southampton 
such a homely and friendly town, a characteristic which in time, 
contributed in no small measure to its fame and prosperity as a shopping 
centre. '78 
Two circular roads were proposed as main features in the new road 
system. First, the 'Circular Road' - an outer or external traffic system 
girdling the 'Shopping Area' based on Above Bar - High Streets. The 
primary purpose of this road was to improve direct access from all points 
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of the compass, and to discourage any traffic from entering th- main 
shopping street unless it had business therein. The main traffic from 
the south, i. e. from the Docks, would be directly routed north, east or 
west along this road, rather than using a north-south route parallel to 
Above bar - High Street. 79 The route of this 'Outer Ring' followed in 
the main the existing roads. Another circular road, the 'Inner Ring 
Road', would surround the Above Bar and High Street area starting at 
Civic Centre and following the existing lines of Portland Terrace, Bugle 
Street, Canal Walk, Palmerston Road and East Park Terrace, then finally 
turning due west along the new road axial with the Civic Centre. The 
main purpose of this road was to make provisions for Above Bar and High 
Street being treated as a shopping precinct in future. As the Borough 
Engineer's report stated, 
In the first years bus services will probably 
use the Above Bar Street - High Street route 
but bus services must be made to circulate 
properly and the ideal circuit for this 
purpose is the "Inner Circuit Road" already 
mentioned. The advantage of this road as a 
circular bus route is that passengers can be 
put down or taken up along the whole length 
and breadth of the Shopping Area, and so 
build up an interest in the Shopping Area as 
a whole with consequent more uniform and 
sustained rateable value. 80 
The prime consideration in designing the main shopping area was to 
preserve as much as possible of the existing layout and to enhance the 
importance of the original main shopping street of Above Bar and High 
Street. It was also proposed to provide a covered retail market on a 
site south of the Bargate which would accommodate as many of the small 
traders who might not be able to establish themselves in new 
buildings 
with high rents and rates. With this, it was expected that there would 
be a great increase in the shopping interest in High Street and rateable 
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values in this area would be immediately assured. 81 At the end of the 
report he emphasised again the importance of practical economics. 
In conclusion the guiding principle in the 
preparation of the scheme has been the extent 
to which existing roads, services and 
buildings can be preserved without 
perpetuating past defects in the layout of 
the town. In the main streets the rebuilding 
of the shops and business premises can be 
carried out merely by setting back to the new 
building lines. Utopian ideas have therefore 
been restrained by practical economics and an 
endeavour not only to plan a completed scheme 
but one which can be built up in successive 
stages without any insuperable difficulty. 02 
At the special meeting of July it was resolved that the officers 
concerned should confer with the MOTCP and the MOWT to obtain their 
advice on the two plans. 83 But the proposed conference did not take 
place until November as the question of land acquisition policy became 
the most controversial point in the local elections. 
Following the conference with the Minister of Town and Country 
Planning in February 1945 the Borough Council in April considered the 
Planning Committee's recommendation to advertise that the redevelopment 
of the central area as a whole was being considered. While the 
recommendation was adopted by the Council, the discussion centred around 
the question of land acquisition policy. The Labour party claimed that 
the local authority should acquire the whole of the area under 
consideration and should remain the owner of it as the Minister told them 
in February. Members of the Ratepayers' Party maintained that this advice 
was very far from saying that the whole of the area before the Council 
recommended as a designated area had to be acquired. 85 
Now the Planning Committee had to decide what area should form the 
subject of an application for a Declaratory Order under the 
1944 Planning 
Act. A special meeting was fixed for June 13. Before that 
date the case 
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of the Canterbury City Council was made known. The Local Government Act 
of 1933 laid down that any member of the Council who had an interest in 
properties affected or in contracts was unable to discuss or vote on 
matters like the acquisition of land. In Canterbury only six Council 
members out of 26 could vote on the question of land acquisition. Most of 
the members of the Ratepayers' Party had to be disqualified in this 
respect. Accordingly the special meeting for 13 June was cancelled and a 
way of avoiding disqualification was hastily sought. 86 By July it was 
found that the Portsmouth City Council had applied to the Minister of 
Health for dispensation, and the Planning Committee resolved, upon a show 
of hands, to follow the same line. 87 
At the Council meetings, however, the Labour Party was fiercely 
opposed to dispensation. "B The local press criticised strongly the 
Council's delay in deciding their post-war scheme. What Southampton 
needed was 'a "Get on with it" plan', but in order to get such a plan, 
the question of land acquisition had to be settled as soon as possible, 
for the principal cause for the delay was 'undoubtedly that there has 
been too much concentration in the Borough Council on making points for 
party at the expense of progress. '89 The SDE soon revealed its own 
political stance on the question of compulsory acquisition by saying that 
the rebuilding would take twice as much time as it would without it: 
Those who favour wholesale acquisition will 
say that this is the view of "vested 
interest. " Those who examine the facts 
dispassionately will recognise it as a view 
based on plain common sense. 9° 
The dissatisfaction of the traders with the lack of decision regarding 
the reconstruction of the town was also represented 
to the Cour., il. 91 
Moreover the MOTCP became very concerned about the lack of progress 
in 
Southampton. As L. Neal reported to the Minister in August 1945: 
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there are strong political influences which 
are delaying any further formal action, and 
which are unlikely to be resolved until after 
the November elections. The Corporation, 
both elected members and officials, are 
divided into two camps. The more 
Conservative element, led on the elected 
member side by the Chairman of the Planning 
Committee and the Planning Officer, and the 
more Left Wing view led by the Deputy 
Chairman to the Planning Committee who 
supports the technical views held by the 
Borough Architect. It is therefore possible 
that after the November elections the present 
plan, which was prepared by a predominantly 
Right Wing Council, will be scrapped. 92 
In September the Ministry wrote to the Council, saying that at the 
meeting in February it was understood that Southampton were in a position 
to submit an application for a declaratory order under the 1944 Act: 
The Minister notes with some anxiety that 
although more than six months have elapsed 
since that date, no such application has yet 
been submitted by the Town Council under the 
Act. 93 
At the adjourned special meeting of the Council on 11 October, Labour put 
forward their amendment seeking to disqualify all the Council members 
except those whose interest within the area in question was only nominal. 
In their view dispensation simply meant the Ratepayers' Party's taking 
refuge so that the vested interests would be safeguarded 
their freehold away by the large-scale land acquisition. 
was lost by 23 votes to 32. It was a straight party vote. 
Lewis, leader of the Labour party, observed: 
The air is full of this question of the 
reconstruction of Southampton, and whether 
the views of the Ratepayers' party, plus one 
member of the Independent Party, are to rule 
from taking 
The amendment 
As Alderman 
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or whether the considered, sensible views of the Labour Party are to prevail. That is the 
issue. I can quite see that some people 
want to get the municipal elections over first. 94 
Certainly the question of land acquisition became the most controversial 
issue in the local elections. The Ratepayers' party maintained that the 
Council should purcahse only as much land as necessary to carry out the 
replanning scheme, i. e. land for road widening and other improvements, 
and the bottom part of the town. 95 Leasehold of 99 years was also 
criticised because it was 'not a long time in the life of a business. '96 
The importance of the February meeting with the Minister which had been 
emphasised repeatedly by Matthews was rather cynically denied. As one 
Ratepayers' party member said: 
But it was extraordinary 
reliance on what was 
Government, by words 
encouraging the bombed 
and acquire property. 
seemed to have swallowed 
barrel. 97 
that he put so much 
said then. The 
only, had been 
towns to plan boldly, 
Councillor Matthews 
that lock, stock and 
In their words what the Labour Party was trying was 'to attach to the 
rebuilding of Southampton the opportunity of putting into operation what 
is nothing more or less than nationalisation of land. '98 
The Labour Party showed no hesitation in saying that what the city 
needed was the power for the local authority to plan the central area as 
its large scale owner. As their manifesto for the local elections put 
it, public ownership would give the Council continuous control of 
development, and would enable the increased values created by public 
expenditure on reconstruction to come into public funds instead of into 
private pockets. As it went on: 
118 
Reconstruction of the central area can in the 
long run be a reasonable financial investment 
for the people of Southampton, but only if 
the area is publicly owned. It has long been 
profitable to those who privately owned it. 
The Ratepayers' Party are not willing to 
adopt the policy recommended to it by the 
late Minister of Planning, who was a 
Conservative. They want to minimise 
acquisition and in so doing will add 
substantially to the long run cost of 
reconstruction, and make the plan itself 
ineffective. 99 
The result of the election was a sweeping victory for Labour. The Party 
gained 13 seats out of the 16 previously retained by the Ratepayers' 
party. '°° With this result Councillor Matthews said confidently that the 
question of wholesale acquisition 'has been clearly settled by the 
electorate. '101 
Quite apart from this issue, however, there remained a further 
problem, in that the City Council still had to choose one of two plans 
for the central area, the original one by the Town Planning Officer and 
the new one by the Borough Engineer and the Borough Architect. 
Councillor Matthews was now entirely inclined to the new plan, despite 
his earlier efforts at bold replanning. There were some obvious 
explanations of his change of mind. First, given the expected shortage 
of labour and materials after the war, the first priority had to be 
given to housing. Secondly, loss of rateable value with regard to houses 
and shops through war damage was extremely severe for Southampton, even 
compared to other blitzed cities such as Coventry and Bristol, but the 
financial assistance from the Government would be very restricted in 
scope. The local Labour Party's land policy - wholesale acquisition of 
the areas under the replanning scheme - further confirmed the need 
for 
economy. Moreover, Matthews was concerned about the intimation of the 
Ministry of War Transport that they were not prepared to pay a 
full grant 
to the ring road in Cook's plan which consisted in the main of grandiose 
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new roads. 102 These factors certainly worked in with the argument for a 
more practicable and economic plan based on the existing layout so as to 
revive and possibly enhance as quickly as possible the rateable value of 
the main shopping street. 
There was another factor which reinforced this argument. As 
Matthews told the City Council in early 1941, the first consideration in 
replanning was the future of industry, which would be governed by 
national policy. In this connection he made a comprehensive survey of 
Southern Hampshire for the Nuffield College of Social Reconstruction 
Survey in 1941-42. His conclusions in this survey about Southampton's 
industrial future were not at all promising. For one thing, he predicted 
that possible industrial expansion in the Southampton area would be 
related to 
i) industries linked with shipping services; 
ii) local service industries and 
iii) some miscellaneous industry which might be attracted to the area. 
Although he was acutely aware of the danger that Southampton's 
dependence on shipping might bring, he had to admit that 'The major 
issue for the town is the restoration and continued development of 
shipping. '103 The future of other important industries such as aircraft 
and engineering was 'very uncertain, ' while there was 'in fact, little 
doubt that Southampton will revive as a premier port. '104 At the same 
time it was also expected that, in view of rationalisation and 
the 
decrease of the numbers of insured workers in the shipping service 
taking 
place during the inter-war period, 'a large number of 
dock and shipping 
traffic could be carried out with a diminished labour 
force and that 
compensating industrial expansion would not necessarily 
be dependent on 
an increase of population. '10' 
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The Advisory Panel of the MOTCP agreed with Matthews adding that 
there were further possible adverse factors to Southampton. First, other 
seaports in the north which had received considerable encouragement due 
to war conditions might continue to retain after the war some of the 
traffic diverted from the Southern ports. Secondly, large sized rodern 
factories for war production recently constructed in many other districts 
would stay there after the war. It was therefore expected that 'the 
prospect of substantial industrial development in Southampton is not very 
bright, ' except that 'there is every possibility of people desiring to 
live in or near a town coming here to retire. '1°6 
Hopes were however again raised in late 1944. In October Cook 
reported to the Planning Committee that a number of applications and 
enquiries for modern factory buildings or sites had been received during 
the last few weeks, and told the Committee that the fullest advantage and 
initiative should be taken to absorb such new industries into the 
town. 107 As he also stated in public around this time, 'if an 
enterprising policy is pursued, we shall get all the diversification of 
industry we need in this area. '108 At the same time, as the White Paper 
on Employment in 1944 indicated, it was widely thought that the Board of 
Trade would take action to control the location of industry after the war 
with a prime objective to revitalising the 'Development Areas', 
i. e. the 
areas of the old staple industries who had suffered massive unemployment 
before the war. It was thus generally understood that the 
first priority 
in regard to the location of new industries would 
be given to these 
'Development Areas'. Accordingly in November Cook approached the 
Board 
of Trade asking if the Board could give any assurance 
that new industries 
should be allowed to settle in Southampton. 
The Board, trying hard to 
commit themselves as little as possible at 
that moment, stated that 
'Southampton's needs were not regarded as of the same 
immediate urgency 
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as the regions which have previously been drawn up as Development 
Areas'. 109 Cook pressed harder referring to the firms in London and 
Manchester who would like to move to Southampton, only to be told that 
the first priority in these cases should always be for one of the 
Depressed Areas. All he could get from the Board was that 'if the 
Development Areas appeared to be receiving a satisfactory number of new 
industries to absorb their post-war labour surplus, consideration would 
be given to further assistance to Southampton. 'lio 
Although the Southampton Labour Party in 1945 still believed that 
extensive new industries could be located in the Southampton area, it was 
recognised that this would depend on the Government accepting that 'a 
blitzed area should have equivalent treatment to the special areas which 
are being singled out for the establishment of new factories. '''' In 
early 1946 Matthews complained about the Government's attitude towards 
industrial development in Southampton, stating that 'Southampton appears 
to be regarded as an area whose prosperity and full employment is secure, 
and no great encouragement is so far being given to new industry to 
locate itself in the area. tt12 Nevertheless, with his knowledge that the 
city's industrial prospects were not bright, it is understandable that he 
favoured economy in the reconstruction plan. 
Cook, being well aware of Southampton's grim industrial future, 
still maintained that the central area of the town required certain 
surgery. He was quite critical of the Borough Engineer's argument that 
economic considerations, rather than planning principles, should 
be the 
basic consideration in the replanning of the area, "since to prepare a 
planning scheme on the basis that planning principles are a secondary 
consideration to any one of the many to be taken 
into consideration, can 
only result in the production of a plan lacking 
in balance to the 
detriment of some of the essential requirements of a good scheme. 
" 13 A 
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good plan, as he argued, had to be economically sound, not only in first 
cost but in maintenance of the enhanced rateable values in the future. 114 
However ideal it might have sounded, the time factor was quite 
important for Southampton in the redevelopment of its central area. The 
replanning scheme was supposed to be self-supporting as quickly as 
possible under the 1944 Planning Act, while what the town could rely on 
in regard to its future prosperity was not its industry but its badly 
damaged shopping facilities. It is therefore not surprising that 
Matthews had to opt for the plan for the future city centre, based on the 
existing layout, and thus less expensive and protracted. On the other 
hand Coventry, led by its Labour leader G. Hodgkinson, did adhere to 
their dream plan with a drastic new road system, shopping precinct, and a 
civic centre with ample provision of open spaces, despite the strong 
pressure from the Government to re-draw it. Coventry was in a sense 
rather fortunate, for the question of its industrial future did not 
preclude, as it did in the case of Southampton, bold planning. It had 
been widely acknowledged that there was in Coventry 'a general alertness 
and enterprise among its citizens and readiness on the part of both 
management and labour to change to a new product or job if an old one 
failed'. 115 This led to the MOTCP to be of the opinion that they 'should 
be optimistic about its post-war industrial development. 1116 The 
Ministry's view was soon confirmed by the Board of Trade, who implied 
that 'in the long run the B. O. T. would expect expansion of Coventry, 
rather than contraction. '117 While there was a certain apprehension 
about problems during the change-over process, 118 especially that held by 
the City Council with regard to the future use of shadow factories, 119 
its industrial expansion in the long term was indisputable. As the City 
Council told the Advisory Panel of the MOTCP, they even expected a 
possible 400,000 population after the war, when the city's population was 
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around the 220,000 figure. 120 In the case of Southampton, the maximum 
population increase they expected was a rise from the current figure of 
180,000 to 250,000, based on the assumptions that new industries should 
come to the town to diversify its industrial structure, and that further 
development of the south coast as a resort centre should have some 
repercussions on the town. 121 
Apart from the question of industrial future, there was another 
great difference that contrasted Southampton with Coventry. In the case 
of Coventry one of the important reasons why the Ministry could not 
undermine the plan was the fear of possible public reaction to such an 
attempt. In Southampton it was the Labour Party on the Council that 
decided to dilute the ambition of the plan. To Matthews in particular, 
it was probably an embarrassment to give up the ideals he had been 
pursuing such determination. 
However, the Southampton Labour Party were not unduly anxious for, 
rather ironically, the public as a whole were not very interested in 
replanning, even when the original 1942 plan was brought before them. 
The Civic Society, for instance, organised an open meeting to discuss 
the new Southampton in May 1942. The meeting had been well advertised 
and several hundred notices sent out, but fewer than 100 people 
attended. The SDE reported that 'the old charge of apathy so often 
levelled at Southampton is being substantiated over replanning, . 122 The 
Civic Society continued their fight against 'the two vested interests', 
i. e. 'apathy and indifference' . 12 3 The Society's efforts, 
however, did 
not bear much fruit. Ultimately their main concern did not go beyond the 
question - how to increase public support for their aims 
if they were to 
exert any influence? '24 
Thus, in Southampton, the financial difficulties caused by the 
blitz, insufficient Government financial and other assistance for 
124 
reconstruction, and pessimistic prospects for the city's industrial 
future, all forced bold planning ideas to yield to economy and 
expediency. Professor Adshead, able town planner of the day, had fallen 
a victim to this process. As we shall see later, it did not take long 
for Southampton's need for economy to claim its next victim. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Replanning the City Centre: The case of Bristol 
1940-1945 
The replanning of the blitzed central area of Bristol during the war 
gives us a rather different picture from that of Coventry or Southampton. 
First of all the preparation of a redevelopment plan took considerable 
time in Bristol. This was in the main due to the approach adopted by 
both the elected members and the officials of the local authority 
responsible for the task. The Planning Committee insisted in the early 
years that they should concentrate on the preliminary research first, 
despite the pressure to get down to replanning as soon as possible. In 
drawing up the reconstruction proposals following the research, the 
method adopted by the City Engineer, who acted as chief planning officer, 
was to have extensive consultation with the interested parties. This 
method, however, proved to be very time consuming. The plan was 
submitted to the City Council in March 1944 for the first time, and after 
further consultation, was approved by the Council in July 1945, with 
certain modifications. The Council itself, which was divided equally 
between representatives of Labour and the Citizen's Party -a coalition 
of Conservatives and Liberals - was not divided with regard to the 
replanning of the central area; nor was there any particular planning 
expert or enthusiast, comparable to Coventry's Hodgkinson or 
Southampton's Matthews. Because of these factors -a rather late start 
at replanning, the lack of an enthusiastic expert Councillor in planning 
and, ironically, the absence of party or personal conflict over the 
matter - it seems that Bristol failed to attract as much attention as it 
might have deserved at national level, in view of the bold nature of its 
replanning proposals. The city was not given any particular attention by 
the Ministry of Town and Country Planning until quite late in the war. 
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At local level, however, the City Council's replanning proposals 
brought about bitter conflict between the Corporation and the interests 
concerned - local traders and a number of eminent architects and 
surveyors, widely known in the country. Of particular importance was the 
keen interest that the local Chamber of Commerce took in the replanning 
of the city. In early 1941 the Chamber set up an organisation 
representing the various interested bodies and made a comprehensive study 
of a wide range of subjects related to the matter. However, as the 
Ministry of Town and Country Planning observed in 1943, the Chamber was 
'active but tactless, ... and its relations with the Corporation are not 
too good'. ' The Chamber wished to be directly involved in the 
preparation of a reconstruction plan. They proposed to the Council the 
co-option of their members onto the Corporation's Committee responsible 
for planning, and the employment of an eminent town planner as a planning 
consultant. The Council, for fear of possible parting with their 
replanning powers, would not take up the Chamber's suggestions. 
As these suggestions had failed to be adopted by the City Council, 
the feeling against its official plan became all the more acute. One 
particular area of controversy in regard to the Corporation's plan was 
over the proposed transfer of the old shopping centre in the Wine Street 
- Castle Street area to a new site. Many small traders, who wanted to 
re-establish themselves as soon as possible on the original sites, feared 
that the severance from the past would do harm to their future. The fact 
that multiple shops, whose growth had been felt to be a threat to their 
existence, were in favour of a new site stiffened their objection still 
further. The attitude of those who opposed the official plan became 
almost uncompromising. 
**** 
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Immediately after the first major blitz on Bristol on 24 November 
1940, a number of bombed-out traders pressed the City Council to make a 
decision on the redevelopment of the damaged central area. The traders 
in question particularly desired to establish themselves again in their 
former business premises. 2 The traders were suffering from the heavy 
financial loss, and there was a strong anxiety on their part that 
trade was leaving Bristol and that people were going to other towns to do 
their shopping, 3 
The Planning and Public Works Committee [hereafter the PPWC) was on 
the one hand very anxious to reinstate these traders as soon as possible 
in a form of temporary shops. At the same time the PPWC was very 
concerned about a possibility that such interim development might become 
prejudicial to permanent development after the war. In order to control 
such development properly, the PPWC decided that each trader should enter 
into an agreement with the Corporation so that premises should be 
constructed to the satisfaction of the Corporation and should be removed 
without the payment of any compensation at the conclusion of hostilities 
or within an agreed period thereafter. 
This arrangement was in general welcomed by traders. For instance 
the Chamber of Commerce stated in their letter to the Town Clerk that 
they regarded this as a definite step in the right direction and urged 
the City Council to proceed with the matter without delay. The Chamber 
also asked that, in view of considerable expenditure necessitated by the 
clearance of sites and the erection of buildings, traders wishing to 
build temporary premises should be allowed to retain possession for a 
minimum period of twelve months after the termination of hostilities. 4 
The PPWC wanted a firm control of the matter and stuck to the condition 
that a period of permission should be a maximum of six months after the 
termination of the war. 5 Although some traders expressed their 
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dissatisfaction with this, agreements were made between a number of 
traders and the Corporation in the early years of the war. 
The Government Inspectors of the test case survey got an impression 
after their visit to the city that Bristol was rather too concerned about 
a possibility of prejudicial development. They suspected that the 
insistence on the urgency of the problem in Bristol was partly due to the 
fact that Castle Street, which was selected for investigation, was the 
ward for which Councillor Martin (Citizen), chairman of the PPWC was the 
member, and that his constituents constantly harrassed him on the 
questions At the same time it was also recorded that the local 
authority were very keen to prepare a redevelopment plan. Then the 
Ministry side somehow misunderstood the situation. They thought that 
with the help of a Government Inspector such plans were evolved for the 
purpose of the inquiry. They also observed, quite wrongly, that it was 
also agreed that the Castle Street - Wine Street area should remain the 
main shopping centre of the city. 7 
When the Chamber of Commerce met the Government Inspector, he 
emphasised the necessity for the appointment of an advisory body of the 
interested parties to make recommendations to the City Council. The 
Chamber took this advice, and in February set up a Special Advisory 
Committee (hereafter the SAC). 8 The SAC included, in addition to 
traders, representatives of the Bristol Society of Architects; the 
Chartered Surveyors Institution (Gloucestershire, Somerset and North 
Wiltshire branch); the Building Trade Federation; the Bristol Property 
Owners Association, and the Multiple Shops Federation. 9 
In April 1941 the SAC forwarded their Memorandum to the Town Clerk 
with a request that the PPWC should receive a deputation 
from the SAC. 
The memorandum set out three points for urgent consideration: a) the 
erection of temporary buildings to enable traders to continue their 
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business; b) the granting of permission to erect temporary buildings on 
certain sites, which would not conflict with a long term scheme for the 
replanning and reconstruction of the city; and c) the preparation of 
such a long term scheme. As the first two points had already been met to 
a certain extent through the means of agreement with the Corporation, the 
SAC emphasised the need for the earliest possible consideration of a long 
term scheme. 
The memorandum then set forth two recommendations to the City 
Council. First the City Council should arrange for the co-option to its 
PPWC of experts in planning and architecture and others with particular 
knowledge of the city. Secondly the City Council should immediately 
employ a Chief Officer, possibly an architect by profession, to whom 
should be given full power to collate the views of all interests and to 
prepare a replanning scheme in conjunction with the augmented PPWC. '° 
A deputation from the SAC led by Col. Mark Whitwill, president of 
the Chamber (by profession a shipping agent), was invited to meet the 
PPWC on 7 May. They stressed the importance of the co-option and of a 
Chief Officer, and urged the need of prompt action before any national 
policy was dictated. Such action was, as the deputation pointed out, all 
the more important, for the city had been selected for the Government's 
test case survey and numerous announcements had appeared in the press 
that the Ministry had asked the City Council to submit a draft 
preliminary scheme of a bold nature. In reply the chairman of the PPWC 
pointed out that new legislation to deal with replanning problems would 
be absolutely necessary, and that, until the Government gave a lead in 
this matter, it would be futile-to spend time which could ill be spared 
from the war effort in preparing any detailed scheme based upon the 
existing legislation. It was also pointed out that, contrary to the 
recent press reports, the Council had received no request from the 
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Ministry of Works and Buildings to submit a draft replanning scheme. In 
fact the PPWC had been embarrassed when the press reported in April 1941 
that Lord Reith, Minister of Works and Buildings, had told the three test 
case survey cities - Birmingham, Coventry and Bristol - to plan for 
I 
reconstruction boldly and comprehensively-" The Bristol Evening Post 
(hereafter the BEN even reported that plans of a drastic nature were 
actually being prepared. 12 The PPWC responded quickly, making it clear 
that no communication had been received from the Ministry instructing the 
Council to plan for reconstruction as stated in the press. When a 
Government Inspector attended the PPWC's meeting on 19 February, all he 
said was that he had been sent to Bristol to enable the Government to 
I consider the legislative and administrative difficulties which would 
arise in the redevelopment of areas damaged by enemy action. 13 As 
Alderman Winchester (Labour), vice-chairman of the PPWC, revealed, this 
Inspector told the Committee that 'I have not come down to advise you, 
but only to listen'. Indeed, Winchester complained that, while they 
asked him if they could prepare plans, he would not answer even that 
question. As Winchester went on: 'We tried to get some indications of 
I 
how we should go on, but he was dumb'. '4 
The PPWC told the SAC's deputation that they were thus of the 
I opinion that the present time was most inopportune to submit a draft 
scheme to the Ministry. The SAC's two recommendations - co-option and a 
I Chief Officer - were not welcomed by the PPWC. As for the first 
question, the chairman of the PPWC said that it might not be convenient 
nor possible to co-opt members upon the PPWC by reason of the numerous 
interests which would need to be represented. As for the second, the 
PPWC promised that they would give it careful consideration, ' but the 
request for a Chief Officer or a Planning Consultant was never to be met 
by the PPWC. 16 
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The Chamber of Commerce was very disappointed because, as they 
stated, the meeting with the PPWC 'gave no grounds for satisfaction'. 
They went on to say that 'the Deputation gained the impression that no 
substantial action was yet contemplated' by the PPWC with regard to the 
actual preparation of replanning proposals. 17 Interestingly, the 
Chamber's criticisms of the PPWC's rather inactive attitude were 
supported by some Labour Council members. Alderman A. W. Cox, a senior 
Labour member, stated at the meeting of the City Council in May that the 
state of indecision and uncertainty made him wonder what was happening to 
the question of replanning. He argued that they should have an early 
opportunity to discuss the matter at length, for some other blitzed 
cities had already got their replanning schemes more or less approved: 
We in Bristol ought to be in a position to 
know roughly what it is we are going to do, 
and we ought to begin to inspire the people 
with what we propose to do, what Bristol's 
going to look like, where roads are likely 
to be, etc. But in this question we seem to 
be sheltering behind something the Ministry 
has not said. '8 
The vice-chairman of the PPWC, Alderman W. H. Winchester (Labour), replied 
that they could only live from day to day in present circumstances, and 
with the many preoccupations of more pressing problems, it was not 
possible for them to settle down to submit a replanning scheme for the 
city, even if it were possible in the uncertainty of what the ultimate 
problem would be. Yet at the same meeting another Labour Alderman W. H. 
Hennessy, who tended to be vocal and a maverick, said that the Committee 
spent too much time on pettifogging matters, but were not allowed to 
discuss major issues such as, inter alia, the replanning of the city. He 
got some support from a few other members, and Winchester had to say 
that he intended to raise the matter at a later date. To this Hennessy 
gave a sharp reply: 'You are all avoiding the real issue. '19 
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The PPWC's first report to the City Council on the replanning of 
damaged areas, submitted in July 1941, was little more than a reassurance 
of the lines that had been taken by the committee. Although the report 
drew attention to 'a unique opportunity for replanning the City' brought 
about by the destruction, it pointed out that in view of what other 
damage might be done before the war ended, it was considered 
'inexpedient, if not impossible, at present to proceed in any detail with 
a definite scheme of replanning. '20 There were also the difficulties 
involved in property rights. If the city were to be rebuilt on modern 
lines, a great number of traders, for instance, might not be able to 
return to their former sites. Before a major scheme could be put into 
shape, the Committee had to know what powers they were going to have in 
regard to this question. 2' 
The Committee had given some thought to the possibility of 
segregating through traffic from shopping streets, the siting of the 
markets, the preservation of historic monuments, and the provision of bus 
stations and car parks. But what they wanted to concentrate on for the 
present was preliminary survey work - the production of maps showing the 
existing users and the extent of war damage, both of which were already 
well under way. At the Council meeting Alderman Cox again insisted that 
nothing was preventing the Committee from proceeding with the replanning, 
except itself. He went on to say that it might be better to have a 
special committee charged with the preparation of a replanning scheme 
that would inspire the people, for there would never be time to do the 
job if they kept waiting. 22 
Although the PPWC's report was eventually adopted by the City 
Council there was strong pressure on the Committee immediately it set to 
work. The City of Bristol Traders' Association, for instance, expressed 
their opinion that the general layout of the central area as a whole 
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should be completed as soon as possible, for, contrary to what the PPWC 
maintained, this did not have to be affected by the possibility of 
further blitzes. 23 The Bristol Round Table sent a letter to the PPWG 
attacking the Committee's '"wait and see" policy with regard to 
replanning. '24 At the same time a number of proposals and suggestions 
with regard to the replanning were being forwarded to the PPWC. In order 
to deal with these suggestions efficiently, the Committee decided, upon 
the suggestion of the City Engineer, to adopt a procedure by which such 
proposals would in the first place be forwarded to the Engineer and then 
be considered in detail by a joint technical sub-committee (the 
'Conference of Chief Officers') consisting of the Town Clerk, the City 
Engineer, the City Architect, the City Valuer and the Town Planning 
Officer. This Conference would eventually prepare a report to the PPWC 
for information and consideration of such proposals. 25 
The Chamber of Commerce tried to establish a close relationship with 
this Conference of Officers. In September 1941 the Chamber sent a letter 
to the PPWC asking to endorse the setting up of an enlarged 
representative organisation to replace the existing SAC. This new body 
should have, through the medium of its Liaison Committee, close personal 
contact with the Conference of Officers, for, as the letter stressed, 
such contact would be the only way in which competent external opinion 
could be effectively presented to the Corporation. 26 
At the meeting of the PPWC some Labour members expressed their 
concern about the Chamber's proposal. Alderman F. Bicker said that the 
Conference of Officers was most suited to deal with the matter, and if 
the Committee attempted to bring everyone else in, they would have a 
jumble before anything could be done. Alderman Hennessy suspected that 
the Chamber were trying to get representation on the executive. He went 
on to say that they were only anxious to secure restoration of the old 
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city streets and not replanning. 27 In the end, however, the PPWC 
resolved to inform the Chamber that they were generally in agreement with 
their proposals, provided that the Committee would 'not delegate or in 
any way part with their replanning powers. '28 
The Chamber regarded this as a satisfactory reply and in October 
they formed an enlarged Advisory Committee, now renamed the Replanning 
Advisory Committee [hereafter the RAC], with their President and Vice- 
President as chairman and vice-chairman respectively. The RAC 
represented more than 150 organisations and interests in the city, and 
was divided into 12 groups dealing respectively with arts, churches, 
commerce, distributive trades, education, entertainment, industry, 
medical affairs, social welfare, sports, technical aspects, and 
transport. An Executive Committee was set up consisting of the 
representatives of each group, and from this Committee a Liaison 
Committee of five was appointed to maintain contact with the Conference 
of Officers of the Corporation. 29 
In the end not much contact seems to have been made between the 
Conference of Officers of the Corporation and the Liaison Committee of 
the RAC. In December 1941 they met for the first time, and the Liaison 
Committee asked, among other things, whether the Corporation had formed 
any ideas with regard to the re-establishment on their original sites of 
industries which had been damaged by enemy action. They were also 
anxious to know the extent of the area which the Corporation would 
propose to consider under any new planning scheme. The Conference of 
Officers insisted that very little could be done in connection with 
replanning until particulars of the impending legislation were known, and 
the Liaison Committee, although very reluctantly, had no choice but to 
accept this. 30 In April 1942 the RAC approached the Conference of 
Officers again and asked if the Town Planning officer might accompany 
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their proposed deputation to the Ministry of Works and Buildings. The 
PPWC replied flatly that this request could not be granted. 31 
**** 
Meanwhile the question of the reconstitution of the PPWC came under 
review. In August 1942 the Chamber of Commerce sent the Interim Report 
of the RAC to the Conference of Officers. The Report recommended, among 
other things, the immediate setting up of an ad hoc Planning Committee 
for the region for which the City Council were responsible. The Report 
also said that such a Committee should co-opt up to 30 per cent of its 
membership from representatives nominated by the RAC. This suggestion in 
the first place called the attention of the Conference of Officers to the 
fact that the PPWC had 'a multitude of responsibilities' which were 
interlocked to a very considerable degree, thus preventing it functioning 
efficiently. The PPWC had been set up in 1933 by merging the Town 
Planning Committee and the Sanitary Committee. The dual function of 
planning matters and maintenance works, however, did not work as had been 
expected. As the Town Clerk put it, all matters were considered by the 
full Committee of eighteen members and consequently it spent a 
considerable amount of time discussing minor matters and the officers 
were detained for long periods. The Officers' recommendation was that the 
duties of the PPWC should be carried out by two smaller Committees, one 
dealing with planning matters and the other responsible for maintenance 
works. If the duties of the PPWC were divided on the lines suggested, 
then there would be a possibility of co-option on the proposed ad hoc 
Planning Committee, especially to review matters which were not normally 
considered by a Corporation Committee. 32 
While the PPWC had no objection to the officers' proposal to set up 
two smaller Committees, they were unable to come to any conclusion on the 
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question of co-option, and decided to refer it to the City Council with- 
out making any recommendation. 33 However, the Council also failed to 
arrive at a decisive conclusion on the matter. At the Council meeting in 
December 1942, Alderman R. L. Lyne, a Citizen Party member, argued that a 
Planning Committee should ensure that matters which concerned Bristol on 
a much wider basis should be properly co-ordinated and their interests 
should be represented and authoritatively stated, the point made by the 
RAC's Interim Report. Not surprisingly one Labour member questioned if 
the motive behind the amendment was directed to co-option. Although this 
was categorically denied by the Citizen Party side, a feeling of 
uncertainty and suspicion prevailed in the Council. 34 
A hint of conflict between the Labour members and the Citizen Party 
members appeared in appointing the first chairman of the Planning and 
Reconstruction Committee [hereafter the PRC]. Labour recommended 
Alderman Cox, while the Citizen members pushed Alderman Inskip, and the 
matter could not be settled at the first meeting of December 1942.35 
After one month, however, the PRC unanimously decided to appoint Inskip 
as chairman and Cox as vice-chairman respectively. 36 As the City 
Engineer urged the PRC, they had to settle down as soon as possible to 
the question of the officers and the Committee itself. 37 The officers 
were 'firmly of the opinion that planning is essentially a matter which 
calls for team work and the fullest co-operation between the various 
officers concerned, ' and claimed that the existing machinery - 
'Conference of Officers' concerned - would be most conducive of practical 
research and good planning. 39 The PRC, also emphasising the importance 
of team work, stated that at the same time the new Committee should 
appoint one officer styled 'Chief Planning officer' who would lead and 
co-ordinate the whole of the planning activities of the Corporation. The 
question was whether it should be filled by the City Engineer who was 
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responsible for planning matters under the existing system, or it should 
call for an entirely new appointment. The PRC were 'satisfied that a new 
appointment from outside the service would not at the present time be in 
the best interests of the Corporation', and decided unanimously to 
appoint the City Engineer as Chief Planning Officer. At the same time 
the PRC extended the scope of duties of the City Architect which had been 
confined to elevation of buildings, so that he should be allowed 'full 
expression as an Architect in all planning proposals with direct access 
to and full collaboration with the Chief Planning Officer and the 
Committee. 39 
This decision enabled the City Engineer to start giving the PRC his 
preliminary outline of tentative planning proposals for the city 
comprising highways and some suggestions for the layout of the central 
area. 40 The PRC then asked him to commence the preparation of proposals 
relating to housing and the location of industry with a view to assessing 
the desirability or otherwise of a sattelite town or towns in the 
adjoining counties. 41 While these proposals were settling into shape 
nothing was done about the question of co-option and the Chamber of 
Commerce became impatient. They told the PRC that they had arrived at a 
point where they could be of no further service to the Corporation unless 
they were brought into the Committee's counsels and were informed of the 
Corporation's plan. 42 In reply the PRC told the Chamber that 'as and 
when this Committee are tentatively agreed upon any proposals affecting 
the principles of replanning the Committee will give an opportunity to 
the Chamber of Commerce or others who are directly interested to discuss 
the proposals. '43 In this way the Chamber's insistence on co-option was 
virtually turned down and the preparation of replanning proposals for the 
central area progressed without any particular intervention from outside 
bodies. 
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In May 1943 the City Engineer submitted his road proposals to the 
PRC. The main objects of the proposals were first to diversify regional 
and national traffic from the central area of the city, and secondly to 
deal with the traffic which would reach the central area. The first 
objective was to be met by two ring roads - an 'Outer Ring' of 34 miles 
and an 'Inner Ring' of 21 miles. The second objective would be met by an 
'Inner Circuit' of two miles, half of which was already completed as 
Redcliffe - Temple Way. Consultations with regard to the road proposals 
had already taken place with various interests, including the MOWT, the 
Regional Planning Officer of the MOTCP, County Surveyors concerned, the 
Chief Constable, the City Architect and the Bristol Tramway Company. 
While the proposals met with fairly general approval, there was one 
particular point of discussion - whether public service vehicles, i. e. 
buses, should be allowed to use any or all of the roads within the Inner 
Circuit Road. The City Engineer maintained that buses should be excluded 
from the confines of Inner Circuit, but many others argued that some 
streets within Inner Circuit should be used as omnibus routes for the 
sake of public convenience. 44 
In June the PRC approved the three ring roads, but as to the Inner 
Circuit, it was agreed in principle only and consideration of the 
question of exclusion of buses was left to the City Engineer after 
further consultation with the interested bodies. 45 
Meanwhile the PRC started their consideration of the City Engineer's 
zoning plans for the central area. 46 One member suggested that a 
progress report upon the replanning should be submitted to the City 
Council as soon as possible. Others maintained that before a 
satisfactory report could be presented they had to come to a decision 
with regard to the planning of the area within the Inner Circuit, 
especially that of Castle Street - Wine Street area. In this connection, 
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the Town Clerk informed the Committee that the Advisory Panel of the 
MOTCP would visit Bristol in September to discuss the matter with the PRC 
and the Officers concerned. 47 
The Advisory Panel found the case of Bristol rather difficult, but 
in quite a different way to that of Coventry. The local authority had 
made a late start with post-war reconstruction plans. Although the City 
Engineer was said to be preparing a reconstruction plan, nothing 
particular was yet known of his proposals apart from those of the road 
system. 48 At the meeting between the Panel and the local authority the 
City Engineer explained that, although there was not much to show on 
paper, his method was first to consult with interests on the basis of a 
rough sketch plan and then to base the plan on the results of the 
consultations. The Panel expressed some concern about the size of the 
reconstruction area which the local authority might purchase. It was 
about 600 acres but some of it, such as areas owned by the Dock 
Authorities, the Cathedral and the University would not necessitate 
acquisition. It was also pointed out that Bristol might have to disperse 
some of their population to a satellite or satellites. Against this 
suggestion the City Engineer argued that there was no real need for a 
satellite, for there was still some room in the city and the population 
was not likely to increase very much. 49 Back in London the Panel tried to 
figure out the salient planning issues at Bristol. The most they could 
find out was that, because the damage was fairly scattered, the recon- 
struction area might have to be a large one. It was also pointed out 
that Bristol was larger than any of the other six cities selected by the 
Panel, and this would make the problem more complex. 5° 
Although not much was acteieok as a result of the discussion with 
the Panel, the PRC carried forward the consideration of the planning of 
the areas within the Inner Circuit. In October 1943 an important 
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suggestion was put forward by the Multiple Traders' Federation [hereafter 
the MTF], whom the City Engineer had already met and was 'glad to find 
... in agreement with his views on a number of points. '5' Their 
suggestion was that the Castle Street - Wine street area, the shopping 
centre before the war, should now be planned as a 'civic' area, i. e. an 
open space with perhaps a conference hall or other buildings of this 
character, and that the shopping centre originally in this area should be 
transferred to the north, i. e. to the Broadmead and Lower Union Street 
area. 52 The plan was soon prepared by the MTF, while their suggestion 
was considered by the Retail Distributors' Group of the RAC. The Group 
told the PRC that, although they could not commit themselves until more 
detailed plans were available, they needed more information from the MTF 
on costs as a basis for further discussions with the PRC and officers. 53 
The PRC in turn regarded the retailers' request for the estimate of 
cost as their virtual approval of the proposed new treatment of the old 
shopping centre, and decided to agree in principle to replan this area as 
an open space. The remaining question was thus a site for the new 
shopping centre, which could be, as suggested by the City Engineer, 
either in the Broadmead and Lower Union Street area, or in Victoria 
Street. °4 
**** 
In February 1944 the City Engineer completed his report on the 
proposals for the planning and reconstruction of the central area of the 
city. The area covered by the plan amounted to 774 acres, all of which 
had been largely affected by enemy action. As the Engineer proudly put 
it, this 'Master Policy Plan' had been 'thoroughly well considered and 
should serve to form a useful basis of discussion in order that the 
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tragic destruction of the war years may result in the replanning of a 
still better Bristol City. '65 
Among policy proposals particular emphasis was placed upon the road 
system, for, as the City Engineer maintained, in a commercial city such 
as Bristol 'neither efficiency nor amenity can be obtained unless very 
adequate arrangements are made to deal with the control of traffic. '56 
The most important road proposal was for the Inner Circuit Road, designed 
with 'an absolute control of access points to it'. Vehicular traffic 
would be allowed to gain access to, and exit from, the Inner Circuit Road 
only at controlled roundabout intersections. Outside the Inner Circuit 
Road, two important proposals were for the possible widening of Park 
Street to give an adequate link between the Inner Circuit and the area 
west of it; and for exclusion of traffic from Queen's Road in order to 
make it a shopping cul-de-sac. 57 
The Inner Circuit Road would enclose an area approximately three 
quarters of a mile in diameter. This area would be divided into 
enclosures or precincts by other major roads only secondary in importance 
to the Inner Circuit Road itself. Each portion thus divided and would be 
planned in detail to discourage heavy traffic, through traffic and public 
service vehicles travelling across the area bounded by the Inner Circuit 
Road. At the same time, although it was at first hoped to exclude 
altogether public service vehicles from this area, as had been pointed 
out through the consultations with the interested bodies, this 
was practically unlikely without trespassing unduly on public 
convenience. ' It was therefore suggested that the minimum number of 
public service vehicles should be routed across the area bounded by the 
Inner Circuit Road, although by far the larger number should travel via 
the Inner circuit Road itself. 5° 
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In order to control the type of user that would be permitted in the 
various areas covered by the Report, the zonir.; proposals were made to 
indicate a predominant user in any particular area, some of which were 
intended to be reserved and ultimately acquired for special purposes. 
These proposals included: a warehouse and distributive trades zone in 
the vicinity of the City Docks and Temple Meads Railway Station; a site 
of approximately five acres for a Central Wholesale and Retail market at 
the junction of Victoria Street and Temple Way; an industrial zone in 
localities adjacent to the Docks and the Temple Meads Railway Station; a 
housing estate, to the south of the Inner Circuit Road, for key workers 
employed in connection with the Docks, Railway establishments, or the 
industrial and commercial area adjacent; a business zone, roughly on the 
lines of the present one, around areas such as Clare Street, Corn 
Street and Baldwin Street; a municipal civic centre in the College Green 
area; King Street as a museum piece for the buildings of historical and 
architectural interest; and a 60 acre precinct for extensions to the 
University, the erection of further hospital buildings and a medical 
school. 59 
Two particularly important proposals were for a shoppinaý zone and 
for enhanced public open space, which had been duly commended by the 
Multiple Traders' Federation. The pre-war shopping centre around the 
Wine Street - Castle Street area, stretching between Bristol Bridge and 
Old Market Street, was now reserved as a public open space with a limited 
number of buildings - such as a Conference Hall - upon it. A 
considerable area underneath this open space could be used as an 
underground car park accommodating 2,000 out of 4,500 cars scheduled to 
be on sites provided by the City Council. In the Broadmead area, to the 
north of the pre-war shopping centre, a new main shopping precinct of 
approximately 35 acres was proposed. Its pivotal point would be circular 
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in shape, with arcaded shops, and the surrounding area was to consist of 
larger blocks, built to the most modern and approved description. No 
through traffic roads were allowed, but back service roads would be 
provided. Other areas zoned for shopping purposes included the frontages 
to Park Street and Queens Road, which was a continuation of pre-war 
use. 60 
In concluding his report the City Engineer stated: 
Some of the proposals are new 
rather revolutionary, but your 
that the spirit of adventure 
connection with post war dev 
that Bristol would not wish to 
in this direction. 61 
and possibly 
Engineer feels 
is abroad in 
elopments, and 
be behind hand 
Although the PRC decided that the City Council should consider the City 
Engineer's report 'in private', 62 the local press were quite pleased to 
see that the secret was eventually out. The new Bristol envisaged by the 
PRC was, as the BEP put it, 'bold beyond the wildest dreams of most 
people, but it is conceived through the telescope of 50 years ahead - to 
meet the needs of the Bristol of 2,000 A. D. '63 One important question 
was 'who should pay for the cost. The BEP expressed the concern that 
'From the plans it would appear to have been designed on what is regarded 
as desirable, regardless of other considerations'. 64 The BEP however 
went on to argue: 
The Government should pay, and there is a 
rightful expectation that it will. In any 
case, the scheme should prove to be economic, 
so that in the process of years increased 
values should reflect themselves in a 
balanced budget. If neither of these 
expectations could be realised it is still 
necessary that the blitzed areas should be 
restored, and the fear that the rates will 
reflect this necessity in an increased 
financial demand should not be allowed to 
paralyse an endeavour to worthily recreate 
our treasured city. 63 
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At the same time it was expected that there would be widely differing 
opinions on the City Engineer's proposals, especially those relating to 
the new shopping precinct and the fate of its predecessor. 
Within two weeks of the City Engineer's report having been submitted 
to the City Council, the PRC and the Officers met representatives of 
various interested bodies to discuss the report and found, rightly or 
wrongly, that no serious criticism had been made. It was reported that 
there were only some criticisms of the proposal to move the shopping 
centre and that the City Engineer was examining alternative suggestions 
which had been submitted for the restoration of the shopping centre on 
the Castle Street and Wine Street area. 67 
A month later the City Engineer told the PRC that he had given 
careful consideration to the alternative schemes aiming at the reinstate- 
ment of traders in the Castle Street and Wine Street area, but he did not 
think that there was any chance of reinstating the traders in this area 
and providing a shopping centre worthy of the city. The City Valuer also 
stated that the ideal unit for shop sites should have a frontage of 25 
feet and a depth of from 85 to 100 feet, and that the National Fire 
Service was asking that a fire break of at least 50 feet should be 
provided between blocks. The fire of November 1940 caused by the blitz 
had spread very rapidly because of the congestion in the old area, and it 
was duly suggested that any reconstruction should have ample fire breaks 
to lessen such a hazard. 68 In view of these points it would be 
impossible to reinstate all the traders in the old shopping centre. For 
one thing the old area had a shopping frontage of 6,000 feet compared to 
9,600 feet in the proposed new area. The City Architect then intimated 
that he was in agreement with the views expressed by the City Engineer 
and the City Valuer, adding that he regarded the proposal to have an open 
153 
space in the centreal area as of prime importance. On these comments, 
the PRC stated that up to the moment they had received no practicable 
information or proposals suggesting that there was a possibility of all 
traders formerly carrying on business in the Castle Street and Wine 
Street area being reinstated there, although they also added that they 
would be prepared to consider any further proposals on these lines. 69 
**** 
In fact criticisms and alternative suggestions of the City 
Engineer's replanning proposals were flooding into the City Council. The 
Western Counties Chapter of the Incorporated Association of Architects 
and Surveyors [hereafter the IAAS], a body of young Bristol architects 
and surveyors, were opposed to the official plan to take the Inner 
Circuit Road through 'The Centre' on the ground that it would materially 
reduce its effectiveness for the diffusion of traffic. Instead, the Inner 
Circuit should include the proposed municipal centre in the College Green 
area, and The Centre should be the focus of the communal and civic life, 
rather than part of the main traffic route. 70 In regard to the civic 
centre at College Green, however, the Chamber of Commerce maintained that 
the area should still be retained as a shopping area in view of its past 
history. 71 In this connection Bristol Rotary Club produced a plan for a 
new civic centre in Victoria Street, even scrapping the existing official 
proposal at College Green where a new Council House was already under 
construction. The merits of their idea were, first, that it was the 
only real level site in the city where extensive reconstruction could 
take place, and secondly, that it would provide a dignified approach for 
visitors to the city from Temple Meads Railway Station. 72 The proposal 
to convert Queens Road into a shopping cul-de-sac and to ban traffic from 
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it and Park Street also met considerable opposition, especially from the 
traders concerned. 73 
The most contentious issue with regard to the City Engineer's 
replanning proposals was the re-siting of the shopping centre. There 
were two main grounds for the opposition to the proposed open space in 
the old shopping centre. First, there was an acute concern about the 
economic and social effects of the sterilisation of too large an area of 
importance in the heart of the city. 74 Secondly, the majority of traders 
were anxious, inter alia, that this area should again be used as a 
shopping centre. Although this argument was perhaps understandable in 
the light of the old adage that 'the devil you know is better than the 
devil you don't know', 75 most traders had become, as the City Engineer 
told the PRC, extremely adamant in refusing the Council officers' 
contention that the area was not large enough to adequately accommodate 
all the traders who had formerly carried on business there. 76 
Thus the main criticism of the proposed new shopping centre in the 
Broadmead area was that it was geographically unsuitable, particularly 
because it was 'off the beaten track' of pedestrians who habitually 
walked through the centre of the old city - Wine Street and Castle 
Street. It was argued that the fact that these streets had proved a 
direct link between east and west Bristol made them a popular and 
valuable shopping centre. " Moreover, there was a concern that the 
Broadmead area, the low-level area on the bed of the River Frome, was 
'waterlogged', 78 and the bearing qualities of the sub-soil were not 
sufficient to carry heavy buildings. Reference was made, for instance, 
to the flooding of 1889, even though improvements had been made since 
then to the River Frome to prevent the repetition of such an event. 79 
Not surprisingly most of the alternative proposals to the City 
Engineer's plan aimed at the retention of the Wine Street - Castle Street 
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area as the principal shopping centre. In general it was understood that 
further development of this area might well take place northwards in the 
Broadmead area. In May 1944 the Bristol Re-planning Association - which 
was effectively a renamed RAC - put forward a scheme for the replanning 
of the old shopping centre drawn up by eminent local architects. It had 
been thought that the Association was generally in favour of the plan 
endorsed by multiple shops envisaging the new civic area based on the 
pre-war shopping centre. They had made it clear, however, that, contrary 
to an impression which existed, they had given no approval to it, but 
were, in fact, of the opinion that it was open to serious objection. 80 
Their alternative plan, endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce, proposed to 
accommodate existing shopkeepers in the old shopping centre in accordance 
with modern requirements, with the space northwards to allow for further 
expansion. 81 In June another alternative suggestion appeared in the 
local press drawn up by a local architect on the instructions of certain 
Wine Street traders. It proposed a 100 ft wide road along the river bank 
on the south side of the shopping area to connect Bristol Bridge and Old 
Market Street, which would also be used as a service road for the area. 82 
Thirdly, the IAAS suggested a generous replanning of the old site with a 
traffic-restricted shopping boulevard between Old Market Street and The 
Centre. A central park should be provided to the west of the Centre, 
rather than in the existing shopping centre, which appeared to be a 
natural choice, greatly enhancing The Centre and the Civic Centre (in 
this case the official proposal of College Green area). 83 Finally, 
Bristol Rotary Club, with the help of E. Button, vice-president of the 
Bristol Society of Architedcts, also produced a plan for the shopping 
centre based on the old area, with an extension northwards. 84 
This flood of alternative suggestions opposed to the official 
proposals of transferring the shopping centre made the Lord Mayor state 
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strongly in public around this time that a final reconstruction plan 
should satisfy most, if not all, of the interests clamouring for 
recognition and adoption of their own ideas. 85 At the same time there 
were some encouraging signs for the PRC in relation to their proposal for 
the new shopping centre. As the Chamber of Commerce admitted, it was 
generally understood that the multiple traders were favourably inclined 
towards the new site for a shopping centre in the Broadmead area. 86 It 
was stated by the MTC themselves that two-thirds of the traders who voted 
on a questionnaire concerning the removal from the old shopping centre to 
the Broadmead area were in favour of moving. 87 The Co-operative Society 
also informed the PRC that they had no objection to the transfer of a 
shopping centre. 88 Some traders also showed their qualified approval of 
the official proposals. Bristol Retailers' Advisory Committee on Town 
Planning of the Chamber of Commerce, while regarding the Re-planning 
Association's plan as best, intimated that a civic centre in the Castle 
Street and Wine Street area might be acceptable on the understanding a) 
that the conversion of this area into a civic centre should be the only 
solution for a successful new shopping centre in the Broadmead area; b) 
that the City Council should be responsible for safeguarding the 
Broadmead area against flooding; and c) that provision should be made as 
soon as possible for temporary shops to be erected on the Wine Street and 
Castle Street area during the building of the proposed new shopping 
centre. e9 In October 1944 the BEP, too, commented that a more expansive 
site for the new shopping centre than the original one seemed to be 
inevitable. First of all, the previous occupants in the original area 
often wanted to take more space than before when getting back to the old 
sites. Secondly, many well-known firms who had previously not been 
represented in Bristol were said to be keen to establish themselves 
there, particularly in the new shopping centre. As it went on: 
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While understanding the desire of the former 
traders in the old site to conserve their 
interests, the public would, doubtless, 
welcome newcomers as adding to the variety 
of goods displayed and the delight that 
shopping gives to womenfolk. 90 
Meanwhile the PRC continued their consideration of the City Engineer's 
reports on all criticisms and observations of the Corporation's plan of 
March 1944, and on all alternative suggestions and plans put forward to 
the City Council. In September 1944 the Committee decided to make 
important modifications to the original proposals. The Committee 
accepted alternatives to the original proposal to convert Queens Road 
into a shopping cul-de-sac and to ban traffic from it and Park Street; 
to the reservation of College Green for a civic (municipal) centre; and, 
to the proposed open space reservation in the Wine Street and Castle 
Street area. 91 
Now the PRC decided that both Queens Road and Park Street should 
remain as a two-way thoroughfare for traffic, with Park Street to be 
widened by 20 feet to adapt it for modern traffic. This decision then 
became the primary reason to look elsewhere for a civic centre other than 
the originally proposed College Green area, for, as the chairman of the 
Committee later put it, 'It would never do to have a main traffic street 
running right through the civic area'. 92 As an alternative the Rotary 
Club had proposed turning Victoria Street into a site for civic 
buildings. However splendid their plan might look, Victoria Street did 
not commend itself to the PRC, for they thought that the new shopping 
centre should be in close contact with the civic centre, and not separate 
from it with the river in between. 93 At this point the City Engineer 
expressed the view that much of the opposition to the proposed new 
shopping centre in Broadmead would disappear if the Castle Street and 
Wine Street area could be satisfactorily developed instead of its being 
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reserved as open space. In view of these points the PRC came to the 
conclusion that the Castle Street and Wine Street area, the most 
important and the most valuable area in the city, should be devoted as a 
long-term policy to public services, including such buildings as a 
Museum, Art Gallery, Guild Hall, municipal buildings, concert hall and 
conference hall. Moreover, this decision then opened the way to a 
further concession - the request that the College Green area should be 
used for shopping purposes in continuation of pre-war practice. 94 
The amendment to the zoning of the College Green area provided a 
further opportunity to accec to the traders' request. It at first 
brought about the question of the future use of the Council House, the 
construction of which was nearing completion. In January 1945 the PRC 
decided that the building should be completed as quickly as possible in 
order to provide accommodation for the activities of the Council, since 
the suggested layout of the Castle Street and Wine Street area as a civic 
centre should be adopted as a long term policy. At this point the City 
Engineer suggested that the pre-war shopping centre might be used, 
pending its final layout for public purposes, for the erection of 
temporary shops until such time as the shopping centre in Broadmead was 
developed. 95 Requests on these lines were forwarded from the Retailers' 
Advisory Committee on Town Planning and the City of Bristol Traders' 
Association. 96 By June negotiations with the interests had proceeded, 
and the PRC decided to provide 100 temporary shops in the Castle Street 
and Wine Street area in the first instance. 97 
Taking care of the industrialists who were affected by the central 
area plan was also well considered, and in June 1945 the City Council 
approved the joint recommendation of the PRC and the Docks Committee to 
set up a trading estate at Avonmouth at an initial expenditure of 
£275,000.98 
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Meanwhile the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, who had not 
been well acquainted with Bristol's replanning proposals for the central 
area, in the end became fairly impressed with them. In April 1945 the 
MOTCP suggested that the PRC submit the central area plan to them 
informally for comments before it would submit it to the City Council for 
approval. The City Council had been hesitant to apply for a declaratory 
order for compulsory purchase under the 1944 Town and Country Planning 
Act. The aim of the Ministry's suggestion therefore seemed to encourage 
the Council by telling them that their plan which had to accompany the 
application for a declaratory order was favourably viewed by the 
Minister. 99 In June the City Engineer reported to the PRC that Professor 
Holford, technical adviser to the MOTCP, had inspected the draft plan for 
the central area, and intimated that he was 'broadly speaking' in 
sympathy with the main proposals. 10° In fact Holford had a very high 
opinion of them. As he wrote to the Regional Planning Officer of the 
MOTCP around this time, 'It is very satisfactory to see that the basis 
for a really effective plan is being so well laid in Bristol by 
discussion between the Council and the various interests. ' For instance, 
a new proposal for siting civic buildings on the old shopping centre 
would, as he put it 
have the advantage of preserving the area 
from becoming "dead" and, since the civic 
buildings will not be built for some years, 
of allowing a very valuable site for 
temporary shops while those in Broadmead are 
being built. I am, therefore, inclined to 
the view that if a suitable layout is agreed 
for public buildings on the former shopping 
area, there could be little objection to the 
proposal. 
As for the proposed new shopping centre, he pointed out that 
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the trading interests, and in particular the 
multiple stores, had shown considerable 
interest in this scheme, and were 
sufficiently well organised to be able to 
give what amounts to a satisfactory assurance 
to the Council that if it were developed in 
the way proposed, they would take up leases. 10' 
**** 
In July 1945, the City Council considered the PRC's plan for the central 
area, with a view to applying for a Declaratory Order. They also 
considered the estimates of initial costs made by the Finance Committee, 
with a view to making applications to the Minister of Health from time to 
time for sanction to borrow the necessary moneys. £2,000,000 for the 
acquisition of sites in the central area; £250,000 for the erection of 
100 temporary shops in Castle Street and Wine Street; and £60,000 for 
three more trading estates (at St. Philip's, Brislington and Bedminster), 
on top of that in Avonmouth approved in June. 
As for the central area the significant difference between the 
original and new plans was the modifications to the proposals in regard 
to the Wine Street and Castle Street area, College Green, and Queen's 
Road and Park Street. But the site of the new shopping centre was not 
changed. In fact the PRC's strongest emphasis was placed upon their 
adherence to the new shopping centre in the Broadmead area. As Alderman 
Sir John Inskip, Chairman of the Committee, told the Council, the 
question of the main shopping centre had been 'the most contentious and 
the most difficult. ' There had been considerable opposition to the idea 
of transferring it from the Castle Street and Wine Street area to 
Broadmead. He asked the Council, however, to grasp what a modern 
shopping centre would require: 
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It is all very well to say Castle Street and 
Wine Street have served the city well over 
all these years, and why not put the shops 
back there? The fact that they have been 
there, and, therefore, should remain, is 
surely the worst of all possible reasons. '°2 
Regrettable as it was to break a link going back many years, the PRC were 
convinced that it was impracticable to put back into such a restricted 
area even the shops that were there before. If they had to choose which 
traders should return to the old shopping centre with a 25 ft frontage 
each, they could not accommodate more than 60 to 70 per cent of those 
there before. The multiple shops might want up to 100 ft frontage, while 
there were the new businesses, large and small, which it was hoped would 
be attracted. The argument for northward extension to Broadmead proposed 
in many alternative suggestions was also dismissed because of the 
difference in level between the two areas. The City Council approved the 
plan unanimously. If anything, there was certain concern, as quite 
rightly predicted, about the proposal to put temporary shops in Castle 
Street and Wine Street, for, as it was expressed, it would be in a sense 
reinforcing the feeling that they should be retained as a shopping 
area. 103 
W. S. Palmer, chairman of the Retailers' Advisory Committee on Town 
Planning, pointed out in the press that the new proposals appeared to 
accept certain important suggestions put forward by the interests 
concerned following the lines of the MTF's plan. Among other things, as 
he stated, that the changing of the civic centre to the Castle Street and 
Wine Street area would probably make a considerable difference to the 
opinions which many had held on the transference of the shopping centre 
to Broadmead. A large number, as he pointed out, had not liked the idea 
of an open space on the old shopping centre. He also expressed the view 
that traders would welcome the proposal to provide temporary shops as 
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quickly as possible. Describing the new proposals as 'a bold scheme', he 
stated that they 'would certainly receive the early and most careful 
consideration - of which it was worthy - of the retailers. 410 
To many others, however, the new proposals related to the shopping 
centres were far from being acceptable. Eustace Button, (vice-president 
of the Bristol Society of Architects), one of the five members of the 
Liaison Committee of the Replanning Association, for instance, was 
strongly opposed to the new civic centre and the shopping centre. 
put it: 
It is interesting to note that the civic 
buildings are going to be moved within the 
Inner Circuit to the business heart of the 
city. It is curious, however, that the most 
difficult and expensive site for these 
buildings has been chosen, in the Castle 
Street and Wine Street area, when a much 
finer site is available in the Victoria 
Street boulevard. 
Now that the Castle Street and Wine Street 
area is to be built over, it is all the more 
necessary to hear what are the over-riding 
reasons for displacing the successful 
shopping centre from its original position, 
at vast expense, and reinstating it in an 
area that has always been "off the map. "° 
As he 
The Rotary Club soon got together to make strong comments on the passing 
of the new proposals for the central area of the city. The PRC's 
argument that only 60 to 70 per cent of the present tenants in the Castle 
Street and Wine Street area could be accommodated was, as one member 
pointed out, never convincing, because the same area was going to be a 
civic centre with any extension that would be necessary. In fact in the 
Corporation's proposal the civic buildings were going to be scattered in 
different places. It was also said that the new shopping centre would 
never be a success, for people were looking forward to having the old 
centre of the mediaeval town as a shopping centre as before. As one 
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member said, the Corporation's scheme had 'one fundamental unsoundness, ' 
the lack of an expert's advice to judge it. 
The people who devised it are the judges of 
their own work - the plaintiffs are their own 
judge and jury. ios 
Against this the PRC and the Officers could argue that they had 
considered very carefully the criticisms of and the alternative 
suggestions to their original proposals in 1944 and in certain respects 
acceeded to them: 340 comments and criticisms of the original proposals 
plus 20 alternative plans had been forwarded to them, and 25 associations 
had been consulted. As the City Engineer told the local press 
confidently, "We believe we have done the best possible to meet the many 
difficulties involved and the wishes and representations expressed to 
us'. 107 Thus, as the chairman of the PRC told the Council, their 
Officers and the Committee were convinced that the Broadmead shopping 
centre was 'the right and only practicable proposal', and therefore, that 
'there could be no letting the traders go back to the sites they occupied 
before'. 10 e 
**** 
In October 1945 a joint meeting was held of the Chamber of Commerce, 
the Replanning Association, and the Rotary Club. In view of a public 
inquiry, prescribed under the Town and Country Planning Act 1944, into 
the City Council's application for a declaratory order with the central 
area plan as supporting evidence, they agreed to submit a joint case of 
objections of the three organisations to it. 109 The strong objection in 
some quarters to the Corporation's plan for the central area had, how- 
ever, very little, if anything, to do either with the municipal election 
in November 1945 or with the City Council's attitude toward the plan. 
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The only difference between the Labour Party and the Citizen Party with 
regard to the question of reconstruction seemed to be the former's 
hostility to, and the latter's sympathy for traders. As the Labour 
Party's municipal programme read: 
To us now is given a chance that is truly 
priceless - the chance to plan and build a 
city that will be worthy of the ancient 
traditions of Bristol and its glorious 
future. If this chance is to be utilised to 
the full no vested interest, no selfish 
profit-making clique must be allowed to 
endanger it. The Labour Party serves no 
private vested interest. It is only 
concerned with the greatest good of the 
majority of the people. We believe shopping 
interests should serve the people and not the 
people the shopping interests. 110 
The Citizen Party, stating their reconstruction policy, said: 
We realise fully the struggle of the small 
private traders and all those who have to re- 
establish themselves after the ravages of 
war, and it will be our earnest endeavour to 
help them and to so order the planning and 
reconstruction of the city that both the 
largest and smallest trader shall find 
himself re-established on a suitable site at 
the earliest possible moment. "' 
This did not mean, however, the traders' plea for the re-establishment of 
the old shopping centre might be accepted by the City Council. As the 
Party's programme went on to say 
Nothing will be allowed to hinder the 
planning and reconstruction of Bristol. The 
city should be the cultural and artistic 
centre of the West. We believe that the 
proposed layout of the destroyed centre of 
the city is a good one, and we shall actively 
proceed to carry it out, and especially that 
part of it which provides for new public 
buildings, including conference hall and 
concert hail. 112 
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Thus both the Labour Party and the Citizen Party were confident in the 
Corporation's plan for the central area of the city, and were keen to 
proceed with the matter as quickly as possible. At the same time it 
should also be noted that both parties put the first and foremost 
priority on housing, and as Alderman Inskip, leader of the Citizen Party, 
admitted, there seemed to be no particular issue which divided the two 
parties. 112 If anything, the Labour Party put stress on the public 
ownership and control in various matters, while the Citizen Party sought 
room for the private sector to take part in, and keep abreast of the 
local authority. The result of the November election was a sweeping 
victory for the Labour Party, with a majority of 18 Councillors. 114 
Declaring the victory, they stated that they were determined to carry 
into effect the programme as quickly as possible, with their 'sleeves 
rolled up for action', but the two imminent issues were, as they put it, 
the provision of houses and the municipal ownership and control of the 
city's bus service, and the reconstruction of the central area was not 
put in the limelight. 115 This was not surprising at all, for the City 
Council had always been united in supporting the City Engineer's approach 
to the replanning of the central area. They were also confident that 
they had given enough consideration and even concessions in some cases to 
the suggestions made by the interest. At the same time it was agreed by 
all parties that housing should be given priority, and that, in view also 
of the shortage of labour and materials, it was not possible to place 
in 
the forefront the reconstruction of the city centre, which might take 
years to materialise. 
In the case of Bristol there was not much enthusiasm for the matter. 
On the City Council, which was quite large, having 112 members, neither 
party seemed to have any acknowledged planning expert. They 
did not 
respond to the electric atmosphere of the early days of the war, and made 
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a rather late start at the replanning of the city centre, given that 
Bristol was one of the test case survey cities. Their approach, based on 
the extensive consideration of suggestions from the interests and 
consultation with them, however reasonable it might have been, did not 
allow rapid progress. By the time the Council approved the fairly bold 
replanning scheme for the central area, it did not attract as much 
nationwide attention as other cities' plans, notably that of Coventry, 
had done in the earlier days. The general public in the city did not 
seem to be too interested in the question either. When the organised 
bodies were expressing their opinions one after another about the City 
Council's original plan in 1944, one local paper observed: 
The problem has, in fact, received 
considerable publicity, but the impression 
remains that the people of Bristol have not 
displayed any signs that they are fired with 
holy zeal to design the "shape of things to 
come. " It may be that the general public, so 
well schooled in the primary necessity of 
first winning the war, prefers to leave the 
minor conflict of city planning "till the 
boys come home. " The boys themselves, being 
now almost solely occupied with the grim and 
necessary task of wiping out cities, have had 
little time or opportunity to express their 
views on the future plan of what they have 
been fighting for. ' 16 
When the war was over, however, the people's concern was around the 
housing. The existence of the RAC (later Replanning Association) and 
some other organisations might give an impression that the replanning of 
the central area had been widely discussed, and that the objections to 
the City Council's plan were rife among the people. It must be pointed 
out, however, that these organisations represented the voices of limited 
circles, notably traders and such professions as architects and 
surveyors. There was also a considerable overlapping of membership among 
these bodies, and, as the City Engineer's exhaustive list of comments and 
suggestions with regard to the central area reconstruction scheme shows, 
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keen interest in the matter came in the main from these limited 
sources. '17 Moreover bigger traders were inclined to be in favour of the 
Corporation's proposals, which made small traders feel more threatened 
about their future. 11° As for architects, Bristol was said to have been 
endowed with a long tradition and eminent figures. 119 Both traders and 
architects were trying hard to establish themselves in the matter of 
replanning the central area through such recommendations as co-option and 
a planning consultant. The PRC never let them in on the process of 
decision making. It is not too difficult to imagine why the threatened 
traders and the frustrated and possibly offended architects were so 
adamantly opposed to the main features of the Corporation's plan - the 
resiting of the shopping centre. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Recognition of the City Centre Plans 
at the Public Inquiries, 1946 
This chapter looks at the way the local authorities' replanning 
schemes for the central areas developed during the immediate post-war 
period, when the local authorities became confident in proceeding with 
the reconstruction work thanks to encouragement from the new Minister of 
Town and Country Planning, Lewis Silkin. Particular reference will be 
made to the public inquiries held by the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning into applications for compulsory purchase orders. 
Both in Bristol and Coventry the Councils showed solid confidence in 
their city centre plans, and in Coventry public support for their plan 
was remarkable. In Southampton, however, there was some controversy, for 
a political split had emerged, at the end of the war, between two 
competing central area plans - the original one supported by the 
Ratepayers' Party and the new one endorsed by Labour. Moreover, 
incidents prior to the public inquiry were seemingly casting a big 
question mark over the wisdom of the Council's replanning policy. 
**** 
Lewis Silkin, the new Minister of Town and Country Planning in the 
new Labour Government of 1945, was known to be determined to make rapid 
progress with the rebuilding of the blitzed city centres. ' He was 
expecting, in the first instance, that the local authorities concerned 
would submit an application for a declaratory order for the compulsory 
purchase of war-damaged areas, with a replanning scheme as supporting 
evidence for the application. The procedure laid down by the Town and 
Country Planning Act, 1944, required the Minister to call for a public 
inquiry into such applications, at which objections could be lodged. 
After examining the objections at the inquiry, the Minister might confirm 
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the order as a whole or with possible modifications, which would then 
entitle the local authority to purchase the land covered by the confirmed 
order under the powers of the 1944 Act, compulsorily if necessary. 
Towards the end of 1945, however, Silkin became 'seriously 
concerned' about the lack of progress, especially 'the absence of 
applications by blitzed cities'. 2 The Ministry officials reported3 that 
there was a general combination of obstacles which made the local 
authorities hesitant to make a move. First of all, there was a question 
of war-damage payment to bombed out owners. An owner of war-damaged 
premises was entitled to a 'cost-of-works payment' (i. e. full cost of 
actual rebuilding) under the War Damage Act, 1943. However, if his 
premises were included in the local authority's replanning scheme and 
thus were to be compulsorily acquired, then, according to the Town and 
Country Planning Act, 1944, he would be entitled only to a 'value 
payment', equivalent to the March 1939 value of the premises (plus, in 
the case of owner-occupiers, a supplementary addition up to 30 per cent 
of such value). Having regard to the soaring building prices prevailing 
at that time, a strong feeling of injustice was rife that the owner 
of war-damaged premises affected by the replanning scheme would be unable 
to afford to rebuild his premises on a new site. The local authorities 
for their part feared that if such owners did not receive enough to cover 
the cost of building on new sites, then essential rebuilding by private 
enterprise in the blitzed area would not take place, or would not take 
place rapidly enough, and consequently the authorities would have to take 
the financial burdens of rebuilding on themselves. 
The financial provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, 
was heavily criticised as inadequate, especially by those local 
authorities like Coventry who were not confident that their replanning 
schemes would prove entirely self-supporting within a period of 10 - 15 
177 
years or so, as presupposed in the Act. 4 The local authorities were also 
concerned about the acute shortage of labour and materials. Because of 
the pre-eminent importance of housing, it was feared that there would 
inevitably be considerable delay in getting priority in labour and 
materials for the redevelopment of city centres. Thus, as Bristol told 
the Ministry in April 1945, large-scale purchase of such an expensive 
area as the city centre with little possibility of an early start on 
actual redevelopment would 'land them in a loss over a long period and 
put their finances in Queer Street'. 5 
Finally, the absence of developed schemes for the central area was, 
for many local authorities, an obstacle to an early application for a 
declaratory order. Officially, the schemes had only to be 'skeleton' 
proposals presented as supporting evidence in the authorities' 
applications. At local level, however, it was generally assumed that the 
public inquiry would be a very important - and possibly a final - 
opportunity for the interests to object to the scheme as a whole. 
Understandably many authorities were 'a little timid of facing a local 
inquiry until they have assured themselves fully that their proposals are 
unassailable'. 6 This was particularly the case where the replanning of 
the central area had become a serious political issue, which was often 
complicated by the existence of competing plans of the various technical 
officers of the local authority. In such cases the authorities often 
pressed, as Southampton did in late 1945, for the Ministry to pass 
judgement on them. 
The Ministry officials were extremely cautious about this matter. 
They pressed the Minister to adhere to wartime practice - i. e. to 
continue assistance and guidance to the authorities on technical matters, 
but to refrain from any direct intervention which might have political 
repercussions. For the moment, any articulate comments on, let alone 
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final judgements about, the plans were out of the question until the 
Ministry's patient education produced much improved plans acceptable to 
most of the interests concerned. 8 
Bearing these points in mind, Silkin proposed to meet the local 
authorities concerned individually in early 1946, in order to encourage 
them to make further moves, especially an early application for a 
declaratory order-9 As far as Bristol, Coventry and Southampton were 
concerned, they had all virtually decided to make formal applications 
when they met the Minister in early 1946. Nevertheless these meetings 
were quite significant to the three authorities who were still very 
worried whether they would be able to get on with reconstruction in view 
of the various obstacles mentioned above. The Minister tried hard to 
persuade them not to take too gloomy a view of the difficulties. He 
maintained, for instance, that local authorities were exaggerating the 
problem of cost by assuming that present day building prices would 
continue. He himself expected them to fall in a few years' time to 
approximately 30 per cent above pre-war levels, once greater stability 
had been achieved, in which case the alleged difference between 'value 
payment' and 'cost of works' payment would not be appreciable. 9 He was 
particularly anxious to impress upon them that he took a fairly liberal 
view of the financial provisions of the 1944 Act, which had been regarded 
by the authorities as inadequate. If there was eventually a substantial 
deficiency in respect of Government grants, he promised that the matter 
would be duly taken up with a view to remedying it by amending 
legislation, adding that no Government would be able to resist the 
pressure of the local authorities on such an issue-10 Moreover, with 
regard to the difficulty in attracting building labour for city centre 
redevelopment, the Minister intimated that there would have to be some 
preference given to blitzed towns. " 
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The most striking encouragement by the Minister was his praise for 
Bristol City Council's replanning proposals, particularly since his 
officials had suggested he refrain from any public comment. Silkin told 
a local newspaper reporter, on his visit to Bristol in March 1946, that 
the Corporation's central area plan was 'a scheme I can support in every 
way', adding that he saw 'no reason why the Ministry should not be able 
to give its word "Go" to Bristol in "a matter of months"'. He continued: 
If no serious objections are forthcoming, I 
may consider the possibility of saving time 
by not holding a public inquiry. You will 
appreciate that in this sort of thing we are 
in a sense creating the appropriate procedure 
as we go. '2 
Although objections to the Corporation's application for a declaratory 
order necessitated a public inquiry in June 1946,13 the Planning and 
Reconstruction Committee decided to ask, along with a declaratory order, 
for a more expedited procedure with regard to the new and old shopping 
centres by applying for two compulsory purchase orders: one dealing with 
the Castle Street and Wine Street area for the provision of 112 temporary 
shops; and the other in the Broadmead area for the sites of permanent 
shops and the Inner Ring Road. It was essential that once these 
compulsory orders were confirmed, the whole of the properties covered by 
them would be vested in the Corporation in one go, rather than that 
individual properties should come before it as in the case of a 
declaratory order. 14 It was hoped that these compulsory purchase orders 
would greatly facilitate an early start on the development of the new 
shopping centre, and at the same time, by preventing any rebuilding of 
shops of existing owners in the old centre, provide funds for them to 
redevelop in the new centre. ' 
180 
While the City Council was thus determined to proceed quickly with 
the redevelopment of the central area, the local interests hardened their 
stand against the Corporation. In March 1946 a draft statement of 
objections to the Corporation's application for a declaratory order, 
drawn up by the Chamber of Commerce, the Re-Planning Association and the 
Rotary Club, was approved by the interested bodies. 16 Significantly one 
of the main reasons for the objection was that these bodies would not 
approve the Corporation' s reconstruction proposals, especially those 
related to the resiting of the shopping centre. 17 Moreover, as the 
Ministry's Regional Planning Officer observed in early 1946, 'whilst in 
the early days there seemed to be very considerable support to the 
Corporation's proposals ... that agreement is weakening and doubts are 
rising in some of the interested parties' minds'. 18 For one thing the 
Bristol Retailers' Advisory Committee on Town Planning, whose chairman 
had made a sympathetic comment on the City Council's revised plan in July 
1945 was now making a number of objections to the proposed new shopping 
centre at Broadmead. As the Corporation officers reported to the PRC in 
December 1945, they had held a number of conferences with this Advisory 
Committee, only to find that they were unable to make any further 
progress. 19 
The public inquiry into the City Council's application for a 
declaratory order was held in June 1946.356 objections were lodged, 191 
of which were objections to the principle of compulsory purchase, the 
remainder to parts of the Council's replanning proposals. 20 At the 
inquiry proceedings, however, it was made clear that the majority of 
objections to the Corporation's plan, especially to the resiting of the 
shopping centre, were in effect based on a hatred for compulsory 
purchase, notably, the loss of freehold and traders' goodwill, and the 
injustice to owners involved in the question of compensation. 21 It was 
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also argued by the objectors that the Council's application covering the 
area of 771 acres was outside the scope of the 1944 Act, because its 
replanning proposals were for the sake of 'a long term planning policy, 
and not the laying out afresh and the redevelopment of war damaged areas 
alone'; the only way war damage had entered into the application was 
that it afforded the Corporation 'an excuse to do all these other things 
that they wish to carry out'. 22 Thus the feeling against compulsory 
purchase was particularly strong when it came to undamaged properties 
including cinemas and churches. 23 
There was also grave concern about the uncertainty relating to 
finance, especially the terms of compensation, the possible cost of the 
replanning scheme and the extent to which Government grant would be paid 
towards it. As M. Rowe, K. C., who appeared for the MTF, put it: 
I wonder what you would say about a man who 
asked an architect to design a house and then 
told him to go ahead and build it without 
asking how much it would cost. You would say 
the fellow was stark raving mad, and yet that 
is really the position in which we are in 
this matter of rebuilding Bristol. We all 
want to get the best possible plan, but how 
can you tell what is the best plan unless you 
have some idea if it is financially 
possible? 24 
At the same time he did not hesitate to admit that his clients, multiple 
shops, were in agreement with the Corporation as to the location of the 
new shopping centre. They kept, however, 'coming up against a brick 
wall', because they did not know exactly what the Government had in mind 
with regard to financial help towards reconstruction. His attention was 
then focused on the Government: 
We do very earnestly beg the Minister of 
Planning to put an end to this apparent 
policy of keeping everything up his sleeve 
and telling nobody what he really has in 
mind. If it were not for this policy of 
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silence, if we really knew 
Minister's mind, and had 
opportunity of discussing 
objectors in this room would 
a very good deal of time and 
been saved. 25 
what was in the 
been given an 
it, half the 
not be here, and 
money would have 
The Corporation's defenders - T. J. Urwin, Deputy Town Clerk, and H. M. 
Webb, City Engineer - first of all stressed that there had been the 
urgent need for comprehensive replanning of the central area. Most of 
the buildings in the area covered by the application would be ripe for 
redevelopment in the quite near future. There also existed three main 
defects in the area from a planning point of view: considerable 
congestion of traffic in the main streets; haphazard cheek by jowl 
mingling of all kinds of property; and a lack of the amenities one would 
expect in a city like Bristol. Now the Corporation was definitely of the 
opinion that they had a splendid opportunity of rebuilding the area, and 
it was determined to take the fullest advantage of it. 26 The allegation 
that the Corporation's application was outside the scope of the 1944 Act 
was flatly dismissed. As the Deputy Town Clerk stated, the prime purpose 
of the 1944 Act was to deal satisfactorily with what was called extensive 
war damage, and Bristol was a city in which the war damage had been 
extensive, for there was 'nothing in this area which cannot be described 
as near or neighbouring on war damage of one kind or another'. 27 What 
was more, there was 'no satisfactory way of dealing with it (war damage) 
in this city, except as part of a comprehensive scheme of redevelopment 
as a whole'. 28 Thus any individual undamaged property should not be 
omitted from the application, otherwise an island of freehold would be 
set in a sea of leasehold interests, which could not be touched when the 
surrounding leaseholds became due for redevelopment. 29 With regard to 
the cost of the scheme (i. e. cost of the acquisition) the Corporation 
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stressed that they were expecting a large Government grant, for: 'A 
blitzed city like Bristol should have some claim for national help. '30 
The public inquiry made it clear that the Corporation's replanning 
proposals - especially that of the resiting of the shopping centre - 
could stand against the objections made to them. The local authority 
demonstrated its determination to redevelop the central area in a 
comprehensive way. At the same time the interests' objections were shown 
to be based on a narrow interpretation of the 1944 Act, hostility to 
compulsory purchase, and strong concern about the ambiguity of Govern- 
ment reconstruction policy. But they failed to bring to the inquiry any 
alternative schemes to the Corporation's proposal for a new shopping 
centre at Broadmead. 
The inquiry also made it obvious that future progress would depend 
on the clarification of Government reconstruction policy. First, would 
the Government uphold bold planning by - as an initial step -confirming 
the large scale declaratory order and the two compulsory purchase orders? 
Second, would they give the local authorities generous financial help to 
offset the cost of acquisition, without which there was going to be a 
heavy burden on the rates? And thirdly, as Bristol intended that most of 
the actual rebuilding should be done by private interests rather than the 
Corporation themselves, would the 'cost-of-works' question be solved as 
soon as possible by the Government, so that the traders should be fully 
confident of rebuilding themselves in the new shopping centre? Although 
some suspected that there was 'undue optimism on the part of the City 
Council as to what they may expect from that quarter"' (the Government), 
the Corporation's confidence in their proposals was fairly justifiable, 
considering the endorsement to them made by the Minister in March 1946. 
Immediately after the Bristol inquiry, the Ministry's next inquiry was 
held into the case of Coventry, to which we now turn our attention. 
184 
The Ministry officials were never contented with Coventry's 
replanning scheme, despite the fact it had gone through important 
modifications. As Doubleday, the RPO, stressed in early 1946, there was 
one outstanding point still left unresolved in the reconstruction scheme, 
namely the amount of land devoted to the proposed civic centre. He 
continued: 
I have never been satisfied that this area of 
the Scheme is sound. I still feel that the 
Redevelopment Committee should be asked to 
produce some evidence that the Civic Centre 
is on the lines required for the area. In 
other words that it is not merely wistful 
thinking on their part of what buildings are 
needed. 32 
The CRC thought differently. To them 'the time has arrived when it is 
appropriate to initiate steps for a definite start on the Coventry Re- 
development Scheme'. 33 Accordingly, they resolved in January 1946 to 
issue a public notice announcing their intention to apply for a 
declaratory order. It was also hoped that an active commencement on the 
scheme itself would be made during 1946, the first stage of which would 
be the development of the Broadgate area. 34 In February a site for the 
equestrian statue of Lady Godiva, designed by a famous sculptor, Sir 
Williams Reid Dick, was chosen at a point in the centre of the new 
Broadgate, where the statue would be in the direct line of the Cathedral 
vista. 35 In March the CRC decided to organise a Levelling Stone ceremony 
on the forthcoming Victory Day, 8 June, as a suitable 'advance work' to 
mark the official inauguration of the redevelopment scheme. The site 
would be near the top of Smithford Street, within what would eventually 
be one of the gardens of the shopping precinct. 36 Lord Kenilworth, who 
had met the cost of the model of Gibson's city centre in 1941, again 
offered help to cover the cost of the Levelling Stone, and the 
preparation for the ceremony proceeded rapidly. 37 
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The two projects mentioned above -a site for the Lady Godiva statue 
and the Levelling Stone ceremony - were originally suggested by Gibson, 
City Architect, who had frequently been exposed to fierce criticisms 
from Ministry officials as well as his fellow Corporation officers. It 
seemed that Gibson was now in a stronger position than ever before to 
encourage the CRC to make an early start on his scheme. One of the main 
reasons for this was that he eventually found that he had 'allies' among 
his fellow Corporation officers. 38 F. Smith, Town Clerk, who had been 
the most adamant opponent of his scheme during the war, decided in early 
1946 to retire, stating significantly that this would be convenient given 
the redevelopment scheme the Council had in mind. 39 C. Barratt, Deputy 
Town Clerk, who was to replace Smith, and Dr. A. H. Marshall, City 
Treasurer since 1944, were said to be determined to get on with Gibson's 
plan, just the opposite to their predecessors. 40 
In May 1946 Coventry City Guild, who had been active in the 
replanning of the central area before the war expressed their general 
approval of the City Council's scheme and pressed them for prompt 
action. 41 The relationship between the City Council and the Chamber of 
Commerce had also been greatly improved since the compromising amendment 
was made to Gibson's plan in July 1945. The CRC's decision in early 1946 
to put up temporary shops with the five year interim development 
permission, as opposed to one year permission during the war, was 
welcomed by traders. 42 A conference was arranged between the Corporation 
and the interests likely to be affected by the redevelopment scheme in 
order to discuss the resettlement arrangements of such interests. 43 As 
Hodgkinson observed in June 1946, what the City Council needed most had 
been: 
the sympathy and earnest co-operation of the 
citizens, and perhaps more particularly those 
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who subsequently conduct their businesses on 
this central site. ... We have, I believe, 
passed through a delicate negotiation stage 
with much credit to all concerned, for there 
is now general agreement that the major plan 
is acceptable. 44 
The City Council were also encouraged by the firm confidence of the 
general public in Gibson's scheme. In early 1946 the City Council 
arranged the 'Open Ideas Competition' in association with the CET to 
obtain the views of the citizens on the lines on which the redevelopment 
should be carried out. About 2,500 individual suggestions were made, but 
though they were mostly related to the need for the provision of such 
welfare facilities as children's playgrounds, nurseries, and community 
centres throughout the whole city, a significant number expressed their 
approval of Gibson's city centre plan. 45 In fact it seemed that the 
public were also very understanding of the difficulties the Council had 
been facing with their city centre plan. As the CET put it at the 
beginning of 1946: 
For a long time the re-development scheme was 
almost bogged down, and the ideal of 1940 ... 
looked rather like an embarrassment in later 
years ... We are still a long way from the 
stage of big building operations, but the 
perserverance and latterly the adaptability 
of the local planners has produced a result 
from which we can derive encouragement. 46 
The CRC's determination to proceed with their city centre plan was also 
reflected in their choice of the optimum area for the declaratory order 
application. It should be noted that a few reputedly radical Labour 
Councillors were rather critical of the Committee's attitude to severely 
damaged areas other than the city centre. The area proposed to be 
included in the application for a declaratory order was 452 acres based 
on the city centre as defined by the Inner Ring Road plus the run-down 
Spon Street neighbourhood immediately to the west of it. In February 
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1946 the CRC was asked to consider the desirability of applying for a 
declaratory order for the Hillfields area to the east of the city centre 
as well. This area, admittedly severely damaged during the war, was as 
large as 513 acres. The CRC argued that it would be 'mistaken policy to 
attempt at this stage, when so much effort has to be devoted to the 
completion of the preparatory work for Area (of Extensive War Damage) No. 
1, to commence work on another and larger area'. They maintained that 
'good and useful changes can be made in suitable parts of the suggested 
area' by using the general powers of the Town and Country Planning Acts, 
the course which they thought 'more advantageous ... than to attempt at 
this juncture formally to prescribe a second Area of Extensive War 
Damage'. 47 
The CRC's decision was vigorously challenged at the City Council 
meeting in March. Mrs. Allen, one of the Hillfields Councillors, moved 
the resolution that the CRC should prepare a report regarding other 
blitzed areas of the city outside Area No. 1. As she told the Council: 
It was time they knew where they were going 
in the other "blitzed" areas of the city as 
well as in the centre. This was especially 
the case as people in those other areas were 
forced to live amidst the debris, whereas in 
the centre of the city people were not having 
to live amongst it. 48 
While observing that there was no lack of sympathy in respect of 
Hillfields or any other damaged areas, Hodgkinson argued: 
they could only bite off as much as they 
could chew, and a very big programme was 
involved in the central area. There seemed 
to be a view in the Council that areas were 
going to be left behind because of prior 
attention somewhere else. They would look 
foolish if they went on prescribing areas of 
development when they already had one iron in 
the fire concerning the central area. It was 
a question of how much they could carry. 49 
188 
In the end the Council's application was formally lodged with the 
Ministry on 4 April, in respect of Area No. 1 only as had been initially 
intended. 50 
The laying of the Levelling Stone ceremony on Victory Day, just 
about a fortnight before the public inquiry, played quite an important 
role in strengthening public acceptance of the city centre scheme. 
Hodgkinson declared: 
To-day, we hitch our minds and hopes to a 
conception of new and better things. For 
many of us there will be only a glimpse of 
the final creation, but there is a bounden 
duty on those who have responsibility to-day, 
to ensure that Coventry takes the splendid 
opportunity to build worthily of a people who 
have made so great a sacrifice and 
contributed so much to the nation's 
survival. 51 
As 
A CET editorial gave whole-hearted sympathy and encouragement. Noting 
that 'the Coventry reconstruction scheme, which broadly commands the 
support of the majority of the citizens' would eventually bring 'the 
solid results ... when the strain of these times is eased', 
observed: 
if to-day's ceremony is an act of faith in 
the future, it is also a fitting reminder of 
what has already been achieved. The men and 
women who have brought the scheme to this 
stage deserve the city's thanks. They have 
done well to mark their achievement and their 
faith in public manner on this Victory Day. 
Another generation will see the end of the 
labour and the fulfilment, but as long as the 
stones of the new city stand, what Coventry 
did on Victory Day in 1946 will be 
remembered. 52 
the paper 
The public inquiry into the City Council's application for a declaratory 
order was started on 25 June, 1946. In all 259 objections were lodged, 
but only six objections held that the scheme was not good planning. 53 One 
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of the points at the inquiry would be, therefore, 'to what extent the 
Corporation could meet these objections without seriously upsetting the 
plan'. 54 In fact opposition to the scheme as such lost much weight at 
the actual inquiry. For instance, one objector, who represented himself 
as a planning expert, described the appearance of new Broadgate as 
'diabolically German and Fascist in character', and declared that 'it was 
planned largely for architectural need at the expense of Coventry 
considerations', and thus would not be taken to by 'all the poor people 
of Coventry [who] have suffered at the hands of these wretched Nazis`. 5' 
Cross-examined by the new Town Clerk, however, the same objector agreed 
that the style of Trinity Street was satisfactory and eventually admitted 
that the Corporation responsible for that development might be trusted to 
make a satisfactory job of further planning. 56 Criticism was also made 
that the proposed civic centre was 'laid out extravagantly to satisfy the 
aesthetic standards of one or two town planners or even the Redevelopment 
Committee', irrespective of cost. The contender argued that the 
Corporation should concentrate on 'the planning of a new city, not a 
Utopia', and thus 'must come down from the clouds down to the realms of 
hard cash', for the 1944 Act did 'not contemplate, much less authorise, a 
dream city'. In reply, Gibson, City Architect, stressed that the public 
buildings of the present day were quite inadequate, and that, in view of 
the phenomenal population growth the city had experienced, the proposed 
centre was essential to meet future needs. 57 
Strong concern about the financial effects of the scheme as a whole 
considering the uncertainty of Government help, was also dismissed by the 
Corporation. M. Rowe, K. C., appearing for the Chamber of Commerce and 
the Multiple Shops' Federation, intimated that there would be a 
considerable burden on the rates. Although he had been told at the 
Bristol inquiry that the Government would be generous in making good 
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most of the likely financial shortfall in the replanning scheme, he was 
extremely suspicious of such promises. In reply, E. Ford, the City 
Engineer, emphatically stated: 
If we are unable to meet all liabilities, we 
shall expect - and I think have a right to 
expect - the Exchequer will meet what was a 
loss to the city caused by a national 
disaster. It was not Coventry's fault. It 
was a national matter, and should be spread 
over the whole of the nation. 58 
Most objections as in Bristol, reflected the strong criticism of 
Government policy on such matters as the 'cost-of-works' payment and the 
basing of compensation on 1939 prices. One Counsel, disapproving of the 
provisions of the 1944 Act on these issues, declared 
There is injustice. There is different- 
iation. It is the first duty of a Government 
to administer social justice, and see all 
people are treated equally and fairly. 59 
At the same time he told the inquiry that the substance of his contention 
lay in a belief that 'by reiteration of protests at inquiries like this 
remedies could sometimes be secured'. The difficulties involved in the 
matter were 'not all of the Corporation's making but of a policy dictated 
at higher level'. In fact he warmly appreciated the manner in which the 
Corporation had treated objectors, and went on to say that 'Coventry's 
scheme revealed a great deal of careful thought and consideration'. 60 
All told the Corporation showed very little difficulty in carrying 
through the inquiry. The main reason for this was their conviction that 
they had public support for their replanning scheme, shown, as the new 
Town Clerk pointed out, in events like the ' Future Coventry' exhibition 
held in October 1945 and the 'Open Ideas Competition' in early 1946. The 
vast majority of people in the city were convinced that the scheme was 
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`worth while and to the ultimate benefit of Coventry', and with this 
support, the Corporation 'would not allow themselves to be deflected from 
their goal by mere personal interest' put forward to the inquiry. 61 The 
259 objectors, representing approximately 1,000 interests, accounted for 
only one tenth of those affected by the scheme. 62 And as the Standard 
noted, even those interests themselves gradually realised that the 
necessity of the local authority's wholesale control of the central area 
was incontrovertible. 63 The CET editorial made assurance doubly sure: 
We believe that the Corporation is right in 
seizing an opportunity created by misfortune, 
an opportunity which may never occur again to 
rebuild the centre of the city so that it 
provides for the needs of this age. There 
would be no wisdom in a policy of timidity at 
this time, and the Council has approached the 
matter from the point of view of the whole 
city. 64 
Thus, the importance of the Coventry inquiry lay in the fact that it 
reinforced support for the Corporation's replanning scheme, and that such 
support made the case for the local authority's control of land 
indisputable. At the same time it was once again made clear that further 
progress in the matter would all depend on the Government; how to 
ameliorate the aggrieved feeling of private interests and how to respond 
to the local authority's high expectation for genuine assistance in the 
implementation of the Scheme. We now move to the examination of the 
remaining case, Southampton, where the replanning of the central area had 
become, unlike the previous two cities, a critical issue of local 
politics. 
**** 
Immediately after the municipal elections in November 1945, 
Southampton City Council, now led by Labour, decided to make formal 
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application for a declaratory order. They also sought judgement from the 
Ministries concerned on the relative merits of the two alternative 
schemes for the central area prepared by Cook, Town Planning and 
Development Officer, and Wooldridge, Borough Engineer. Two conferences 
with the MOWT and the MOTCP were held hastily in the same month. As 
Alderman Matthews, now chairman of the Planning Committee, told the 
Ministries, the Council was most anxious to make a decision on the matter 
as soon as possible so that they should be able to submit a formal 
application for a declaratory order. Moreover, while he was in favour of 
the Wooldridge plan, it had not yet been before the City Council for 
approval. It was thus obvious that his real intention was to obtain de 
facto authorisation of the Wooldridge plan from the two Ministries. 65 
These conferences, however, proved to be of little use. Whereas the 
MOWT was generally in favour of the Wooldridge plan, the MOTCP described 
it as little more than 'a series of road proposals', 66 which needed 'more 
detailed examination than they have received'. 67 In particular, there 
was a fundamental difference between the Ministries in their opinion as 
to the precinct treatment of Above Bar-High Street proposed by 
Wooldridge. It was understood that while private cars were allowed to 
use the street, any public transport service would be excluded from it 
and use an inner ring road. The MOWT supported the idea strongly, but 
the MOTCP 'expressed the opinion that it would be impracticable to take 
public service vehicles out of the main shopping street, and that, if 
this were done, it would seriously disturb the values of land and 
property in that street'. 68 The conferences thus reached an impasse, and 
the only joint recommendation made to the Planning Committee was 'to 
suggest that the matter is clearly one on which your Committee most 
definitely make up their own minds'. 
69 
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The decision of the Committee made in January 1946 was that 
Wooldridge's plan should be taken as the basis of a final plan, which 
should be completed jointly by Cook, Wooldridge, and D. Winston (new 
Borough Architect) by March. 70 As Matthews observed at the Council 
meeting: 
Where experts differ the layman has to make a 
decision ... and having made it the officers 
must loyally accept it and get to work on the 
details so that the reconstruction of the 
central area can proceed rapidly. 71 
Cook, however, would not give way. He could not accept any plan which 
put prime emphasis on economy before planning principles. 72 Accordingly 
the Planning Committee decided to submit Wooldridge's plan to the Council 
for approval. 73 At the Council meeting in March it was carried by 40 
votes to one - the solitary dissentient being Alderman Kimber. 74 
The Council's adoption of the Wooldridge plan was the last straw for 
Cook. Within a month he resigned his appointment as Town Planning and 
Development Officer. 75 He was soon welcomed to the newly-formed Central 
Area Association of Southampton as its secretary and technical adviser. 76 
The Association was set up in April 1946 to represent some 200 business 
and industrial interests in the central area and to facilitate their 
rehabilitation. 77 Cook emphasised the unique advantage of the 
Association, having in view the public inquiry to be held in September 
into the Corporation's application for a declaratory order. While 
individual traders might find it difficult to object in very broad terms 
to a replanning scheme, an organisation like this was obviously better 
placed to put forward objections dealing not only with individual 
properties but the whole policy and general proposals envisaged by the 
Council. Moreover, such an inquiry would possibly be the only 
opportunity for the public to put forward their views, after which it 
194 
would be entirely a matter for the Corporation and the Ministry to decide 
what was to be done in the area. 78 How much Cook bore a grudge against 
the Corporation in his activeness in the Association is not clear, but he 
was certainly strongly opposed to the principle of wholesale acquisition, 
not to mention the Wooldridge plan. 79 The setting up of the Association 
was welcomed by other organisations80 who had declared their disapproval 
of the Corporation's acquisition policy since November 1945,81 and in May 
1946 it was duly proposed to form 'a united front' of the Central Area 
Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Property Owners' Protection 
Society, in objecting to the Corporation's scheme at the forthcoming 
public inquiry. 82 
While it was not unusual for the interests concerned to express 
their objections vigorously before the inquiry, things were moving 
adversely for the Corporation. First, as Alderman Lewis, Labour leader, 
admitted, there was a hint of regret about the fact that 'the original 
grandiose scheme could not be operated and had to go by the board'. 83 
When it came to the Wooldridge plan, because it had to be adopted rather 
hastily in connection with the application for a declaratory order, there 
had been little time for the Corporation to consult with the interests 
concerned about it. 84 What was worse, Cook's resignation as Planning 
Officer did not reflect any credit on the Corporation. Alderman Kimber 
and former Councillor G. E. H. Prince (Ratepayers' Party, member of the 
Planning Committee during the war, who was not returned at the municipal 
election in November 1945) made some attempts to make Cook's departure 
look scandalous by asserting that Cook had been forced to resign by 
Matthews. " 
Whether the accusation was true or false, Matthews, who had been 
responsible for the creation of the Town Planning and Development 
Department in 1941 now had to propose its abolition. In May 1946 the 
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Borough Council adopted the Planning Committee's recommendations that the 
Planning Department should cease to exist as a separate entity. Its 
duties were distributed between the Borough Engineer, the Architect, and 
the Valuer; and a technical panel of these officers plus a principal 
planning assistant was established to co-ordinate the implementation of 
the Wooldridge Plan as well as of any further preparation of planning 
schemes. 86 At the Council meeting Matthews admitted that for some years 
they had had to face 'a nightmare' -inadequate cooperation between the 
Departments. The recommendations would lead to better co-ordination of 
departmental action than had been possible in the past, which would 
facilitate rapid reconstruction. Alderman Lewis supported Matthews by 
adding that the whole situation was 'due to a set of circumstances over 
which we have no control'. As he went on: 
I agree he [Cook] did excellent work, but 
this is not a question of his work, but one 
of working together. When he left we said 
that we must have a different method to get 
all the co-operation we can. 87 
Whether the new arrangement was the result of the unforeseen or not, the 
fact that Cook joined the objectors' camp undoubtedly brought disgrace 
on the Corporation, especially on Matthews. There was, thus, a 
possibility that the forthcoming public inquiry into the declaratory 
order covering 514 acres would be a considerable blow to the adoption of 
the Wooldridge plan. 
In fact at the inquiry, which started on 24 September, 1946, the 
Corporation had to face the accusation that they had neglected the 
interests in adopting their scheme. The ubiquitous M. Rowe, K. C., this 
time appearing for the Central Area Association and a number of 
individual firms, observed that the Southampton inquiry differed deeply 
from other recent inquiries. Elsewhere there was a certain measure of 
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agreement upon the basic principles of the schemes. This was due to the 
fact that there had been prolonged consultations between the local 
authorities and the principal local interests. He continued: 
Here that is not the case ... there has not been the slightest real effort to obtain from 
any important and representative section of 
the public their views upon this plan. That 
is an extraordinarily unfortunate thing, 
because I am sure it must have impressed 
itself on the inspector [of the inquiry] that 
Southampton has taken an interest in the 
plan, and many of the owners and those 
principally concerned would not have been 
backward in trying to co-operate with the 
Corporation in getting something satisfactory 
to both parties. 88 
Little information was thus available in respect of such matters as 
alternative accommodation and the conditions of lease. 89 
Severe criticisms were made of the Wooldridge plan and some 
alternative proposals, including Cook's 1944 plan, were submitted to the 
inquiry. Especially strong concern was expressed about the future of 
Above Bar. For one thing, precinct treatment was not favoured. As A. E. 
Lees, appearing for Marks and Spencer, put it, if public service vehicles 
were taken out of a main shopping street, the importance of the street 
was quickly destroyed. 90 For another, the use of Above Bar excessively 
for shopping purposes was called into question. In this connection T. S. 
Dulake, town planning consultant from Mayfair, proposed that it should be 
developed as a new Regent Street with cinemas, hotels, restaurants, 
offices and shops, 93 rather than a 'dreary terrace of shops'. 92 
The substance of the objections, however, differed very little from 
other inquiries. The analysis of 370 objections put forward to the 
inquiry showed that the majority of them were associated with the 
inequity and hardship involved in compulsory purchase - the 1939 basis of 
compensation and the 'cost-of-works' payment. 93 Loss of freehold was 
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never popular among owners (who would rather stay on in the original 
sites and rebuild themselves). 94 Hysterical criticisms were made of the 
leasehold system which was described as 'unEnglish', 'nothing short of 
nationalisation of land', and 'a despicable act on the part of the 
Corporation to attempt to cash in on the citizens' misfortunes'. 95 
Messrs. Edwin Jones, multiple store and the second largest ratepayers in 
the Borough, asserted that 'The Corporation have gone completely mad on 
this fetish of no freeholds'. 96 The area of 514 acres was regarded as 
too large - 'a grandiose scheme, municipal self-glorification, and 
nothing connected with war damage'. 97 The non-availability of an 
estimation of the cost and too much reliance on the Government assistance 
was again raised by M. Rowe. 98 
On balance the Corporation side managed to defend their case neatly. 
N. C. Scragg, senior assistant solicitor in the Town Clerk's Department 
who conducted the case for the Corporation, dismissed the alleged lack of 
consultations between them and the principal local interests. To begin 
with, the most important interests of all - such as the Southern Railway, 
the Harbour Board, and the churches - had been consulted, and a 
considerable measure of agreement had already been made. 99 Moreover the 
traders had been consulted extensively since 1942, and the new plan 'was 
built up after taking into account all the major trading issues which 
have been so forcibly ventilated during the past four years'. '°° As 
circumstances permitted, the Corporation would discuss such matters as 
alternative accommodation, and the rents, and they would not let the 
traders down. 10' 
Cook's 1944 plan was categorically described by Scragg as 'far more 
expensive than the plan we have to-day' '102 while other proposals were 
partial alternatives to the Wooldridge plan intended to redevelop the 
original sites themselves. '03 Regarding the criticism of a shopping 
198 
precinct in Above Bar, the Corporation argued that it would obviate 
serious traffic congestion, and thus enhance rather than destroy the 
values as the main shopping street. The suggestion from a Mayfair 
planning consultant to develop Above Bar like Regent Street did not 
represent the views of the local traders, who preferred a continuous 
shopping frontage. As Scragg went on: 'Members of the Council, as 
representatives of the public, are far more qualified to know what the 
public of Southampton require'. 104 
The mere dislike of leasehold was 'not a good and valid reason 
against this Order', without which there would still be 'a jumble of 
user, traffic congestion and other difficulties'. 1° While the 
Corporation were sympathetic to the owners with regard to compensation 
at 1939 values and loss of 'cost-of-works' payments, the objection to 
them was an objection to the 1944 Act for which the Council had no 
responsibility. '06 The Corporation were unexpectedly encouraged by the 
evidence of an objector, R. W. H. Collier, war damage and valuation expert. 
He argued that the area covered by the Order was within 80 yards of war 
damage, thus within the scope of the 1944 Act, and that the scheme would 
be a success financially. 107 Failing this the Corporation were, as 
Scragg argued, justified in expecting large additional Government grants 
'as some compensation to the loss and sufferings of the towns which, 
owing to their situation or importance to the national effort, 
experienced savage bombing from the enemy. 108 
Thus the objectors failed to strike a decisive blow at the 
Corporation in their adoption of the Wooldridge plan. Had there been any 
serious challenge from the Ratepayers' Party at council level before the 
inquiry, the situation would have been more critical. Previously the 
Ratepayers had opposed both wholesale acquisition and the Wooldridge plan 
advocated by Labour before the municipal elections in November 1945. But 
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the election results brought a significant change. First of all, former 
Ratepayers Councillor Lane, who as chairman of the Planning Committee had 
consistently supported Cook's plan, was not re-elected. The Ratepayers 
continued their opposition to wholesale acquisition, but now supported 
the Wooldridge plan, on the grounds that it could be implemented more 
quickly and economically than Cook's. It was obvious that the Party, 
especially its leader Alderman Woolley, had changed its mind, in view of 
the still serious loss of the town's rateable value, 109 and the urgent 
need for rapid rehabilitation of the town's trade. ''° Not only did 
Woolley praise the new plan highly, 11' he even supported the abolition of 
the Town Planning and Development Department, a move for which Matthews 
expressed genuine gratitude. 112 
This bi-partisan support for the Wooldridge plan made it look as if 
the Council were also united in their support for the wholesale 
acquisition policy. This was, on the one hand, a logical conclusion, for 
the importance of the plan at the public inquiry lay in its role as 
supporting evidence for the declaratory order. On the other hand the 
Ratepayers' Party, demoralised by its minority position, could do 
nothing to prevent wholesale acquisition being adopted by the Council. 
Already in November 1945, immediately after the municipal elections, 
Woolley seconded Matthew's recommendation to formally apply for a 
declaratory order. Although at that time Woolley still maintained that 
the question of wholesale acquisition was quite another issue and 
threatened that 'we shall have something to say about it later', 113 in 
the event no effective opposition was made at the Council level 
before 
the public inquiry. 
It was not until the October 1946 Council meeting following the 
public inquiry that Woolley made his final attempt by asking the council 
to withdraw the application for a declaratory order. His speech at the 
200 
Council meeting was pathetic in its inconsistency. He mentioned that he 
had always been in favour of Cook's plan, which amazed even Alderman 
Kimber. He also observed that a declaratory order was essential to the 
speedy purchase of land, but because he believed it should be piecemeal 
and not wholesale acquisition, he had to ask for the withdrawal of the 
application altogether. In the end he stated: 'I submit the resolution, 
knowing that it will not be carried'. This resulted in a straight party 
vote, eight for his resolution and 38 against it. 114 
Before the municipal elections in November 1946 the Ratepayers' 
Party made some hasty efforts to object to compulsory purchase. At a 
public meeting the Corporation's acquisition policy was denounced as the 
confiscation of the freehold property, which would cost £50,000,000 and 
increase the rates by 25s. This rather extravagant statement was 
renounced at the Council meeting by Labour Councillor Parker, chairman of 
the Finance Committee, as 'arrant nonsense'. 116 At the same time, 
despite knowing that they had 'reduced the opposition to impotence'''7 
Labour nevertheless seemed to feel some anxiety about the elections. As 
one successful Labour candidate with the largest majority told an after- 
the-poll party meeting, they had 'had a difficult election to fight, 
because the past year had been one in which foundations had been laid, 
but the fruits were not evident yet, and some people were 
disappointed'. 118 The results of the elections - another Labour gain 
increasing their majority to 28 - were, as Alderman Lewis confidently 
stated, 'a complete endorsement by the people of Southampton of Labour's 
policy and administration during the past twelve months'. 119 Labour 
could thus have increased confidence in their reconstruction policy, 
already well established by the success of the public inquiry. 
** ** 
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The analysis of the three public inquiries has shown certain 
important points about the replanning of the city centres. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, it was quite an institutional affair: the 
inquiries provided a battle field for head-on confrontation between 
owners - especially traders - and the local authority. The interests 
concerned often got together to bring forward their objections to 
compulsory purchase and, to a lesser degree, to the Corporation's 
planning proposals. Although, in Bristol and Southampton, the 
Corporations' replanning proposals were controversial and could have been 
in grave jeopardy, the selfish motive behind the objections could not 
pose a serious threat to the legitimacy of official plans approved by the 
Councils as representatives of the public. As Wooldridge emphatically 
told M. Rowe at the Southampton inquiry, 'no evidence you can bring will 
change my opinion [about the plan]. If you want to change it, get 
elected to the Council'. This finally silenced Rowe, the ubiquitous, who 
replied, 'In view of what you have said, I will accept your hint and will 
sit down'. 120 In this respect Coventry is worthy of special mention. 
The Corporation put prime emphasis on the support of the general public 
for the city centre plan as the principal reason for acquisition. Local 
newspapers, which were not necessarily pro-Labour, gave consistent 
endorsement of the Council's wisdom when it came to the replanning of the 
central area. 
The objectors were not only self-interested but behind the times. 
The quintessence of their objection - abhorrence of the loss of freehold 
- was totally against the principle of the Town and Country Planning Act, 
1944, passed under the Coalition Government. As many counsels admitted 
at the inquiries, objection was often made in order to make a plea to the 
Government for mercy. Yet redevelopment of the central area based on a 
bold plan with the local authority as a ground landlord was the demand of 
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the day, endorsed by such Conservative Ministers as Reith and Morrison. 
Councillors who chose to represent the voice of the objectors were either 
quite content with this principle, or, as in the case of Southampton, 
simply incompetent. 
The success of the public inquiries led the local authorities to 
concluded that a reasonable measure of general acceptance of their city 
centre plans had actually been established. With encouraging signs from 
the new Minister of Planning, Lewis Silkin, of positive Government 
assistance, the local authorities had every reason to expect that an 
early start and rapid progress would be made in the actual redevelopment 
of the central area. 
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CHAPTER IX 
Recognition of the City Centre Plans in the 1940s 
After the public inquiries in 1946 Bristol, Coventry and Southampton 
held high expectations about the Ministry's backing : ýv the city centre 
redevelopment by early confirmation of the declaratory orders and 
subsequent approval of the cen tral area plans. These hopes, were, 
however, ill-founded. First there were considerable delays and 
curtailment in the Minister's confirmation of declaratory orders. His 
early confirmations, such as the case of Plymouth, ran into High Court 
appeals, and he had to wait and see how things were going until around 
mid-1947.1 Moreover, his confirmation was influenced by the Treasury, 
whose interest was, as he told the blitzed local authorities in October 
1947, 'naturally to cut down. ' As he continued: 'we are perhaps, if I 
may say so within these four walls, rather too closely tied up (with the 
Treasury) in the 1944 Act - (they) have perhaps too big a say in these 
matters'. 2 Consequently, the confirmation of orders involved 
considerable reductions. 3 
The new town planning legislation did not offer much help to the 
blitzed authorities. The Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, 
consolidated the number of planning authorities from 1,441 into 145 
County and County Borough Councils. Every planning authority had to 
carry out a survey of its area and to prepare a development plan. By 
this means it was expected that broad planning principles should first of 
all be established over a wide area, while the detail would be filled in 
when the development was about to take place. 4 But the crucial 
question to the city centre redevelopment was how smoothly the blitzed 
authorities could proceed with acquisition of land covered by the 
confirmed order. In this connection the Government grant for acquisition 
would cover as long as sixty years starting with up to 90 per cent for 
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the first five years then scaling down. However, this grant system made 
the local authorities extremely cautious in proceeding with actual 
acquisition, because there was no guarantee that actual redevelopment 
would immediately follow in view of various difficulties. 5 The economic 
crisis made the situation much worse: the blitzed authorities had been 
very concerned about the shortage of building labour and materials; now, 
building operations had been prohibited unless a strong case could be 
made that it was essential to the export trades; and even compulsory 
acquisition of land, which had to be pursued in a miserable piecemeal 
manner, was further limited by the Ministry's Circular 39 in March 1948 
restricting capital expenditure. 6 As Silkin observed in October 1947: 
At the moment we are concentrating on such 
measures of reconstruction as will enable us 
to improve our economic position. Housing, 
the rebuilding of our blitzed towns, even 
the building of new towns, are for the 
moment regarded as luxuries, or rather as 
irrelevant in the rebuilding of our economic 
position, and only such building as will 
further our economic position will, for the 
time being, be permitted.? 
In fact while, with all these difficulties, the building of houses 
advanced, there was no sign of the actual construction of any permanent 
shops or other buildings being made in the war-damaged central areas. 
The effect of such an extremely grim prospect for city centre 
redevelopment was too obvious. As the Architects' Journal observed as 
late as 1952 (when a token start had been made): 
Since the war everyone has been waiting for 
the priority work - houses and schools - to 
be finished, and for the economic crises to 
end, so as to allow the rebuilding of the 
blitzed and decaying centres. What is being 
slowly forced on us is the realization that 
there is no foreseeable end to the priority 
work, or to the economic crises. If the 
country's wealth does not markedly increase 
there may be no possibility of rebuilding the 
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town centres and we, or our children, may 
watch, for a change, not the growth but the 
galloping decay of a city, in terms of 
property, not from the outside in, but from 
within outwards to the perimeter. 8 
Whether this prediction proved to be true or not, pessimism could only 
give rise to doubts about the city centre plans. This was all the more 
reason why the Minister's approval of a plan was necessary in the 
remaining years of the 1940s when no visible progress was expected, in 
order to give confidence and authorisation to the local authorities that 
what they envisaged was on the right lines. Yet here again the 
authorities were forced to realise that a possibility of obtaining the 
Minister's approval was almost out of the question. One striking change 
was taking place within the Ministry after the war; most of the 
officials active during the war were gone, and the local authorities were 
now facing newcomers. As Silkin put it, this change was imperative 
because, understandably in the case of a newly created Ministry in 1943, 
'our original staff consisted of people who could be spared from other 
Departments', and 'inevitably they have not all been good'. For new 
officials, however, 'it does take a little time to get into the 
atmosphere and to get going, to understand the complexities of town 
planning, and especially town planning legislation, and we have suffered 
from the fact that we are a new Ministry and that we have practically a 
new personnel'. 9 In fact these new officials were imposing further 
restrictions on the authorities and trying hard to deny the legality of 
planning boldly; they were overwhelmed by their planning 
responsibilities, and less inclined to give any authorisation or approval 
of a city centre plan. The odds were against the blitzed Councils. 
**** 
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The situation in Southampton after the public inquiry did not look 
very favourable for the speedy redevelopment of the central area. The 
housing problem was formidable. In March 1947 a target was set for the 
permanent housing programme for that year envisaging the completion of 
1,087 houses during the year and the starting of work on another 1,318.10 
By June the Council had completed the erection of 1,014 pre-fabricated 
temporary bungalows out of 1,750 allocated to the city. " Yet in May it 
was reported that there was a vast amount of overcrowding throughout the 
Borough, with 11,810 applications on the Corporation housing list up to 
6 April. Additional applications were being received at an average rate 
of 60 per week-12 The Borough Council also had to face an acute shortage 
of building labour in the town, about which, as Alderman Lewis observed, 
there was no immediate prospect of any improvement. 13 The financial 
prospects of the town were also gloomy. The rates, which had to be 
increased in March 1946 for the first time for five years by 2s. 10d. in 
the pound, 14 were further increased in March 1947, this time by 3s. 5d., 
or 52 per cent over a period of two years. ' 
Nevertheless, both the local traders and the Corporation were 
determined to achieve the speedy rebuilding of the central area. The 
fear of losing trade to such neighbouring towns as Salisbury and 
Winchester was looming larger and larger in the old-established traders' 
mind. 16 They also complained about the increasing number of street 
traders operating throughout the town, particularly in the main shopping 
thoroughfares. '' The Corporation's determination was reflected in their 
policy with regard to the allocation of building labour between housing 
and other work. The general practice throughout the country was that 60 
per cent of the labour force was directed for housing and 40 per cent for 
other building. However, as Councillor Barnes, chairman of the Housing 
Committee, observed, the Corporation were 'compelled by force of 
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circumstances and their own common-sense' to pay regard to the urgent 
need for getting shops and commercial and industrial buildings going 
again, and thus came to the conclusion that there should be a 50-50 
division of labour rather than a 60-40 split. 18 Moreover, Matthews was 
convinced that the time had come to consider the reconstruction of 
permanent shops in Above Bar on top of temporary shops. Despite the 
warning from the Ministry of a great risk of premature action before the 
confirmation of the declaratory order, 19 the Council adopted in June 1947 
Matthews' resolution to apply for a compulsory purchase order in respect 
of five acres in Above Bar for permanent shops with expedited 
procedure. 20 
The relationship between the Borough Council and the local traders 
was not too good. The traders pressed the Council to let them know the 
precise sites for re-establishment and allow them to proceed with their 
redevelopment plans. 21 They further argued that it was essential to such 
speedy rebuilding to have immediate and frequent discussions between the 
Planning Committee and them. 22 The Committee, however, avoided seeing 
traders too often, maintaining that such consultations should start only 
after the Ministry confirmed the Corporation's declaratory order, and 
thus the uncertainty of the Government policy was cleared. 23 The Central 
Area Association managed to see the Committee only once before the 
confirmation of the order, and made a request for further discussions. 24 
While the Committee left it to Matthews to arrange further 
consultations, 25 there was no sign of such meetings taking place, and the 
Association became very frustrated. 26 
Apart from awaiting confirmation of the declaratory order, the 
Planning Committee had another reason for avoiding close contact with 
traders. Under the new Town and Country Planning Bill 1947, it became 
obligatory for the local planning authority to prepare a plan for its 
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responsible area within three years from the appointed day. Moreover, 
while the 1944 Act was basically an Act for land acquisition with a 
redevelopment scheme as an appendage to the application for a declaratory 
order, under the new Bill the designation of land for such application 
would form part of a 'development plan', the Minister's approval of which 
was now the most important target for the local authority. As far as the 
central area plan was concerned, the Council wanted to go ahead with the 
existing plan discussed at the public inquiry. In May 1947 the Council 
gave general approval to the detailed layout of the area around the Civic 
Centre - the Guildhall Square section; the East Park-terrace section 
consisting of such buildings as a six-storey health centre, an indoor 
bath with a gymnasium, a museum, colleges and a municipal office block; 
and the large-scale commercial development west of the Civic Centre 
between the Law Courts block and the Central Station. 27 Many local 
interests seemed to realise that the Corporation's central area plan 
would be approved by the Minister in some form, following his 
confirmation of the declaratory order, and that there was little chance 
of upsetting it. 28 But others, like Cook, still argued: 
The present is an opportune time to suggest 
that a plan for the future of an area of such 
importance should be the subject of 
discussion between all the interests 
concerned. Even at this stage much time and 
energy could be saved by following a policy 
of consultation and collaboration in the true 
sense of the word. 29 
Thus it became all the more important for the Council to obtain not only 
the Minister's confirmation of the declaratory order but his early 
approval of the replanning scheme for the central area. However, the 
relationship of the Council with the Minister was no better than its 
relationship with the local interests. In June 1947, when the 
Corporation became rather frustrated by the Minister's delay in 
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confirming the declaratory order, Silkin stated that much of the 
responsibility for the considerable delay in the replanning of blitzed 
cities should lie with the local authorities themselves. Thev had been 
very slow in putting up their proposals to him because they were so 
'nervous of taking the plunge', in spite of his consistent encouragement. 
Matthews made an angry reply claiming that the Minister's statement was 
unfair to Southampton, because the Corporation had gone 'as far ahead as 
could reasonably be done', only to be held up by the Government's 
restriction on labour and materials and by the Minister's own 
indecisiveness as to the Corporation's declaratory order and the central 
area plan. The Planning Committee decided to ask the Minister to receive 
a deputation "to clear up any misunderstandings". 30 Indeed the local 
Labour Party got so furious that they wrote in July to Silkin and to the 
National Executive Committee of the Labour Party urging that "responsible 
Ministers of the Government should refrain from making irresponsible 
statements'. They went so far as to say that, when 'it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to keep the people with the Labour Government and, 
in Southampton, with the Labour Council' because of the increasing cost 
of living, austerity, etc., they could not appreciate why the Minister 
'should go out of his way to provide political opponents with substantial 
ammunition to castigate Southampton Labour Party'. 31 Within a week of 
this letter being sent, the local Labour Party received a reply from the 
Minister, in which he wished to make it clear that what he said was not 
to be taken as criticism of the approach made by Southampton or any 
particular authority in their very heavy task of reconstruction, 
but as 
an observation in general terms. The letter also stated that the Borough 
Council would now receive his decision on the declaratory order. 
32 
This long-awaited confirmation covered approximately 270 acres out 
of 514 in the application. The excluded portions embraced the area to 
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the north of the Civic Centre (a residential area) and the Northam and 
Chapel districts (a proposed industrial area alongside River Itchen). 33 
The Ministry officials had wondered why the demarcation in the 
application appeared to have been decided in relation to Cook's plan. 
For one thing, the northern half of the area in the application would 
have been required for the northern portion of the ring road, but it was 
no longer required for this purpose in the new plan. When it came to the 
Northam and Chapel districts, war damage was not extensive enough for 
them to be included in the order. 34 The Council's reaction to the 
confirmation was one of relief. Matthews said at a Labour Party meeting 
that although the exclusion was substantial, he was 'pleased and 
satisfied' with the order after waiting eleven months since the inquiry. 
Among other things it included the whole of the area south of Commercial 
Road, 'the very important core area'. Moreover the confirmation opened 
up the way to consultation with the Ministry about necessary 
modifications to the plan for its final approval. When it came to actual 
redevelopment, however, he warned that citizens should not believe that 
the confirmation would automatically produce 'miraculous advances'. 
There were 'still many hurdles' to go, and progress would inevitably be 
'a step by step process. '35 
In August 1947 a meeting was held between the Council and the 
Ministry officials as to future action following confirmation of the 
declaratory order. Alderman Matthews wanted to obtain, first and fore- 
most, the Ministry's view of their plan, possibly their final agreement. 
The Ministry side maintained that the matter should be considered 
in the 
light of the new Planning Act of 1947, and should be 
left, for the 
moment, to discussion between the officials of the Corporation and 
the 
Ministry on detailed technical points. Assuming that agreement on 
technical points would be made as quickly as possible, much of 
the 
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discussion at the meeting fell into how best the local authority then 
could proceed with actual acquisition of land in view of the fact that it 
had to be a piecemeal process. 36 Thus in October, when the Council was 
invited to the Minister's blitzed towns conference, with a strong 
determination 'to put up a powerful case for blitzed towns to be allowed 
to go ahead, even under crisis conditions' 37 the question of the 
Minister's approval of the central area plans was not touched on at 
all. 38 
The Ministry officials had not been entirely averse to the 
Southampton Plan. For one thing, during the examination of the 
declaratory order, they appreciated highly the plan's proposed layout as 
a whole in that 'to a considerable extent the existing rod system has 
been incorporated in the new plan and the present predominant use of 
zoning has been adhered to wherever possible. ' At the same time they 
made critical observations about some important proposals in the plan. 
First of all they were concerned that the areas set aside for shopping 
and business were 'too large and too widespread'. The Council's 
intention to revive High Street as an important shopping street was 
especially questioned, and it was suggested that a large portion of it 
should in fact remain to be used for warehousing and similar purposes, 
considering the marked northward move of shopping concentrated in Above 
Bar. With regard to the new road system, it was observed that the 
construction of the western arm of the proposed inner ring road would 
require further examination with a view to confining any portion of it 
within the existing Western Esplanade. The reason for this was to 
disturb as little as possible the historic character of the area, 
especially the old town wall around the St. Michael's Square. It was 
also proposed that, instead of widening Cumberland Place and 
Brunswick 
Place to form the main east-west route, it might be advisable to widen 
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Commercial Road and to continue it eastwards even across East Park to 
join the improved Six Dials roundabout. The Ministry Officials maintained 
that this would be a more direct link for east-west traffic, and would 
result in relieving the congestion at the junction of Civic Centre Road/ 
Above Bar/New Road, the middle of the central shopping area. Another 
point they were concerned with was that the north-south route for heavy 
dock traffic (via the line of St. Andrew's Road, St. Mary's Place, 
Threefield Lane and Latimer Street) would cut an existing desirable 
residential area into two halves. 39 
However, the promised meeting between the Corporation officials and 
the MOTCP (plus the Ministry of Transport) held in September did not bear 
any particular fruit, 40 and as time went by the Council had become 
extremely impatient about the lack of official communication from the 
Ministry as to their views on the central area plan. Eventually, as a 
kind of ultimatum, the two Ministries were invited in March 1948 'to talk 
quite plainly' about their views of the plan, i. e. 'whether they could 
accept it broadly as it was, or ..., if they could not, what kind of 
revision should be undertaken'. 41 In reply, Buchanan, MOTCP official, 
first outlined generally the Ministry's present attitude towards central 
area plans, a great many of which they had examined. These general 
points he made were not only discouraging for the Council, but also very 
illustrative of the Planning Ministry's acknowledgement of a full retreat 
from bold planning. Through the examination, he explained: 
they had been gradually forced to realise 
that in considering central area plans they 
were undertaking a very much more difficult 
task than was at one time contemplated ... 
The plan of a blitzed town before destruction 
was the product of perhaps 1,000 years of 
development, and so it could hardly be 
expected that the best plan for 
reconstruction could be produced in the 
twinkling of an eye. It seemed, in fact, to 
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be impossible to arrive at the perfect plan. 
A second general point in considering central 
area plan was whether the plan got the most 
out of what was there already. 42 
When it came to technical points, the Council had to face again, as in 
November 1945, the conflicting views of two Ministries on one key issue. 
The MOTCP duly recommended extending Commercial Road straight across East 
Park as the main east-west traffic route. Against this the MOT observed 
that east-west traffic should not be taken through the park, but should 
be kept to the north of it, i. e. the Cumberland Place-Brunswick Place 
route. In the end, Corporation could not obtain an agreed recommendation 
in the matter. Other points put forward to the Council included the 
western arm of the inner ring road; the north-south route for dock 
traffic (as an alternative, the East Park Terrace/Palmerston Road/Strand/ 
Canal Walk route was suggested); and the need for economy in such 
matters as width of roads and size of traffic islands. One particular 
point appreciated by the MOTCP was that the Corporation was changing its 
mind in that too much provision for shopping, business and industrial 
purposes should not be made, as in the treatment of the High Street 
area. 43 
With these points in mind the revised plans were quickly prepared. 44 
Concessions to the Ministries' views were made by realigning the inner 
ring road so as to avoid passing through the old part of the town and by 
economising on the layout of some roads and traffic islands. At the same 
time the Planning Committee made it clear that the suggested extension of 
Commercial Road was 'wholly unacceptable', and thus the east-west traffic 
route should be the improved Cumberland Place-Brunswick Place line as 
proposed in the 1946 plan. The north-south route for heavy traffic was 
also to be unchanged. 45 Thus the revised plan did not include any 
radical change from the 1946 plan, but rather 'a refinement of 
the 1946 
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zoning by a more detailed sub-division of the areas into their respective 
use zones. '46 
In May 1948 the Borough Council considered the revised plan. The 
Ratepayers' Party made a plea, without success, to defer the matter until 
the plan had been discussed with the interests concerned, and it was 
approved by a straight party vote of 32 to 20.47 Repeated requests from 
the Central Area Association to be involved in the making up of a new 
plan had not been met, 49 and the proposals in the Comprehensive Develop- 
ment Plan for the central area under the 1947 Act, eventually submitted 
to the Ministry in 1954, 'relate closely to those in the Plan produced by 
the Council at the Declaratory Order Inquiry in 1946'. 49 However, it 
should be stressed again here that Southampton's city centre plan was by 
no means a bold one. It was primarily aimed at quick recovery of the 
existing shopping street, and at relief of traffic congestion by means 
of, inter alia, an inner ring road system based on the existing road 
layout. It was inevitable that the plan would be criticised for its lack 
of imaginative ideas, given that a great opportunity had been given by 
war damage. 5° A typical example was the Guildhall Square scheme, one of 
few bold proposals in Southampton's plan. As the Corporation's 
Development Plan in 1954 itself admitted, when the scheme was finally 
approved by the Ministry, the originally proposed width of 400 feet 
between the north and south frontages had been reduced to a mere 164.51 A 
temporary landscaping was then carried out which still survives, 
awaiting the implementation of the scheme. 
The early redevelopment of the main shopping area faced particularly 
severe criticisms. Generally, blocks of two-storey retail shops, simply 
disposed alongside the streets, had been designed as a complete set of 
units with rear access and unified treatment. First they were criticised 
for their lack of height; instead, as was pointed out, the podium of 
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the shops with tall blocks of offices or flats would have resulted in a 
better result. 52 Only quite recently, it was noted that the traders were 
'reaping the fruits of the lack of foresight and are developing the upper 
floors'. 53 This 'block development' was a product of the change of the 
Council's land purchase policy - admittedly one in effect forced by the 
Government - to avoid, wherever possible, compulsory acquisition. It was 
true that unified architectural treatment was required, and that 
developers were encouraged to combine for co-ordinated planning and 
building, and to agree wherever necessary to adjust site boundaries in 
order to achieve an improved building layout. However, the architectural 
expression was rather poor, for, as specialists criticised in 1953, the 
ultimate responsibility did not lie in the Council alone. 54 Inevitably, 
the new shops in Above Bar, even by comparison with the temporary shops 
there mainly set up by the Council, appeared 'unnecessarily 
pretentious'. 55 Somewhat ironically, it was the construction of multiple 
shops and department stores, such as Tyrell and Green, Edwin Jones, C&A 
Modes, and Plummers that offered the opportunity of producing a more 
completely integrated design than was possible in the block of shops . 56 
Overall, the case of Southampton can be described as an example of a 
timid approach in planning. Alongside the Council's obsession with 
economy and quick rehabilitation, the Government Departments were most to 
blame. The MOTCP especially were most unwilling to give authorisation to 
the local authority's plan. Points the Ministry raised were mainly 
technicalities about road layout, and the Ministry did not show any sign 
of enthusiasm to settle such minor problems and to give confidence to the 
local authority. Moreover, the Ministries concerned - the MOTCP and the 
MOT - were too often unable to see eye to eye, which was little 
help to 
the Council. In the end it seemed that economy was not even really the 
object, for whether it was modest or extravagant, the Ministry's 
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authorisation was most unlikely to happen, and the feeling that the 
replanning of the city had been dictated by Whitehall grew very strong. 5 
**** 
By contrast, Bristol's plan, a very bold one, was highly praised by 
the Planning Minister in early 1946, with his promise to give it the go 
ahead very soon. Following the public inquiry, the local authority there 
expected an early authorisation by the Ministry of the plan. 
In Bristol the prospects for actual reconstruction were as grim as 
in any other blitzed city. In July 1946 the Housing Committee complained 
that, while bricks were ready, the shortage of bricklayers was holding up 
house building. 58 It was observed that the anticipated demand for 
building labour for industrial building alone in 1946-47 would be about 
three times greater than the labour available. 59 The Housing Committee 
reported in November that there were about 19,000 applications on the 
waiting list, 60 although the completion of 1,023 temporary and 198 
permanent houses by the end of that month was regarded as not too bad, 
putting the city the fifth place on the 'temporary houses list', 
following Birmingham, Hull, Plymouth and Sheffield. 61 
When it came to the question of the city centre, the Minister gave a 
hard blow to the Council in December 1946. In confirming the declaratory 
order, the Minister made drastic modifications, designed to limit the 
land affected more closely to the area of extensive war damage - just 245 
acres out of 771 in the application. While the confirmed area included 
the Broadmead new shopping centre and the Castle Street-Wine Street 
public buildings zone, the Council's Planning Committee observed with 
alarm that the modified order did not cover the land necessary, inter 
alia, for the completion of the Inner Ring Road and the redevelopment of 
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the Park Street area. 62 As Alderman Bicker, chairman of the Committee 
said: 
The committee are disappointed, there is no 
question about that, very disappointed, at 
the Minister's decision. What has caused him 
to take that decision must be left to 
conjecture, I do not know. 63 
In fact this set the tone for the extremely hard times the Council would 
have to go through before actual redevelopment started. The PRC were at 
a loss, both about how to proceed with reconstruction work in general and 
acquisition in particular, and about whether the Ministry still 
supported their central area plan. In February 1947 the City Engineer 
had a meeting with the MOTCP and the MOT officials which lasted for more 
than six hours. He was told, inter alia, that the MOTCP were not in 
favour of the proposal to use the old shopping centre - the most valuable 
area - for public buildings rather than for buildings bringing in a 
direct return, because it would be difficult to satisfy the Treasury on 
the question of finance. They also felt that the Broadmead shopping 
centre was far too large - in their opinion an adequate plan could be 
prepared to retain the Castle Street-Wine Street area as a shopping 
centre. 64 
The MOTCP side then observed that they were extremely doubtful if 
powers for the Corporation's compulsory purchase orders with a request 
for expedited procedure would be given in the immediate future. First, 
the area of 100 acres covered by the Orders was too large: because of 
the pressure from the Treasury and of the new grant system under the 1947 
Planning Bill, the MOTCP's recent acquisition policy was that individual 
sites should be acquired by piecemeal application from time to time when 
the land became immediately needed for redevelopment. Moreover, 
if the 
Council adhered to the Broadmead shopping centre despite the 
Ministry's 
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opposition, then the proposed compulsory order for the Castle Street-Wine 
Street area for temporary shops would not work adversely, because any 
physical development of permanent shops was so unlikely for a 
considerable time, thus making it extremely difficult to transfer 
shopping activities later to Broadmead. 65 
Not surprisingly, the City Engineer's report to the PRC on this 
conference was coloured by pessimism. The MOTCP's earlier guidance 'to 
plan boldly and to take broad steps to bring land for redevelopment into 
public ownership was no longer the policy to be followed'; Treasury 
interests rather than planning interests were 'going to control any 
action that could be taken locally in the immediate future', and 'because 
of this there would be no great enthusiasm at London level to approve any 
plan for the central area at this stage, but rather to play a delaying 
action by raising point after point, each involving further research, 
further plans, and further discussions'; moreover, all the London 
representatives of the MOTCP were entirely new appointees who 'had given 
very little thought to the Bristol proposals, [and] apparently knew very 
little of Bristol local conditions, and quite frankly ... seemed to know 
very little of local government administration and requirements'. He 
thus concluded that, unless further discussions changed the Ministry's 
opinions, 'any material progress ... will be put 
in cold storage for an 
indefinite period, leaving the Planning and Reconstruction Committee with 
the hopeless job of dealing with interim development applications meeting 
by meeting with no understanding as to what is finally going to be 
approved and therefore with no certainty that the decisions they may make 
are right or wrong'. 66 
No particular progress was however made between the officials of the 
Corporation and the Ministry, and the latter insisted on holding a public 
inquiry into the two compulsory orders despite the Corporation's request 
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for expedited procedure. 67 The Corporation officers wondered why a 
further inquiry into the area covered by the confirmed declaratory order 
was necessary, only to come to the conclusion that it was due to pressure 
from the Treasury to delay the spending of the money, and to Ministerial 
opposition to the Council's proposal for the old shopping centre-68 
Several difficult decisions had to be made. First of all, should 
the PRC adhere to the original proposals for the Broadmead area and the 
Wine Street-Castle Street area? If so, the Ministry side had intimated 
that temporary shops should definitely be built on the Broadmead area and 
not the old shopping centre. Local traders, however, agreed to the new 
shopping centre on the conditions that the acquisition of the old centre 
should proceed quickly and that the latter area should be developed for 
temporary purposes. The idea of municipally-controlled temporary shops 
in the Wine Street-Castle Street area could meet the traders' second 
condition very well. If, however, the PRC would accept the Ministry's 
proposal of temporary shops in Broadmead, in view of the Ministry's 
recent policy with regard to land acquisition, the Wine Street-Castle 
Street area had to be left sterilised for a long time, unless appropriate 
temporary use other than shopping was proposed. Moreover, should such a 
situation arise, many traders might make planning appeals directly to the 
Minister against the Council's refusal of interim development, which in 
theory would only be dismissed by him on the terms that the land would be 
acquired by the local authority. Such private temporary shops could 
easily be constructed in permanent structures, thus obstructing the 
area's ultimate use. In any case the willingness of the 
interests 
concerned to support the Council's plan was 'now suffering a very 
distinct setback', being replaced by a 'mood of bewilderment and 
frustration' with 'a feeling' rife that 'there is such a complete 
lack of 
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confidence between the local planning interests and the Minister that 
nothing practical is likely to emerge for some considerable time'. 69 
The PRC, anticipating the need to abandon the Castle Street-Wine 
Street temporary shops proposal, still decided in July 1947 to adhere to 
the principle that the old shopping centre should be reserved for the 
ultimate provision of civic and semi-civic buildings. A deputation was 
also appointed, together with the local M. P. s, to wait upon the 
Minister. 70 At the meeting the Minister tried very hard to give 
encouragement to the Council. On the one hand he had to emphasise the 
difficulties surrounding himself such as the High Court appeals, Treasury 
influence and traders' appeals against the Council's refusal of interim 
development permissions. Although the Council repeatedly asked for his 
approval of the central area plan, he could not give it at present. At 
the same time he stated that on broad issues he was with the Council, and 
that with regard to the location of the shopping centre in particular, if 
the Council were determined, 'then he would bow to their view'. 71 
Overall the PRC seemed to be fairly encouraged, for, soon after the 
meeting, they decided to submit formally the central area plan to the 
Minister for his approval, and to request him to proceed with the 
proposed public inquiry into the compulsory orders. 72 In August 1947 the 
Committee decided to abandon entirely the Castle Street-Wine Street 
temporary shop proposal. Instead, temporary shops should be built on the 
Broadmead new shopping centre. The old shopping centre should then 
be 
used as a short-term source of sites for such purposes as car parking, 
temporary warehouses, offices and motor repair garages. 
73 It was 
expected that users of this area for such temporary purposes would 
bring 
in an appreciable financial return pending the time when 
the area could 
be used for more permanent purposes, and would be of considerable 
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assistance in supporting the Committee's refusal to permit shop premises 
in the area. 74 
By this time, local objections to the central area plan seemed to be 
confined to a few particular interest groups and the Council were 
confident that the majority of traders supported their p1an. 7 At first 
sight this claim looked to be justifiable. The multiple traders' 
agreement to the new shopping centre had long been known. The public 
inquiry in August 1947 into the compulsory orders reassured the PRC that 
'the traders were generally disposed to support the City Council' as to 
the Broadmead shopping centre proposal. 76 Support of the Retailers' 
Advisory Committee on Town Planning for the new shopping centre had 
gradually been restored, " and in October 1947 the Advisory Committee 
appointed a panel to discuss the layout of the Broadmead shopping centre 
with the PRC. 78 Furthermore two decisions made by the important 
interested bodies around this time worked favourably for the Council. In 
June 1947 the Chamber of Commerce decided not to proceed with its 
proposed High Court appeal against the whole declaratory order of 245 
acres, in the main due to the fear of delaying still further the 
rebuilding of the city. 79 In the same month, the Replanning Association, 
appeased by the reduced declaratory order and suffering from the tight 
financial situation, had decided to disband itself and amalgamate with 
the Civic Society. 8° 
There was, however, one particular group of traders whose persistent 
objection to the new Broadmead shopping centre proposal caused 
considerable trouble to the Council. This was the Bristol Retail 
Traders' Federation - representative of small traders - which 
had 
resigned from the Bristol Retailers Advisory Committee on Town Planning 
as the latter moved towards acceptance of the Corporation's plans' 
In 
October 1946 the Federation put forward to the PRC their alternative 
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proposal based on the Wine Street and Castle Street area -a riverside 
shopping centre with tiers of some 281 shops bounded at different levels 
by three new roads for traffic and pedestrians. 82 When the PRC rejected 
it in January 1947,83 the Federation organised a poll on the question of 
the shopping centre, which showed some 13,000 people preferred the 
reinstatement of the old shopping centre, and only 400 wished to have the 
new centre . 84 Labour, provoked to anger by this, made a strongly-worded 
public statement attacking the Federation. It read: 
The so-called poll is without any official 
sanction and can carry no weight. The slip- 
shod, inefficient and utterly undemocratic 
methods by which it is being conducted are 
reminiscent of Hitler's early efforts in 
political demagogy. e5 
The Federation held on, and in August 1947 met a sub-committee of the 
PRC. They insisted that the PRC should hold a town poll to decide the 
site of the shopping centre, only to be told by Alderman Bicker, the 
Committee's chairman, that the decision had been made and that it would 
be abided by. 86 
Meanwhile the Minister had failed to respond to either the 
Corporation's application for compulsory orders or its submission of the 
central area plan for his approval. By the spring of 1948 the feeling 
was growing that the city had had a 'raw deal' in that its reconstruction 
had been delayed in the hands of the Minister while much shopping trade 
had been lost and initiative had been discouraged. 87 A Bristol MP, W. 
Goldrick (Labour) asked Silkin if he was aware of the anxiety felt 
in the 
city at lack of progress in its reconstruction-88 In May 1948 Alderman 
Bicker, chairman of the PRC, remarked in front of Miss E. A. Sharp, 
Deputy 
Secretary of the MOTCP, that town planning 'has been a nightmare' and 
deplored the suspicion among the blitzed local authorities that others 
had found favour with the Ministry while they had 'gone away with a 
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barren bone'. 89 In fact the 
compulsory orders - for a 
area. As Alderman Bicker, 
a sudden and effective burst 
London had been defeated by 
learned that lesson'. 90 
Minister granted a token confirmation of the 
mere four and a half acres in the Broadmead 
chairman of the PRC, reminded the Council 'in 
of cynicism ... Christopher Wren's plan for 
expediency, and that - briefly - they had 
Moreover, traders became tired of waiting for the Broadmead shopping 
centre plan to materialise and increasingly anxious about the volume of 
trade going from the city to Bath. In July 1948, the Retailers Advisory 
Committee on Town Planning who had been in support of the new shopping 
centre, eventually advised all its members formerly in the wine Street- 
Castle Street area to apply at once to the Council for temporary shops. 9t 
This compelled the PRC to ask the Minister to back the Council. 92 The 
Council had refused the traders' applications for temporary shops on the 
ground that it would prejudice the development of the Broadmead shopping 
precinct. 93 The traders then made planning appeals to the Minister, 
which he dismissed one after another. It was regarded as a clear 
indication of his approval of the new shopping centre. 94 The Minister's 
refusal resulted in the traders serving notices on the Council to buy 
their land in the former shopping centre. Section 19 of the Town and 
Country Planning Act, 1947, said that an owner of land who proved to the 
Minister that refusal to allow him to develop his land had rendered it 
incapable of reasonably beneficial use could compel the Corporation to 
buy it. By July 1949 the Minister had confirmed six of 58 such notices, 
and it was expected that he would ultimately confirm the whole 
lot. 93 
Although the financial implications of the purchase of the whole area 
were considerable - it was estimated to cost about 
E5 million - the PRC 
were 'still unanimous in their belief and determination 
to go ahead with 
the Broadmead scheme', and the Council adopted the 
Committee's 
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recommendations to borrow £1.75 million in the first instance from the 
Ministry of Health towards the purchase and to use the land for a car 
park, temporary offices and warehouses, etc., but no temporary shops. 9^ 
In October 1949 the PRC decided to begin negotiations with tr. iders 
as to lease terms in the Broadmead shopping centre, 97 and in December it 
was announced that the first steel allocation from the Government would 
enable them to erect the first shop in that area, 98 which was eventually 
built by the Corporation itself and opened in 1951. Multiple shops and 
department stores such as Woolworth, Marks and Spencer, and Lewis's 
followed, and with them as magnets, individual traders as well as 
shoppers were gradually attracted to this new centre. The re-siting of 
the shopping centre was later described as 'the most radical movement of 
a shopping centre proposed in the post war years' and 'undoubtedly a 
clear success' from the planning and commercial viewpoints. 99 Some 
credit for the success should go to the Council's determination. As the 
Labour Mayor proudly claimed in 1949: 
it might have been that some weaker-minded 
councils, faced with grievous difficulties 
and frustrations, might have deviated from 
their bold plan. But we have felt it better, 
in spite of all criticism, to wait until we 
could re-develop our city in the way we 
wanted. Members of the present City Council 
are dogged pioneers, just like the Bristol 
pioneers of old. 10 0 
To Alderman Bicker, chairman of the PRC since 1945, it was a quite 
different story. As a result of the municipal elections in May 1949, the 
representation in the Council was again equal between Labour and the 
Citizen Party. '°' Consequently Labour had to drop three aldermen, and 
Bicker was one of those not renominated. 102 He reckoned that 
this 
decision revealed the Party's opinion of his 'independent' attitude and 
opposition to the Government reconstruction policy and he resigned 
from 
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the Labour party in protest. As chairman of the PRC, he went on, he had 
had every reason 'consistently to attack Whitehall' for causing delays 
and difficulties, but, 
I have had little or no support from the 
Labour members on that committee. Their 
docile attitude was to me alarming. I 
believe protests such as mine have been 
justified by the results of the recent 
council elections throughout the country. 103 
It seemed that his critical attitude towards the MOTCP and the MOT' 04 
was a bit too much for the majority of the local Labour Party who, 
admittedly patient in the town planning issues, chose to put the prime 
emphasis on housing, education and health services. '°5 Even in 1961, 
when the Broadmead shopping centre was thriving, there existed persistent 
concern among the local interests about the future of the Wine Street- 
Castle Street area which had served for the past twenty years largely as 
a car park, and the call for an outside planning consultant of national 
standing never disappeared. 106 Thus, although the Minister's dismissal 
of traders' planning appeals for temporary shops in the original shopping 
centre acted as his de facto approval of the Council's proposals, it 
clearly was not as decisive as could have been, had he granted the de 
jure approval which the Council longed for, and Silkin himself at one 
time very much wanted to give. It seemed that any approval of a city 
centre plan was out of the question. We now turn our attention to 
Coventry's plan, which the MOTCP had always wished to curtail. 
Coventry's determination to go ahead with its city centre plan 
continued after the successful public inquiry in the summer of 
1946. The 
situation was no better than that of other cities - 
the Corporation's 
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housing list had nearly 11,000 applications in April 1947,107 while the 
acute shortage of building labour force was repeatedly pointed out. 108 
Yet the Council once again quickly responded to an opportunity to 
celebrate symbolically the start of reconstruction. This time it was an 
offer in October 1946 from the Dutch National Committee to present 
flowering shrubs as an expression of the Netherlands' gratitude for their 
liberation in 1945. Although time pressed because the Dutch were 
extremely anxious that the present should be in bloom by the next summer, 
the CRC jumped at an opportunity to make a reality of the Broadgate 
garden, an island square of 212 feet by 140 feet at the top of the 
shopping precinct, which existed as yet only on paper. 109 The 
Corporation officers worked with enthusiasm11° in the face of the 
opposition from the Government Departments concerned, ''' and in May 1947 
the Dutch Embassy officially handed over 8,000 bulbs and shrubs. 
Unfortunately the garden island was still under construction at that 
time, but the ceremony left, if anything a feeling of greater expectation 
of its completion, seemingly very close at hand-'12 
A week later the city was informed that the Minister would confirm 
the declaratory order. The local reaction to this news reflected the 
hopes and confidence so far raised in the city centre plan after the war. 
Even though it had taken nearly a year since the public inquiry, 113 and 
had been reduced from 452 acres to 274,114 the Council were, as the Town 
Clerk put it, 'highly pleased with the outcome of years of negotiations 
with Government departments'. The fact that the order covered the core 
area including the shopping, business and civic centres, was regarded as 
'The City's Charter of Reconstruction' in that 'the "Dream City" of 
Coventry, which up to now has been a matter of drawing-board plans 
executed by Town Planning experts will, after all be translated 
into 
bricks and mortar'. 115 The right-wing Standard, agreeing 
that there 
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should be 'no physical handicap to the building of the modern city 
visualised by idealists', also re-affirmed (as they did at the public 
inquiry of 1946): 
In some respects it will mean a serious and 
maybe unpalatable infringement on the rights 
of private business and individual desires, 
but it is impossible to conceive a new 
Coventry without this concession being made 
to communal development. 116 
In May 1948 the Broadgate garden was completed and Princess Elizabeth 
came down to the city to lay the foundation stone of the shopping 
precinct. As she observed at the opening ceremony: 
if the spirit which the citizens of Coventry 
showed on the night of November 14th, 1940, 
can be reborn in the hearts of our people to- 
day, then we shall indeed see the fruits of 
peace. They will be far richer and far more 
plentiful than we have found the fruits of 
victory to be. ... The old Broadgate was the 
heart of Coventry, and, as is usual with 
things we have always known, I am sure you 
had a great affection for it. But in this 
century new and prosperous industries have 
found their homes in Coventry, and the town 
had outgrown its ancient centre. I hope that 
before many years I shall come back to this 
place where we now stand to find a new 
Broadgate, as fine as modern taste and 
craftsmanship can build it, and worthy of the 
great city of which it will be the centre. 
... Let us be sure that 
in ourselves, and in 
the personal effort which the times demand 
from each one of us, there is to be found the 
same spirit of enterprise which is rebuilding 
Coventry and the other towns of Great Britain 
a spirit alive to the great opportunities of 
our day. l17 
As the CET put it, 'Royal recognition to Coventry's post-war achievements 
and aspirations' was thus given by her. "" 
Around this time the Council decided to make a start on the 
first 
phase of actual reconstruction in the shopping precinct. 
The 
construction of five blocks was proposed on the understanding 
that the 
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main prospective tenants were to act as the developers, to whom leases 
would then be offered by the Council. The City Architect was given final 
authority on the application to individual buildings of the designs, 
elevations and materials. At the same time the Council reserved the 
power to develop themselves in cases of difficulties. 119 As negotiations 
with the developers went by, various difficulties indeed arose. 12° In 
the case of 'Block B' for instance, development companies would not agree 
to build a connecting bridge over Hertford Street, which the Council 
regarded as an architectural feature of prime importance, and in the end 
they decided to build it themselves. '21 In May 1949, the CRC authorised 
the compulsory purchase of land to form the first instalment of the 
College of Adult Education, a building the MOTCP had thought least 
necessary. 122 
It should be noted, however, that behind the firmly established 
general approval of the city centre plan, the assertion of the civil 
servants that it should be drastically modified died hard. For one thing 
they never took to the 'lavish scale' of the civic centre; it was 'out 
of proportion for the stated number and type of public buildings to be 
erected and wholly disproportionate to other uses within the central 
area', leaving a strong concern about the 'financial implications of such 
an extensive use of highly valued land'. What was more, they maintained 
that the inner ring road should contain only specifically central area 
wedges. In this respect, the western section of the proposed alignment 
was 'too wedded to the idea of achieving a ring. 123 Instead, it should 
follow the existing Queen Victoria Road so as to tightly circumscribe the 
shopping precinct, and until this matter had been settled between the 
Corporation and the MOT, the general approval of the central area uses, 
which the Council repeatedly requested, was out of the question. 
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The Council argued that the Queen Victoria Road line would set too 
rigid a western limit to 
shopping street, having 
shopping precinct and of 
values to the street in 
opinion that they could 
ment between the MOTCP 
the central area uses. 
in mind possibilities o 
the consequent shifting 
question. 125 Moreover, 
not settle the question 
and the local authority 
It was planned as a main 
f future expansion of the 
of the precinct's higher 
the MOT had been of the 
in the absence of agree- 
as to the central area 
uses, 126 an argument which was, as one MOTCP official put it, 'liable to 
get us nowhere'. 127 Eventually in May 1949 the Ministry agreed that if 
there were shops in Queen Victoria Road and if they were essential, then 
it could not be used as part of the inner ring road, and thus the 
Council's proposed alignment had to be accepted. To the Council's 
further satisfaction the MOTCP at last decided to give approval to the 
central area plan, 'so that Coventry could have some confidence that in 
proceeding with redevelopment they were on the right lines. '128 
In July 1949 the Council received a letter stating that the Minister 
agreed that their plan for the part within the proposed inner ring road 
should be accepted as the basis for redevelopment. '29 As Hodgkinson put 
it, they were 'glad' because 'some of the hesitations which might have 
marked our progress will disappear ... knowing that the Minister gives 
full approval' of 'the ambitious programme which Coventry has set for 
itself'. They were not, however, at all carried away at this news. As 
he went on: 'We must move forward step by step to avoid the financial 
problem which might arise if we were to take too big a bite at the task 
at one time'. 130 
While his comment shows generally how difficult the first phase of 
city centre redevelopment after the war had been, what was not stressed 
(or probably not realised) by him was that Coventry was almost certainly 
the only city to obtain the Minister's formal approval of the city centre 
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plan before the construction of permanent buildings commenced at the end 
of the 1940s. It was an extremely difficult time for any blitzed town; 
the Ministry officials were most reluctant to give any sort of approval 
of a plan. To Coventry, however, it seemed to be the case that the 
battle with the Ministry was already over by the end of the war, leaving 
the city with the conviction that they had made enough concessions, and 
with the experience of how to get on with civil servants in this 
difficult task of planning. The Council knew where they should start the 
actual redevelopment in accordance with the Minister's policy - shopping 
facilities and commercial enterprise. 131 While a comparatively smooth 
relationship with the Ministry thus existed in terms of the replanning of 
the shopping centre, 132 the Council took every opportunity to highlight 
the general public support for the city centre plan as a whole, which 
culminated in the visit of the Princess in May 1948, confirming the 
impression that there was no turning back. Under this situation the 
Minister's approval of the plan was inevitable. 
As the implementation of the bold plan gradually took shape, is 
boldness was again praised as 'a feather in Coventry's cap'. 133 The 
buildings built by the Corporation itself - including the problematical 
'Block B' and the public buildings in the civic centre - were regarded as 
architecturally the most interesting buildings. 134 Reviews by specialists 
in the early 1960s, after the sharp change in architectural fashion and 
standard, were still favourable to Coventry. 13° Commercially the shopping 
precinct became a great success, especially with the advent of the 
multiples in the mid 1950s, such as Woolworths, Marks & Spencer, Owen 
Owen, and the British Home Stores. '36 There, Gibson's original 
idea of a 
traffic free precinct was restored thanks to his no less enthusiastic 
successor, Arthur Ling. 137 A dream city, envisaged by imaginative and 
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devoted planners and whole-heartedly supported by local leaders and the 
general public through difficult times, carried the day in this way over 
the restraints on economy and modesty imposed by the central authority. 
Credit was thus given where it was due. 
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CHAPTER X 
Conclusion 
War created both opportunities for, and obstacles to, city centre 
replanning. By comparing the experience of Bristol, Coventry and 
Southampton it has been possible to throw some light on these 
contradictory effects of the war. While all three Councils recognised 
that the bombing had given a golden opportunity for comprehensive 
replanning, their initial responses differed strikingly. 
Coventry took the swiftest action. Established within a fortnight 
of the November 1940 blitz, the City Redevelopment Committee sent a 
deputation to Lord Reith in January 1941. He told them to plan boldly. 
In March 1941 the City Council rejected a rather conservative plan 
proposed by the City Engineer, in favour of an imaginative one prepared 
by D. Gibson, the young City Architect. The sheer speed of the Council's 
action showed their determination - especially that of George Hodgkinson, 
Labour and Council leader who initiated the deputation - to grab the 
opportunity and make the best of it. The city was further inspired by 
the nationwide publicity given to the plan, because it became a symbol of 
post-war reconstruction in general. At the same time the ideas in the 
plan were not produced on the spur of the moment. Discussion about a new 
city centre had been going on within and outside the Council before 
the 
outbreak of war. Gibson and the staff in his department had produced an 
impressive model, a prototype of the 1941 plan, which 
had already 
attracted considerable attention before the 1940 blitz. 
In Southampton the Ratepayers' Party - with a majority on 
the 
Council - was in favour of a quick restoration of 
the heavily damaged 
main shopping area. The loss of rateable value was certainly 
appalling. 
Councillor Matthews, deputy leader of labour, was anxious to prevent 
rash 
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action. First, the town's future had to be thought of in a wider context 
rather than merely aiming at a swift recovery of trade. Its industrial 
prospect was a vital question, which had to be seen both from a regional 
and a national point of view. Secondly the Council's inadequate planning 
machinery had to be thoroughly strengthened and good brains should be 
brought in from outside as consultants. In these respects his efforts 
bore fruit fairly rapidly. An independent department and committee for 
planning had been set up by early 1942, while the Council, on the advice 
of Lord Reith, decided in August 1941 to employ Professor Adshead as 
planning consultant. In February 1942 Adshead and H. T. Cook, newly 
promoted Town Planning Officer, through the backing of Matthews, 
submitted their joint plan to the Council. 
Bristol City Council's approach to the replanning of the city centre 
was very different. First of all they denied press reports in early 1941 
that Lord Reith had told them to prepare a bold plan. Instead they 
stressed the need for a preliminary survey, despite the pressure from 
those interests who wished to get down to the job immediately. Moreover, 
shaping the machinery for this task took a long time. The Planning and 
Reconstruction Committee was set up in December 1942, and it was not 
until February 1943 that the ultimate responsibility for the preparation 
of a city centre plan was given to H. M. Webb, the City Engineer. At the 
same time particular emphasis was placed on the team work of the officers 
concerned, and any replanning proposals were considered through 
the 
'Conference of officers' system set up in August 1941. The plan 
for the 
city centre was finally submitted to the city Council 
in March 1944. 
The plans adopted by the Councils during the war proposed 
drastic 
solutions to the problems of the respective city centres - 
traffic 
congestion, mixed usage, and the lack of social amenities 
or focal points 
of public life. An inner ring road would divert through 
traffic from the 
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central core, which would be divided into sections according to function, 
so as to avoid the entanglement of the various users. Both in Bristol 
and Coventry the existing main shopping streets were to be replaced by a 
traffic-free shopping precinct, while in Southampton the second shopping 
centre, a shopping promenade, was proposed at the intersection of main 
traffic routes. In Bristol the existing main shopping streets were to be 
reserved for public purposes; in Coventry a civic centre was envisaged 
combining administrative, cultural and educational buildings; and in 
Southampton the new shopping promenade and the existing civic centre 
would constitute the town centre, a focal point of public life. In these 
plans the planners were not too concerned about the existing layout or 
possible costs. The important underlying assumptions were that the 
defects in the central area would be cured only by drastic surgery, and 
that the Government would, as Lord Reith promised, do their utmost to 
facilitate it. 
**** 
These bold proposals, however, provoked opposition both from local 
interests and from the Ministries concerned. The three Councils reacted 
to this opposition in very different ways. In Southampton traaers were 
particularly critical of the shopping promenade because it would be too 
competitive with the existing main shopping street. The ministry of 
Transport also objected because it would be dangerous to pedestrians. 
The 
Council, controlled by a coalition of conservatives and 
liberals, was 
receptive to these criticisms. The idea was abandoned 
in the revised 
plan of February 1943, which put prime emphasis on the 
improvement of the 
existing main shopping street. The offer of Adshead 
to continue his 
service as a consultant was turned down by the Council 
in January 1943. 
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In Bristol the Council, equally represented by Labour and the 
Citizen Party, took pains to conciliate the local interests concerned. 
On the initiative of the Chamber of Commerce a Replanning Association was 
formed as early as February 1941 with a view to being directly involved 
in the replanning process. It included not only traders but also 
architects who had established reputations in the field. This body had 
considerable influence. Extensive consultation took place between the 
local authority and interested parties about various replanning 
proposals. The most controversial point was that the existing main 
shopping area based on Castle Street and Wine Street was to be reserved 
as a public open space, and to be replaced by a new shopping centre at 
Broadmead. Fierce objections were raised and the Council made a 
compromise to provide temporary shops in the Castle Street and Wine 
Street area and to schedule it as an area for public buildings rather 
than an open space. At the same time the Council adhered to its original 
proposal for a new shopping centre. They stood resolute against 
opponents who wished to re-establish the old shopping centre. It should 
also be noted that the requests for the co-option of outside members onto 
the Council's Planning Committee and for the employment of an outside 
planning consultant on the Corporation staff were successfully resisted. 
The opposition of traders to the city centre plan did not cause 
Coventry City Council much concern at first. In fact the Council 
did not 
bother to discuss the plan with them for a long time because, as they 
argued, it was already adopted and waiting for the Ministry's approval. 
The Ministry, however, turned out to be the Council's most 
formidable 
opponent. Whitehall's criticisms were twofold. First, the plan was 
made 
up in undue haste and there was a serious lack of consultation 
between 
the local authority and the interests concerned. 
Secondly, certain 
proposals, especially the shopping precinct and 
the civic centre, were 
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too imaginative to be brought into effect. The Ministry soon found that 
the Town Clerk was also rather hostile to Gibson's city centre plan. k'itr: 
his cooperation, immense pressure was placed on the Council to start 
consultation and to modify the plan on more modest lines. The pressure 
worked to some extent, and in early 1944 a meeting was held for the first 
time between the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce to discuss the 
scheme, especially focusing on the proposals for the shopping centre. The 
Chamber maintained that the shopping centre should be constituted of the 
main shopping streets with traffic rather than a traffic-free precinct, 
wiping out the existing layout. The Council made some compromises: that 
the precinct should apply to a limited portion of the whole shopping 
frontages; and that a traffic route should be allowed to intersect the 
precinct. But the Council insisted on the principle of a precinct, 
especially with regard to the Smithford Street area, the city's principal 
shopping street, and it claimed that the demands of the retailing 
interests had been sufficiently met by these compromises. Although the 
Ministry wished to curtail what they saw as another extravagant proposal 
- the civic centre - the Council never let them take the offensive in 
this matter. 
In putting pressure on Coventry, the Ministry had to keep a low 
profile. In face of the call for swift and positive action by the 
Government, its response was very slow and evasive, causing doubts as to 
the genuineness of its early encouragement to plan boldly. 
Expert 
opinions were, as the fate of the Ministry's Panels showed, not utilised 
as much as had been initially expected. Decisions as to a central 
planning authority and the legislation for built-up areas were 
delayed 
and, when made, increasingly limited in scope and nature. 
Although the 
Ministry, especially its officials, always maintained 
that the Coventry 
plan lacked public support, and wished to curtail 
its boldness on the 
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ground of practicability, their attack had to be made behind the scenes. 
Even the Town Clerk, cat's paw of the Ministry, reported that the clan 
actually enjoyed substantial support among the citizens. It would be 
very embarrassing to the Ministry if, by criticising Coventry's plan 
explicitly, the impression was confirmed within and outside Coventry tht 
the Ministry and the Government were really trying to suppress the 
blitzed authorities' aspirations. 
By contrast, progress in Southampton was on lines quite acceptable 
from the Ministry's point of view. The local authority employed a 
consultant in the preparation of a plan, discussed it with the interests 
and Ministries concerned, and modified it in order to meet criticism. 
Moreover, consideration in a wider context - among other things the 
town's industrial future - was given by Councillor Matthews' Nuffield 
Reconstruction Survey. 
The rather pessimistic conclusion of this survey made him opt at the 
end of the war for a new plan prepared by the Borough Engineer who put 
prime emphasis on the economy and practicability of the plan, and thus, 
on the full use of the existing layout. Following this retreat from bold 
planning, the local Labour Party concentrated on the quick restoration of 
the town's main shopping street and the municipal ownership of land in 
the central area which was detested by local traders and the opposition 
party. Labour won the 1945 municipal elections, and the new plan was 
adopted by the Council in March 1946. H. T. Cook, Town Planning Officer, 
resigned from his office and soon joined an opposition organisation, 
the 
Central Area Association, set up in April 1946. The case of Bristol 
did 
not present serious problems to the Ministry during the war, 
partly 
because the plan appeared very late, but in the main 
due to the extensive 
consultation between the local authority and the interests concerned, 
and 
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to the absence of any political conflict among Councillors or the 
Corporation officials. 
The first important phase of city centre redevelopment after the war 
consisted of public inquiries into local authority applications for 
municipal acquisition of war-damaged areas under the Town and Country 
Planning Act, 1944. The plans were regarded as supporting evidence for 
such acquisition. In practice it was thought that these inquiries held 
in 1946 would be a last opportunity to lodge objection to these plans. 
Generally, the Councils managed to defend their plans. This was 
primarily because the substance of objections - mainly from the vested 
interests - was related to the local authority's acquisition of private 
property. However, this principle had been established by the Coalition 
Government in the 1944 Planning Act, and thus had very little to do with 
the Councils. The argument that the plans should not be accepted because 
of the objection to the acquisition based on them was, therefore, easily 
ruled out by the Councils. The three Councils - all of which were now 
controlled by Labour - expected that substantial and swift progress would 
be made in city centre redevelopment under the Labour Government. But 
for the new planning minister, Lewis Silkin, it was becoming more and 
more difficult to meet such high expectations. Economic consideration now 
played a vital role in the country's reconstruction work, and priority 
had to be given to certain essential items in the context of the acute 
shortage of necessary building labour and materials. City 
Centre 
redevelopment had to give way, for one thing, to the provision of 
houses 
and schools. Consequently, Silkin (who was not a member of 
the Cabinet) 
had to cut down considerably the scope of municipal acquisitio:, 
of land - 
the foundation work for city centre redevelopment largely 
due to Treasury 
pressure. Subsequently, the country's worsened economic situation 
from 
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the summer of 1947 brought to a virtual end any Possibility of an actual 
start on the execution of the city centre plans. 
This gloomy prospect was all the more reason why the blitzed 
authorities with their plans already drawn up needed the Minister's 
approval of them. In Southampton there was some strong feeling among 
those who had not been consulted at all during the process of drawing up 
the new plan. In Bristol, the opposition of some traders to the re- 
siting of the shopping centre died hard or became even more obdurate, 
despite the fact that the plan had been highly praised by Silkin on his 
visit to the city in early 1946. In order to clear up any objections to 
their plans and uncertainties and doubts as to their practicability, and 
thus, to commence the actual redevelopment with confidence as soon as 
circumstances permitted, nothing could be more persuasive than the 
Minister's formal authorisation. 
Silkin, however, emphasising how important it was to start planning 
under the new Planning Act of 1947, looked as if he was shelving the 
consideration of these advanced cases, i. e. the plans awaiting his formal 
approval. Apart from economic considerations which had to be obeyed, 
there were some other reasons for his rather cautious attitude. The 
enthusiasm surrounding city centre replanning in the early years of the 
war had gradually been withering away. The mode was now 'first things 
first'. The most essential thing in the field of physical planning 
should be better houses for all, but not necessarily ultra modern centres 
for the blitzed cities, which sounded something of a luxury. 
In this 
sense the question of city centres had become a victim of what 
the Labour 
Government pursued most vigorously - fair shares, or a more egalitarian 
society - explicitly shown in their efforts to create 
the welfare state. 
There was also a marked tendency among Ministry officials, 
most of 
whom were newcomers after the war and thus somewhat 
ignorant of the 
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authorities' early efforts, to sit on the fence when considering local 
authorities' replanning proposals. They admitted unashamedly that they 
were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task. Thus even in the case of 
Southampton, whose plan was no longer a bold one, the Ministry officials 
were never able to pass judgement, and remained stuck in detailed 
technical matters, often confusing the situation by disagreeing with the 
officials of the Ministry of Transport. In the case of Bristol, the 
civil servants were critical of the new shopping centre proposals, and 
yet never lent themselves earnestly to helping the local authority who 
were battling with the fierce opposition of some traders and therefore in 
desperate need of formal approval. Not surprisingly, the relationship 
between the Ministry and these local authorities became rather tense and 
not a little hostile. 
Given the situation and the climate of the time, the fact that 
Coventry obtained the Ministry's approval of its city centre plan in 1949 
was perhaps surprising. The Ministry wished to consider plans under the 
1947 Planning Act, rather than the 1944 Act confined to war-damaged 
areas, so that every plan should be placed on the same footing, whether 
the areas covered by it had been blitzed or not. These plans generally 
appeared in the early 1950s and it took several further years before the 
Ministry's approval was given to them. In other words, when the 
construction of new permanent buildings started at the end of the 1940s 
in the three cities, only Coventry was doing the job with the authorised 
plan, and thus could be confident that they were moving in the right 
direction. What accounted for this approval? First, the wide attention 
and the unique status the city had enjoyed as the first city that 
prepared a plan for the future immediately after the 
blitz. The 
Ministry, with their first Minister's legendary encouragement to 
Coventry 
to plan boldly, could not put decisive pressure on Coventry 
in trying to 
257 
curtail the city plan's more imaginative features. Secondly, the City 
Council had actually gained experience and confidence through the harder 
times - especially in the battle with the Ministry - since the plan was 
first made public in 1941. Bristol and Southampton were bitter in their 
expression of the unfair treatment meted out to the bombed cities and 
their anger, disappointment, and distrust of the Ministry after the war, 
while the opposition from local interests was still smouldering, and 
often got inflamed. Coventry no longer put the blame on the Government. 
Instead, once the war was over, Coventry Council took every opportunity 
to explain to the public that the plan had met all relevant criticisms. 
A public exhibition and ceremonies to mark the start of the plan's 
implementation were organised, attracting wide and sympathetic attention. 
The general recognition of the city centre plan thus became an 
accomplished fact. In Bristol and Southampton the local authorities were 
content with claiming that their plans should be supported, simply 
because they were approved by the elected representatives of the people. 
This argument, however, turned out not to be substantial enough to 
convince the Ministry. As demonstrated in the case of Coventry during 
the war, the Ministry officials were very sensitive to the political 
repercussions of city centre replanning. Their criticisms of any plan 
were therefore subject to the level of public support for it. But 
it 
could be argued that in fact ordinary people were rather 
indifferent. 
They were very concerned about housing, jobs and welfare - subjects which 
were more directly tangible, and tended to dominate controversy 
during 
the municipal elections. Whereas the blitz had been 
directly experienced 
by the people, a paper plan for the future city centre 
felt rather remote 
to them. It was very technical, and was, as shown 
in the local 
authorities' consultation process and the public 
inquiries in 1946, an 
affair for vested interests and those with specialised 
knowledge. What 
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was needed to arouse public interest was, therefore, to get people out to 
see what the plan entailed and to start its implementation, as was done 
in Coventry. 
**** 
As this study has demonstrated, the difficulty lay in how to reach 
consensus out of diversified views of the post-war world and opinions as 
to how it should be re-made. Differences existed even among the Council 
officials, which often worked adversely to rapid progress. At the same 
time it was the restive reaction to drastic changes that set the pace of 
the decision-making process. All three cities suffered opposition from 
the propertied and retailing interests and the timid"tr of the Ministry. 
Southampton exemplified the case most clearly. They sacrificed the 
original plan with progressive ideas prepared by planning experts to the 
quick restoration of trade. The fact that Labour had to concentrate on 
the land acquisition issue in the municipal elections shows how 
influential the opposition views were. Bristol approached replanning 
with deliberate steps, especially in terms of extensive consultation with 
the main interested parties. Yet when the plan was forwarded to the 
Ministry, no final judgement was passed on it - merely a hint of 
scepticism. To these two cities, planning became a nightmare, something 
which had to be dictated by Whitehall. 
In this sense the efforts of Coventry to obtain public support 
should be appreciated. From the beginning the Council was 
determined to 
grab the opportunity for replanning provided by the blitz. 
At the same 
time the case of Coventry poses a question whether the 
blitz, and the 
war, actually provided the optimum circumstances for the replanning 
of 
city centres. It certainly did in destroying the otherwise 
untouchable 
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entanglement of buildings, and in attracting attention to the hitherto 
neglected problems there. 
The opportunity, however, seemed to come too suddenly. For one 
thing, there was not yet a firm enough foundation for positive 
consideration, and acceptance, of drastic changes proposed by town 
planning experts. The thoughts of the Government, especially civil 
servants, were coloured by conventions. The public were deeply absorbed 
in daily struggles and more mundane worries during and after the war. 
They were unlikely to commit themselves on such highly technical 
questions and they certainly would not do so unless they were fully 
informed and given an opportunity for serious participation in city 
centre replanning. However, neither the professional organisations 
associated with town planning nor the local authorities (except Coventry) 
made any particular efforts to involve the public. The experts' belief 
in technocracy and the local authorities' belief that they represented 
the public were, therefore, rather complacent. 
Moreover, the war gave rise to too many reconstruction problems, 
which induced the Government to exert the strongest influence of a 
restrictive nature in the replanning process. In view of the strictly 
limited resources, and of the ever deteriorating economic situation of 
the country in the 1940s, it was essential to make priorities among the 
many problems. Labour put prime emphasis on the export drive - even 
if 
it might do harm to the ideal of balanced industrial development - and on 
the creation of a welfare state in accordance with 
its 'fair shares' 
philosophy. The implementation of the Beveridge Report became 
the litmus 
test for the Government's achievement, and later attracted the warmest 
approval of the public. At the same time city centre redevelopment 
had 
to be brought to a standstill. At this point the 
Ministry's approval of 
260 
their plans became all the more important to the blitzed authorities, 
but, among others, civil servants were least prepared to do so. 
It is thus obvious that the case of Coventry was quite an 
exceptional one, which seemed to enhance the impression that the blitz 
provided a millennial opportunity. The local authority's efforts to 
involve the public as far as possible should be counted to their credit. 
At the same time the lack of consultation with the local interests in the 
earlier years could have caused serious problems had there been as 
influential a representative organisation of those interests as in the 
case of Bristol. In terms of industrial development after the war 
Coventry Council had very little say. Coventry were expected to, and 
did, continue to expand as an important engineering city, which complied 
with Government post-war policy especially in the context of the export 
drive and then of Korean war rearmament. This in effect exempted the 
Council from taking the industrial future into consideration, in contrast 
to Southampton where fears that the city's economic base would be 
insufficient to sustain a bold plan for the city centre came to play an 
important part. 
At the same time, because of the pressure from Whitehall to enhance 
Coventry's existing industrial base, the city inevitably failed to 
diversify its industrial structure, or to control its population size. 
Ironically, Southampton continued its industrial expansion mainly 
due to 
the growth of new developments in industries such as oil refining, 
telephone and cables, and the construction of light commercial vehicles. 
There was no coherent national planning in the 
1940s. City centre 
replanning proceeded largely independently of other considerations 
in 
reconstruction work. The decision making process 
involved a three-way 
negotiation between local authorities, local vested 
interests, and the 
Central Government. Generally the local public played 
little part in the 
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process, and tended, in any case, to be indifferent to the question. 
the time the war was over the high priority previously given to the 
question of city centre planning had disappeared, and it continued to 
suffer setbacks in the difficult post-war economic situation. The war, 
it seems, created as many obstacles to comprehensive replanning of the 
city centres as it provided opportunities, before a more firmt-, 
established consensus for the need for such replanning could be made. 
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